Ideological and political evolution of the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany in 1920-1922

Lysenko Maksim Postgraduate Student, Department of Modern and Contemporary History, Faculty of History, Lomonosov Moscow State University 119991, Russia, Moscow, Leninskie Gory str., 1 maximus-lysenko@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The problem of ideological and political evolution occupies a central place in the history of social movements and modern left-wing parties in Germany. In the conditions of the XX century, characterized by the growth of imperialism, the splits of the labor movement, two world wars and an intersystem conflict, the socialists had to revisit their concepts more than once. A striking example of this was the NSDPG. After the revolutionary boom of 1918-1919 and the departure from the party of supporters of the scenario of the October Revolution in Germany in 1920, the independents remained on the positions of classical pre-war socialism, entering into confrontation with the new left currents, i.e. with radical communism and reformist social democracy. However, the period from 1920 to 1922, against the background of the new political realities of the Weimar Republic, was marked not by the flourishing, but by the extinction of the NSDPG, which was expressed in ideological shifts within the party and ultimately in unification with the SPD.

Researchers, retrospectively assessing the successes of the left-wing organizations of the Weimar Republic, turned little to the failed history of the independents. This attitude can be explained by the short time of the party's existence – only 5 years. In the works devoted directly to the NSDPG, historians either singled out communist parties in the party. ^[1],[2],[3], or social-democratic ^[4] traits, depending on political preferences, or indicated the organizational failure of the organization ^{[4],[5],[6],[7]}. Moreover, scientists generally agreed that the death of the "third way" occurred in the first three years of the party's existence due to the loss of its revolutionary potential. The time interval from 1920 to 1922 was superficially considered in research as a natural convergence of the NSDPG and the SPD.

The state of scientific research on this topic determines the novelty of this article. The aim of the work was to study the ideological and political evolution of the NSDPG in the period from 1920 to 1922. This approach made it possible to reveal that the independents after the split of 1920 could still offer an alternative option for the development of the labor movement, and the unification with the SPD in 1922 was primarily the result of ideological changes in the party. Of course, the ideological and political transformation could not be considered in a vacuum, since it was the events taking place and the practical decisions of the independents that had a great influence on it.

The article used typical sources for this topic. First of all, it is the party press: the NSDPG newspaper "Freiheit" ^[8] and, as an auxiliary, the SPD newspaper "Forverts" ^[9]. The press organs of the socialist parties were open to various discussions, so it was possible to find discussions of important theoretical and practical issues in them. This also includes essays by the prominent socialist figure K. Kautsky ^[10],[11] which played the role of open letters published in the same party press. An important source was the transcripts of the congresses and the programs adopted at them ^{[12],[13],[14],[15],[16]}, which made it possible to establish the ideological orientation of the party and to identify their compatibility and incompatibility with practical solutions. Additionally, the memoirs of contemporaries V. Dittman ^[17] and K. Geyer ^[18] were used, as well as publications of works, essays, speeches and personal letters of P. Levi ^[19],[20].

The First World War had a tremendous impact on many spheres of society, including the party and political system of Germany. Social democracy did not stand aside either. The parties of the Second International, who so staunchly protested against military preparations before 1914, abandoned the class struggle with the outbreak of the war and supported the tactics of class peace and the defense of their countries. Within the SPD, in contrast to the party majority, a group stood out that did not support the course of the leadership and opposed military loans. Finally, the Social Democrats were split in March 1916, when a minority of the SPD faction led by party chairman G. Haase voted against the military budget, and on April 6-7, 1917, the NSDPG was created in the People's House in Gotha.

The formation of the party was a natural process. In political terms, this was a manifestation of conservatism, when a group of politicians maintains the old ideological course and does not accept innovations. Independents adopted the democratic component of their program from the mother party – they also opposed violent actions that could lead to civil war. The dividing line between the fraternal parties was the attitude towards socialist internationalism. After the actual dissolution of the Second International with the outbreak of war, the SPD reoriented itself from the international cooperation of workers' organizations to solving the problems of the proletariat within only one country. Independents opposed the new strategy and thereby expressed orthodox socialist principles that were the norm for workers' parties until 1914. In this regard, the parties had different views on the exercise of power. The Social Democrats were actively involved in coalition games and cooperated with non-socialist forces. The priority direction of the SPD policy was the creation of a democratic parliamentary republic, while the NSDPG demanded the creation of a "social republic" where all branches of government would be subordinate to the Soviets ^{[21, c, 135]}. It is worth noting that the Social Democrats were still more numerous and more successful than the independents. Thus, in the elections to the National Assembly on January 19, 1919, the former collected 37.9% of the votes and received 163 seats in the Reichstag, while the latter only 7.6% and 22 seats ^{[21, c, 252]}.

At the same time, the creation of the NSDPG was a controversial event. On the one hand, the protest image caused a large influx of socialists who did not accept the conformism of the SPD. The popularity of the party led to success in the Reichstag elections in 1920: the Social Democrats received only 21.9% of the vote and 103 seats, while the Independents received 18.6% and 83 seats ^{[21, c, 350]}. On the other hand, the revolutionary upheavals of 1917-1918 also attracted radicalized elements to the party, to whom the democratic traditions of social democracy were alien. The experience of the October Revolution and the corresponding scenario of actions in the emerging left wing of the NSDPG were of great importance. The unity of the party was preserved due to two factors. Firstly, the general rejection of the course of the SPD. Secondly, the popularity of the party chairman G. Haase, who tried to find a compromise between the wings ^{[21, c, 252]}.

In an effort to overcome the differences between supporters who tended to extra-parliamentary activities and democratically minded independents, the Leipzig Program was created in 1919. She recorded that the Soviet system was the only form of transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat ^{[16, p. 532]}. In this case, the Parliament as an organ of the struggle for the power of the workers was losing its significance. At the same time, moderate independents managed to preserve the provision on the rejection of "any violent actions of groups or individuals" ^{[16, p. 534]}. Thus, the confrontation between the supporters of parliamentarism and the policy of active actions took such forms that incompatible principles of the exercise of power were fixed in the program. It is not surprising that the appearance of the Comintern, whose ideas appealed to the left wing, and its "21 conditions", which clearly did not suit the right wing, led to the split of the NSDPG in October 1920 and the outflow of slightly more than half of all independents to the Communist Party of Germany.

Of the 894,000 members of the NSDPG, 340 thousand people remained, which was only 38% of the previous number ^{[7, p. 263]}. 61 out of 81 people remained in the faction, which still retained the third largest Reichstag for the party ^{[17, p. 797]}. In addition, the independents retained the Freiheit central press, most of the local newspapers and trade unions. After the split, democratic elements remained in the NSDPG, which allowed the leadership to pursue the previous balanced strategy. Like the Social Democrats, they recognized that the dictatorship of the proletariat could not be imposed by a minority of society, so its construction had to be a process, not a one-time action. However, in the NSDPG, unlike the SPD, the Soviet system still played a key role.

The revolution in the form in which it was understood by the German Communists for both the SPD and the NSDPG was not an end in itself. However, there was a difference between the Social Democrats and independents in the retrospective assessment of the November Revolution. The Weimar Republic was still alien to the latter, since its system did not mean true democracy: "Until political freedom is followed by economic freedom, there will be no real democracy" ^{[14, p. 3]}. The criticism of the Independents towards the Social Democrats was precisely to slow down revolutionary reforms, such as the nationalization of industry or the replacement of former imperial officials. It was the conviction that the Social Democrats deliberately prevented the creation of a socialist state that united the rest of the NSDPG. It also determined a half-hearted attitude towards Weimar democracy and crisis situations in the country. Thus, the Social Democrats were a state-forming party, and the Independents were oppositional and anti–systemic.

The new political conjuncture meant that the party had to fight "against opportunism on the right and against putschism on the left" ^{[15, p. 273]}, i.e. against the SPD and the significantly strengthened KKE. The problem of the relationship between the socialist parties and the Communists was a different approach to how the proletariat was to come to power in an already existing state. The position of the NSDPG after the split was initially predisposed to the views of the Social Democrats, i.e. "revolutionary socialism" in essence meant a process in which representatives of the working class sought to gain a majority in parliament. However, the methods of the SPD in cooperation with liberal parties, according to independents, led to "the destruction of unity in the class struggle" ^[22].  The Russian version of the revolution, which was promoted by the KKE, was evaluated by the NSDPG no more than "the unbridling of fratricidal war" ^{[10, p. 217]}. Thus, the party has set itself a fairly rigid framework of behavior both in the Reichstag and beyond.   

         The main problem of promoting its agenda for the NSDPG was domestic political crises. Already in the spring of 1921, as various threats to the existing system of the Weimar Republic grew, the party was literally thrown from among its ideological dogmas to solve purely practical problems. So, in May, the NSDPG advocated the fulfillment of the London ultimatum, i.e. the demands of the Entente countries to accept new obligations for reparations payments within 6 days under the threat of occupation of the Ruhr region. It is worth emphasizing that the independents previously categorically rejected the policy of execution, placing responsibility for the "peace treaty and its destructive consequences" on the "bourgeoisie" ^[23]. Moreover, the new minority ruling coalition under the leadership of Chancellor Y. Virta began to rely on independents on this issue ^{[24, p. 127]}. This decision was justified by the "imminent catastrophe" of the German workers in the event of a rejection of the London conditions ^[23]. At the same time, it certainly demonstrated the rapid reorientation of the party after the split. The ideological program, which brought class antagonism to the fore, faded into the background, giving way to problems of the stability of the parliamentary system. It followed from this that the NSDPG ceased to be an anti-system party.

Another challenge was the murder by ultra-right organizations of the independent K. Garais on June 9, 1921, and then one of the main architects of the Weimar Republic from the Party of the Center M. Erzberger on August 26 of the same year. These events led to joint peaceful demonstrations of the NSDPG and the SPD on August 31 ^{[21, p. 437]}. However, there was no need to talk about close cooperation between the parties - in ideological terms, they were still impenetrable to each other. If the independents appealed to the fact that the interaction of socialists was to lead to the creation of a "united proletarian front" ^[25] and a "truly socialist society", then the Social Democrats advocated "unity of Republicans and Democrats against reaction" ^[26]. The former differences between the approaches of the socialist parties were vividly demonstrated here. The SPD, being in the ruling coalition, made its statements from the position of the all-German Democratic Party, while the NSDPG remained ideologically conservative in this regard.

 Despite the difference between the positions of the Social Democrats and independents, the "impending monarchical counter-revolution" ^[27] involuntarily brought the socialist parties closer together. The question of the NSDPG joining the coalition was raised by the Social Democrats at cabinet meetings with full seriousness. G. Muller (SPD) expressed the opinion that positive changes were taking place among independents that would make them "come to their senses and do everything in the interests of the government" ^{[28, p. 256]}. The NSPDG, in turn, showed a principled position. Although the defense of the republic became an integral part of its policy, class doctrine proved to be more important for it. The party did not demand the formation of a socialist cabinet, but offered in an open letter to the Social Democrats its conditions under which the entry of the NSDPG into the coalition would be possible. They included the nationalization of the mining industry, the continuation of social reforms, the policy of executing the London ultimatum, the creation of a jury based on universal secret and direct elections, as well as the dismissal of officials expressing monarchical views ^[29]. Of course, the liberal parties of the coalition rejected this proposal.

The above events led to an internal party crisis from the autumn of 1921 to the summer of 1922. His first reason was that the NSDPG, despite its ideological program, was increasingly involved in a coalition game with non-socialist forces. The behavior of the independents demonstrated a clear indifference to the viability of Weimar democracy. The party finally lost its revolutionary aura and operated within the parliamentary framework, where the interests of the workers were also represented by the more numerous SPD.

The second reason was the self-isolation of the party in such conditions. The NSDPG still tried to preserve the image of an exclusively workers' party and ignored the existence of other political forces and their views on the protection of the republic. The rigid ideological framework and the conviction that only socialist reforms can fix the situation in the country pushed the coalition parties and, together with them, the Social Democrats away from the independents. At the same time, the categorical nature of the NSDPG's demands did not correspond to its real capabilities to influence the decisions of the Reichstag, so the party had no opportunity to cooperate with anyone.

 The third reason was connected with the Gerlitz program of the SPD in the fall of 1921. Its content suggested that the independents' calculations for the return of all left-wing parties to pre-war socialism had no grounds. Now the Social Democrats declared the meaning of their party's existence not to build socialism as such, but to defend the democratic republic: "It [SPD- M.L.] considers the democratic republic as an irrevocably approved form of government as a result of historical development" ^{[30, p. 4]}. The adoption of this program was considered a victory for revisionists in the party ^{[21, c. 447]}. In addition to the point of commitment to the republic, which is not in the programs of the KKE and the NSDPG, the Social Democrats put forward the thesis of protecting "the workers of the city and the countryside" ^{[30, p. 3]}, thereby further distancing themselves from orthodox socialism. Thus, the SPD outlined a new bar to which the independents had to strive in their coalition compromises. In the prevailing political realities in the NSDPG, the problem of self-identification has again become acute.

At the Leipzig Congress in January 1922, the leaders of the Independents attempted to return the party to the path of uncompromising class struggle as opposed to the idea of "class harmony" of the SPD ^{[13, 27-28]}. In fact, the statements of the NSDPG leadership were a break with the policy of the united front of the socialist parties and a direct confrontation with the SPD. In turn, the party left itself room for maneuver: "The NSDPG can temporarily support the government if it does not act to the detriment of the working class, and if it applies measures to protect the republic and combat the monarchist reaction" ^{[13, 27-28]}. This provision demonstrated the obvious inconsistency of the course of the independents.

The key change in the party's policy was that it focused less and less on the system of councils, as a result of which extra-parliamentary activity (not counting demonstrations) was minimized, and the parliamentary struggle became the main field of action for the party. A significant factor in this issue was the position of trade unions that did not welcome extra-parliamentary actions ^{[13, p. 108]}. Thus, the Leipzig Program of 1922 outwardly looked like a return to the provisions of 1919, but, in fact, it was no longer such. The revolutionism of the NSDPG consisted only in the recognition of class antagonism, while practical activity focused on the parliament.

             Inconsistency in the course of the party leadership caused corresponding consequences. Since January 1922, opposition has been emerging in the NSDPG. It can be divided into two groups. The first represented those independents who expressed an opinion or were even ready to cooperate with other political forces in order to resolve the problematic situation. Among this group, it is worth highlighting the editor-in-chief of "Freiheit" R. Hilferding. The second group differed from the first in that it generally ignored the coalition issue and relied on the denial of further confrontation with the SPD. Prominent representatives of this position were K. Kautsky, P. Levy and K. Geyer. Generally speaking, the oppositionists were on the right flank of the NSDPG and opposed the policy pursued by the leadership. The term "opposition" in this case has a relative character and is radically different from the opposition before 1920. Firstly, its main claims were beyond ideological disputes and concerned primarily the practical policy of independents. Secondly, it did not try to become autonomous within the party and had an unorganized character, and, as a result, did not aim to break away from the party or oppose itself to the leadership.

The first group of oppositionists can include those people who demonstrated disagreement with the leadership on tactical issues. In choosing between "being a true workers' party" and "being a decision-making party", they were inclined to choose the latter. A striking example of the opposition that appeared in the NSDPG was the vote of confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers. Wirth on February 15, 1922, caused by disputes over repressive measures against strikers. Despite the faction's decision to vote against the decisions of the ruling coalition ^{[31, p. 5884]}, 26 deputies did not vote at all. It was about a violation of party discipline and a scandal that immediately spread to all newspapers. More than a third of the faction expressed that "the fall of the government at that moment would lead to the creation of a right–wing cabinet that would not just influence questions about measures [in relation to strikers - M.L.], but also on the whole domestic policy" ^[32]. This example demonstrated that the majority of independents still supported the party's rigid ideological course, while the minority began to think more pragmatically ^{[31, p. 5886]}. For the 26 NSDPG deputies, it was much more important to maintain the stability of the coalition than to conform to the ideological image.

This decision was supported by R. Hilferding. The editor-in-chief of the printed party organ "Freiheit" came into conflict with the leadership of the party, as a result of which the entire leadership of the newspaper resigned in full. He believed that for the working class at that time, foreign policy issues were of great importance, since the Wirth cabinet contributed to detente in relations with the Entente. In his opinion, the dissolution of the government would bring to power the right-wing forces of Germany, whose actions would cause conflict with France and England.: "A government influenced by right-wing parties would make Poincare's position extremely strong and would inflate nationalism on both sides. This is contrary to the interests not only of the German, but also of all socialist parties" ^[33]. In other words, R. Hilferding's position demonstrated that the problems of the working class could be solved not by dogmatic class agitation, but directly by governing the republic, which could improve the situation of the proletariat: "The assumption of a situation where we can effectively represent the interests of the proletariat in the government for a while, even if it is not purely socialist - point a point of view that is represented in broad circles of the party" ^[33].

At the local level, the conflict between representatives of exclusively labor politics and supporters of inclusion in the coalition game has acquired the same features. Deputy from the NSDPG G. Weil came down with harsh criticism of the magistrate of the city of Berlin for raising taxes. This episode would have gone unnoticed if the independent had not particularly scolded his fellow party members who were members of this body, P. Brull and V. Shyuning ^[34]. This example demonstrated that the supporters of the policy of execution were not so numerous in Berlin, so P. Bruhl and V. Schuning were criticized for "agreeing" with the liberals. This episode would not have been worthy of attention if these politicians had not soon switched to the SPD. In addition, Bruhl was at that time a deputy of the Reichstag.

The second group of oppositionists ignored the coalition issue in principle. It was much more important for her to unite the fragmented labor movement at any cost, so they reacted negatively to the attempts of the leadership to oppose the NSDPG to the Social Democrats. The already mentioned P. Levy and K. Geyer, having joined the NSDPG in the spring of 1922, directed their efforts to unite their party with the SPD ^{[18, p. 290]}. These political figures were united by active work in the KKE, which they left in the fall of 1921. The putschist methods of "revolutionism" promoted by the German Communists and the Comintern caused them great disappointment. Both P. Levy and K. Geyer came from the pre-war SPD, so the idea of a revolution where the people, and not a limited group of people, should make a change of power, was important for them. These figures did not perceive the half-hearted policy of the NSDPG leadership as viable. Obviously, independents could not be revolutionaries as long as the KKE exists.

P. Levy in March-April 1922 published an article in his magazine "Unzer Weg", in which he already argued not about how possible the unification of the NSDPG and the SPD is, but about how they should unite. His opinion was based on the principle that there could be only one force in parliament that could defend workers' interests. P. Levy believed that only the tactics proposed by the SPD could "politically" ^{[20, p. 165]} solve the issues of the labor movement, therefore he did not consider the NSDPG and its policy of "parliamentarism" on-revolutionary"" seriously ^{[19, p. 1098]}. In turn, the most prominent socialist K. Kautsky accused the independents of trying not to unite the labor movement with their agitation, but to divide the right-wing Social Democrats. The politician still saw in the NSDPG only dissenters who are not capable of uniting workers, despite the assurances of the leadership: "Unfortunately, the vitality of the party is based not on its own successes, but on the mistakes of its opponents. When the opponents stopped making big mistakes, the growth of the NSDPG stopped" ^{[11, p. 16]}. K. Kautsky's opinion coincided with P. Levy's views - the field of activity of both socialist parties was in parliament. The SPD was able to influence the development of the Weimar Republic, while the actions of the NSDPG proved unproductive against its background.

These examples demonstrated that the continued existence of the party was connected with the issue of adaptation to the new conditions of the German political system. The ideological program not only did not work, but was not executed by the NSDPG itself. The independents, no longer possessing revolutionary potential, continued to talk about "revolutionary socialism" from the rostrums of the Reichstag, while having absolutely no leverage or sufficient influence to promote their program of action. Against the background of the obvious stagnation in the party, more and more supporters of inclusion in the coalition game appeared, who saw the senselessness of confrontation with the SPD. The existence of the KKE on the left flank pushed the field of action of the NSDPG closer and closer to the parliamentary struggle, where only the Social Democrats turned out to be the closest partner.

All researchers agree that the assassination of Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau on June 24, 1922 was a turning point in the fate of the NSDPG. Given the ongoing process of ideological and political reorientation in the party, this event was only a trigger, but not at all the main reason for the unification of socialists. In the new conditions, the independents tactically approached the Social Democrats, and the division between them took place only in the coalition issue. On July 14, 1922, the factions of the socialist parties announced the creation of a single working group with the aim of forming a single proletarian front and promoting a common political agenda ^[35]. Despite the fact that this did not yet mean the unification process, this rapprochement demonstrated that the previous relationship between the NSDPG and the SPD was impossible.

If until the summer of 1922 the NSDPG made temporary exceptions from its program, then after that one of the party leaders A. Crispin put forward a strategy that was no different from the strategy of the right-wing Socialists: "A purely workers' government is possible only when the proletariat is strong enough to take over power, and only then will the decisive battle begin" ^[35]. This quote was a litmus test determining how far the NSDPG is from its uncompromising tactics. In other words, the independents shifted from the initial demand of a purely socialist cabinet to fairly flexible policy options, temporarily abandoning, in fact, their principle of class antagonism. The construction of socialism was postponed indefinitely, when the workers in the republic would be able to assume sole power.

During August, a common program of action of the two socialist parties was being worked out. The finished draft was published on September 6, 1922, and in mid-September separate party congresses were held to discuss it. The Joint Action program demonstrated that the SPD was compromising on theoretical issues. Thus, there was a return of the rhetoric of the Erfurt Program of 1875, in which the terms "class struggle" and "revolution" appeared in the central place. But there were still differences in the interpretations of the socialist parties. The right-wing Social Democrats saw in this concept, first of all, the construction of a classless society without the use of aggressive forms of activity: "Revolution has nothing to do with violence. <...> Once rooted in the masses, the idea of a democratic revolution will become indisputable, as will the idea of a social revolution" ^{[12, p. 68]}. In other words, the class struggle for the right-wing Social Democrats had the same meaning as in the Gerlitz program ^{[30, p. 197]}.

Independents, however, remained more radical in their views: "Realizing that reconciliation of classes is impossible, and that a coalition is just a temporary merger with bourgeois parties, which still remain masters of their independent decisions, he [socialist – M.L.] can at any moment start fighting against all bourgeois parties again" ^{[13, p. 134]}. The class struggle in this interpretation implied that there could be only one winner, whereas the right-wing Social Democrats' idea of class harmony did not imply "enmity" in principle. For Independents, the term "class struggle" still consisted of constant class antagonism, while the Social Democrats regarded it as a struggle to overcome class contradictions. Thus, the preamble itself, which spoke of "obtaining political power" and "implementing the idea of socialism in the class struggle" had discrepancies. Probably, both sides were aware of this fact, but the return of pre-war rhetoric suited the NSDPG as fighters for workers' rights, and the SPD as "builders" of a classless society. Thus, from an ideological point of view, a compromise was reached between the parties.

In tactical matters, the leadership was obviously on the side of the Social Democrats. First of all, the program assumed the refusal of independents from striving for a system of soviets. Although this idea slowly died out during 1920-1922, the lack of discussion about its fate and its complete absence in the final document drew a line under the anti-systemic past of the NSDPG. This step was the key moment in the division of the labor movement into reformist and revolutionary wings. This was also facilitated by the obvious change in the NSDPG of the goals of the struggle, which shifted towards the salvation of the republic. In this regard, there was complete agreement between the socialists, so the new program included the protection of the "starting point for building socialism" ^[38], i.e. the republic.

Weimar democracy became the main tool for promoting workers' interests and mainly concerned the struggle against extreme right-wing elements: "This policy requires the governments of all lands to remove all supporters of the monarchy in the police and administration" ^[36]. The dominance of the Social Democrats on tactical issues was explained by the fact that the Independents for the period from 1920-1922 had already deviated quite a lot from their program of action towards the defense of the republic. Moreover, a consensus was reached between the NSDPG and the SPD in June on the fight against right-wing forces.

*    *    *

When analyzing the ideological and political evolution of independents after 1920, the question of the viability of the party acquired a different meaning. In 1918, for the first time in history, German socialists could directly participate in the governance of the state, which caused profound changes both from an ideological and practical point of view. The SPD quickly refocused on the role of the all-German party, while the NSDPG remained on the positions of pre-war socialism.  This was the uniqueness of the "third way". But the old socialist doctrine did not fit well into the realities of the Weimar Republic. After 1920, the protest revolutionary potential was on the side of the KKE, and in parliament it was necessary to show ideological flexibility in order to reach a compromise solution.

The merger of the socialist parties indicated that theoretical discussions ceased to be a key moment. The political system of the Weimar Republic and the position of socialists in it dictated the conditions under which the solution of primary tasks was of greater importance. Ideological attitudes in this sense have become an ideological guideline or ideal, rather than a clear program of action. The dogmatism of the independents did not contribute to the implementation of their tasks.  It was precisely the conditions new to socialist thought that prevented the NSDPG from remaining a viable party.

The unification of socialists also meant the organizational extinction of orthodox socialism, but not the extinction of the ideological current. Former independents and left-wing Social Democrats had the opportunity to influence the decisions of the entire party more. Thus, only about 84 thousand people did not transfer from the NSDPG to the united party, and in the Reichstag faction, consisting of 171 people, 67 seats belonged to former independents ^{[21, p. 497]}. The dilemma between the role of the opposition and the government party has now affected the entire social democracy. Thus, the so-called "Grand Coalition" became an increasingly urgent problem, in which the field-oriented United Social Democratic Party and the right-liberal German National Party had to get along. The left wing of the Social Democrats showed great resistance in the implementation of this idea. The issue of cooperation with non-socialist parties and the search for consensus with them was a red thread through the crisis of 1923, when one part of the united Social Democrats directed their efforts to get the party back into government, while the other stubbornly resisted it ^{[24, p. 207]}. The influence of the left wing was also acutely felt in the "German October" of 1923, when an attempt was made to cooperate the United Social Democratic Party of Germany with the Communists in Saxony and Thuringia. This behavior could be explained by the echo of the independents' policy, in which the creation of a united front of left-wing parties was preferable to a coalition with the liberals.

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