DOI: 10.7256/2454-065X.2019.2.27133

Abstract: The subject of the research is the tax control over transfer pricing under the conditions of international tax competition. The object of the research is the conditions for the development of Profit Centers and Investment Centers that will contribute to the consolidation of the taxable base in Russia. The author of the article emphasizes that the main target of tax control over transfer fpricing is the timely detection of the violation of the 'reach out' principle. To eliminate the negative consequences and tax losses of the national budget, the author of the article offers a new paradigm of tax control over transfer pricing that can be used under the conditions of international tax competition. Using econometric and statistical research methods, in this article Grundell provides the results of his research of criterial components that influence the development of Profit Centers under particular tax jurisdiction, he also analyzes integral financial economic indicators. The novelty of the research is caused by the fact that the author's model of assessment indicators used to evaluate efficiency of the development of Profit Centers in Russia under the conditions of international tax competition gives a new approach to tax control over transfer pricing and determination of the price market level for negotiation analysis. The author's special contribution to the topic is that as a result of the SWOT-analysis, the author has calculated the yearly average-weighted influence of all indicators  on the development of Profit Centers in Russia. Thus, the author concludes that if favorable conditions for the indicators of the development of Profit Centers are created in the Russian Federation, multinational corporations will try to create Profit Centers and Investment Centers in Russia which will contribute to the repatriation of the taxable base and new approaches to simplified control over transfer pricing. 

Keywords: investment indicators, macroeconomic indicators, business regulation assessment indicators, tax control of pricing, profit centers, transfer pricing, international tax competition, innovative development, multinational corporations, integral criterial components

DOI: 10.7256/2454-065X.2020.4.33228

Abstract: The subject of this research is the transfer-pricing rules applied in various countries, their peculiarities and flaws from the standpoint of approach to taxation of transnational corporations overall; as well as practical issues of implementation of transfer-pricing rules for transnational corporations and fiscal authorities, namely the problems of avoidance of taxation by the representatives of transnational corporations and ambiguity of the applied approaches towards regulation. The author examines differences in the rules applied by various jurisdictions, as well as law enforcement problems emerging thereof. Relevance of the topic is substantiated by high significance of transfer-pricing rules for taxation of transnational corporations, as well as the need for ensuring universality in international taxation. The main conclusions lie in determination of substantial ambiguity in the transfer-pricing riles, associated with the lack of information on comparable transaction in the available information systems, as well as assessment of rules with regards to each individual situation. The mechanism employed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation, aimed ate elimination of flaws in transfer-pricing rules, such as consensual procedure, are expensive and often ineffective for transnational corporations. Therefore, elimination of dual taxation is achieved only in some situations. Differences of legislation on transfer pricing in various jurisdictions can also lead to dual taxation of transnational corporations. Moreover, the “arm’s length” principle do not allow reflecting synergetic effects that emerge in the context of activity of transnational corporation, and thus, definition of taxation base within the framework of acting transfer-pricing rules is incomplete.

Keywords: international taxation, tax planning, related party transactions, controlled transactions, arm’s length principle, transfer pricing, MNE taxation, transfer prices, double taxation, tax avoidance

Abstract: The preset article provides an analysis of one of the main functions of price adjustment for taxation purposes in transactions between interdependent parties. It is the marketing which can actually allow to avoid notices from a federal executive body authorized to conduct control and supervision in the sphere of taxes and levies.

Keywords: marketing, party, organization, market price, policy, interacted, persons, functions.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-065X.2014.1.10964

Abstract:

DOI: 10.7256/2454-065X.2014.1.63983

Abstract: Right after Section V.1 of the Tax Code came into force, it was viewed as a considerable loosening of tax control over price formation. If read literally, the section sets forth that the control over price formation can be performed only by the Federal Tax Service of Russia and only when major transactions between related parties are involved (so called ‘related-party transactions). However, at the end of 2012 there appeared new interpretations of the legal provisions contained in Section V.1 as offered by the Ministry of Finances of Russia. Those interpretations did not only level down the legal rebates provided for taxpayers, but even put taxpayers into worse conditions compared to when Articles 20 and 40 of the Tax Code were effective. In her research the author of the article uses the method of comparative law analysis. She also analyzes the arguments supporting official interpretations of the provisions of Section V.1 of the Tax Code and concludes that these interpretations do not correspond to the actual law. However, it is the author’s opinion that we should not read the Section V.1 of the Tax Code literally because it would give related parties many chances to avoid paying taxes. Based on the results of her analysis, the author makes suggestions on how to improve the existing legislation and eliminate contradictions between the Tax Code provisions and law enforcement practice.

Keywords: taxes, taxation, Tax Code, transfer prices, tax administration, control over price formation, related-party transactions, related parties, compensating adjustment, pricing agreement.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-065X.2013.6.62998

Abstract: The present article describes theoretical grounds and principles of formation of transfer price of a group of interdependent parties taking into account the possibility of correcting the transfer price to the level of market prices in order to avoid additional taxation charges from the federal executive bodies carrying out control and supervision in the sphere of taxes and levies. It is noted that transfer price formation is quite popular in Russia. At the same time, there is no clear description of the process of price formation and composition of the final price. The author also analyzes methods used by tax authorities for defining whether the price of the deal matches the market prices taking into account particular features of activities performed by the companies which control these deals. Moreover, the author also describes certain consequences of additionally charged taxes such as compensating adjustments and specification of tax liabilities in relation to the budget.

Keywords: tax, transfer, price, interdependent, parties, additional charge, methods, profitability, control, market.