The problem of creative imagination. Kantian and Schellingian concepts of productive imagination as an epistemological and ontological source of creativity

Kachay Il'ya Sergeevich Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Siberian Federal University 660041, Russia, Krasnoyarskii krai, g. Krasnoyarsk, pr. Svobodnyi, 82A, aud. 428 monaco-24-Ilya@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Petrov Mikhail Aleksandrovich PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Siberian Federal University 660041, Russia, Krasnoyarskii krai, g. Krasnoyarsk, pr. Svobodnyi, 82A, aud. 428 mipet@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

Consciousness as the highest form of reflection of objective reality by the subject, as the inner spiritual world of emotions, cognitions and images is characterized not only by the ability to preserve, generalize and interpret information about the laws of natural and socio-cultural reality, but also to form new, unique, original, inimitable integral images of objects of reality based on the internal transformation of sensitive, cognitive, emotional, behavioral and social experience through imagination. Indeed, creative imagination in its essence significantly expands the possibilities and boundaries of the subject's consciousness, since it not only uses images of the past, but also allows you to design (and subsequently actively embody in reality) a potential future. In addition, imagination, being an integral human potency, actively participates in the processes of cognition, helping the subject to flexibly interpret reality and creatively transform information received from the outside world into knowledge loaded with personal meanings, which allows a person to create his own reality in a certain sense.

In this regard, imagination (unfolding in the teachings of I. Kant from an epistemological point of view), developed and reinterpreted by F.W.J. Schelling (highlighting the ontological register of this ability), are still relevant concepts for revealing the essence of imagination as the fundamental basis of both creative activity and conscious human existence as a whole. Without any doubt, these thinkers were not the discoverers of the desired human potency. Plato also claimed imagination as an immanent memory of the soul's ability to generate images, and Aristotle interpreted it as an intermediary element between sensory perception and discursive thinking. R. Descartes thought of imagination as the ability to reproduce and combine sensory images and rationally comprehend them, and T. Hobbes and G.V. Leibniz considered imagination to be the most important element of learning. Nevertheless, it is through the prism of the Kantian and Schellingian teachings, in our opinion, that the nature and potencies of the creative imagination unfold in the most full-fledged and justified form, and therefore are of particular interest for revealing the ontological and epistemological orientation of creativity.

Conceptual differentiation of imagination and fantasy

Analyzing the nature of the phenomenon of creative imagination, one cannot ignore the tendency to identify the category of imagination with the concept of fantasy among many representatives of various areas of both philosophical and psychological science. However, it is important to understand that if imagination resurrects fragments of empirical reality in consciousness and creates unique and original images based on their creative synthesis and productive transformation, then fantasy is just fiction, speculation and "premeditation" that cannot be realized in reality. Even being an element of imagination, fantasy, unlike the first one, does not have the possibility of in–depth knowledge of the world and the potency of transforming reality, but is in most cases a way of satisfying unrealized needs or even a variant of escapism - escape from reality into the world of dreams or illusions. It is not for nothing that the Russian psychologist and philosopher S.L. Rubinstein pointed out the danger of reducing imagination, capable of transforming things, to the level of fruitless fantasy, depending on external factors and appearing as a kind of veil from reality.

Indeed, unlike fantasy, imagination has vivid epistemological potentials that are revealed in facilitating the processes of cognition and self-knowledge of the subject. The epistemological nature of imagination, in particular, is indicated by the triad of stages of imagination development highlighted by the French psychologist T. Ribot. If at the first (children's) stage imagination manifests itself through games and fantasies and does not yet carry cognitive value, then in the context of the second (adolescent) and third (adult) stages imagination acquires an increasing epistemological load and is increasingly intertwined with the mechanisms of cognition development. The cognitive foundation of imagination can also be traced in the views of the American psychologist J. Guilford, who identifies imagination with the so-called divergent thinking as the ability to polyvector search for different solutions to problems. So, the epistemological rootedness of imagination unfolds in its potentials of creative assimilation of information and deepening of knowledge about the world, mental transformation of reality within the framework of a cognitive act, as well as a holistic understanding of the subject's own existential-personal space and the inner world of Another.

Specificity and ontological and epistemological foundations of creative imagination

Before directly identifying the ontological and epistemological determinants of productive imagination in the context of the conceptual constructions of I. Kant and F.W.J. Schelling, it is advisable to briefly consider the differentiation of imagination into various types and forms present in the modern research space. Thus, if involuntary imagination is characterized by the spontaneous emergence and unconscious transformation of images under the influence of affects, then arbitrary imagination implies the active conscious generation of new images and subsequent activities for their practical implementation in reality. In turn, if reproductive imagination is the formation of images through the reconstruction of fragments of previously imprinted reality in consciousness, then productive (creative) imagination is alien to this kind of mechanistic cognitive reconstruction, because this form of imagination is distinguished by the creation of fundamentally and qualitatively new, unique and original images that have no analogues in objective reality. At the same time, it should be particularly noted that productive imagination a priori cannot be completely subordinated to purely conscious processes, since it is largely determined by irrational and unconscious determinants, including non-logical intuition in its essence and insight in its nature. One way or another, productive imagination, as will be shown by the examples of Kantian and Schellingian concepts, appears as an epistemological and ontological foundation of creativity.

The importance of the ontological and epistemological aspects of creative imagination and creativity in general is emphasized by many modern foreign researchers in the field of creativity and creative thinking. In particular, M. Peshl and T. Fundneider postulate the interweaving of creativity into the cognitive process, defined by the authors as the process of creating new knowledge, intented for the future, because "what needs to appear is more important than the recombination of already existing knowledge structures" ^{[18, p. 17]}. I. Likata and G. Minati point to the epistemological orientation of the creative act itself, justifying creativity as the ability to create new extraordinary cognitive strategies necessary to overcome subject-object relations in the context of scientific research ^{[16, p. 103]}. M. Baumtrog asserts the unified ontological foundations of the creative act and critical thinking, stating that "critical thinking is not only a thorough analysis of existing conclusions and arguments, but also ingenuity, creativity and imagination" ^{[14, p. 147]}. Imagination as an ontological source of creativity is postulated by R. Gottlieb, E. Hyde, M. Immordino-Young and S. Kaufman, distinguishing between socio-emotive and temporary imagination, the first of which is revealed as the ability to deploy a variety of social scenarios and comprehend one's own identity (which reflects the ontological hypostasis of creative imagination), and the second is defined as the ability of mental creativity that journeys into the future (which reveals the imagination in its epistemological dimension) ^{[15, p. 709]}. However, for a deeper understanding of the ontological and epistemological foundations of creative imagination, one should turn to the direct study of the concepts of I. Kant and F.W.J. Schelling. 

Epistemological aspect of imagination: Kantian concept of productive imagination as cognitive ability

The greatest contribution to the understanding of the nature of productive imagination was made by I. Kant, presenting the latter as the most important cognitive ability of the subject and thereby placing the problem of imagination in the epistemological plane. Indeed, the ability of imagination, according to Kant, acts as the foundation of human experience, perception and cognition in general. The very process of cognition in Kant's teaching, as is known, is revealed as a process of synthesis of sensuality and reason, the first of which is blind without reason, and the second is empty without sensuality. Productive imagination plays the role of a link between sensuality and reason and ensures their organic synthesis. In this regard, I.P. Farman points out that productive imagination performs "the function of systematization, not only in the field of sensory-intellectual activity, but also in theoretical cognition, contributing to the systematicity and unity of cognition as a whole" ^{[8, p. 173]}.

It should be noted that productive imagination is revealed by the philosopher in anthropological and transcendental semantic contexts. In the first of them, the desired ability is actually identified with fantasy and, as V.V. Vasiliev notes, "has no creative functions, in the sense that a person is unable to represent "simple ideas" that were not previously given in sensation" ^{[1, p. 31]}. Considering Kant's concept of productive imagination in an anthropological way, M. Heidegger also states that "the productive formation of the ability of imagination is not "creative" even in the sense that it would form the content of the image simply from nothing, i.e. from never and nowhere else experienced" ^{[10, p. 69]}. Productive imagination from a transcendental point of view is justified by Kant as the basis for the synthesis of active reason and passive sensuality. At the same time, this kind of transcendental imagination, which carries out its activities on the other side of consciousness and reflection, performs its productive function precisely because of its a priori nature, since it precedes any experience.

So, synthesizing representations on an empirical level and combining them in consciousness, productive imagination, according to Kant, literally forms the perception of the subject. At the rational stage, the ability of imagination is revealed in the aspect of transmitting the principles of reason to objects of sensory experience through schematism, which gives the world of phenomena a law-like form. Thus, it is through transcendence that Kant explains the mechanisms of interaction between sensuality and rationality in the aspect of the realization of a priori synthetic cognition, where imagination acts as a hybrid ability to identify and synthesize the basic functions of sensory and rational cognition. In this regard, K. Fischer draws attention to the fact that the productive abilities of imagination (as empirical reproduction or connection), "by virtue of which synthesis occurs, are transcendental, because they condition or create objects of experience" ^{[9, pp. 4783-4784]}. Indeed, productive imagination is not at all limited to the act of reproduction, because, as Kant writes in the Critique of Pure Reason, "in addition to receptivity to impressions, something else is required, namely the function of synthesizing impressions," which is performed by productive imagination, designed to "reduce the diverse content of contemplation into one image" ^{[7, pp. 857, 856-857]}.

In his Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, Kant justifies productive imagination from an aesthetic standpoint and unfolds the idea that through the creative ability of imagination it is possible to "revive the soul, opening to it an endless field of related ideas" ^{[6, p. 189]}, which allow us to see more than can be expressed in a concept defined by words. In other words, through the creative function of productive imagination, genius is able to reveal to the world new aesthetic patterns, which, as L. notes. Ostarik, are presented to the observer as not conditioned by anything, and therefore are regarded by him as original ^{[17, p. 75]}. However, in "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view" Kant writes that "productive imagination ... is not creative, i.e. capable of generating such a sensory representation, which has never been given to our sensory ability before" ^{[5, p. 403]}. The seemingly paradoxical thesis of Kant is explained by A.V. Gulyga, who believes that in this case it is not so much about creativity as the generation of the new, as about creativity in the Kantian sense of the word: "Imagination operates only with the material of sensuality, without creating anything anew. Imagination can be productive, creative, but not creative" ^{[2, p. 37]}.

Thus, the productive capacity of imagination in Kant's philosophy appears as a fundamental prerequisite for the very possibility of cognition and acts as a transcendental bridge between sensuality and reason. The product of this kind of imagination, according to the philosopher, is a transcendental scheme that mediates "between the image and the concept" and is "a representation of the general way in which imagination delivers the image to the concept" ^{[7, p. 247]}. At the same time, it should be emphasized that transcendental schematism, which ensures the unity of sensuality and reason, determines the possibility of realizing the process of cognition not in the mainstream of naive mechanicism, but in the context of autonomous transcendental creativity: "Since the ability of imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also call it the productive ability of imagination and thereby distinguish it from the reproductive ability of imagination, the synthesis of which is subject only to empirical laws, namely the laws of association, as a result of which it does not contribute at all to explaining the possibility of a priori knowledge" ^{[7, pp. 224-225]}.

The ontological aspect of imagination: the Schellingian concept of productive imagination as the spiritualization of the material world

Unlike Kant, who endows productive imagination with the function of a transcendental bridge between sensuality and reason and thereby justifies the desired ability in the epistemological channel, F.W.J. Schelling understands productive imagination as a link between the theoretical and practical and reveals this ability as an undetermined supreme potency of the subject, acting as a formative for existing being, which illustrates the ontological rootedness of imagination. If at the early stage of his work Schelling de facto identifies imagination with fruitless fantasy, then later the thinker significantly changes his attitude to imagination, defining it as the ability of creative individualization, as "the ability through which the ideal is at the same time the real, the soul is the body", as "the ability of reunion, on which in fact, all creativity is based" ^{[13, p. 85]}.

However, the ontological determinant of creative imagination is most fully developed in Schelling's postulation of the divine imagination, which acts as a source of the diversity of existence and, therefore, ontologically prevails over the desired human ability. Indeed, if the imagination of the subject manifests its creative intentions in giving material things an ideal reality, then the divine imagination directly constitutes both the real (through the transformation of the infinite into the finite) and the ideal (through the transformation of the finite into the infinite) being, and also ensures their identity. In this regard, the imagination of the subject, as N.A. Ilyinova writes, is "a way of the free inner intention of human thinking to reveal the unity of all that exists as an objective reality of the self-conscious Absolute, God" ^{[4, p. 95]}.

Thus, the activity of the human imagination in the context of Schelling's philosophical quest is the ability to outpace reality in some way, which, according to the views of A.V. Gulyga, "is in the middle between our ability to know and the ability to realize" ^{[3, p. 80]}. In this respect, the divine imagination "eliminates this soaring of the imagination, through which it vainly tries to connect the unity of nature with all-completeness and all-completeness with unity" ^{[11, pp. 40-41]}. Nevertheless, the creative imagination of the subject is revealed by Schelling as a true and boundless inner reality, in the space of which the possibility turns into reality, and a discrete point unfolds into infinity. Moreover, the images of imagination, according to the philosopher, form significant relationships among themselves, around which an individual history is established, claiming the status of objectivity, since, "reflected in the human imagination, the universe is recreated as a fantasy world, the general law of which is absoluteness in limitation" ^{[13, p. 93]}.

In addition, at a certain stage of his philosophical creativity, Schelling differentiates imagination and fantasy in more detail, recognizing the potency of conception and formation of art products for the former and interpreting the latter as external contemplation, extraction and image of art products from himself. The philosopher also draws the ontological structure of productive imagination, which includes a triad of ways of representation, such as schematism (contemplation of the special through the general), allegory (contemplation of the general through the special) and symbol (absolute synthesis and identity of schematism and allegory), which is interpreted by the philosopher as an absolute form. Anyway, as Schelling notes in his "System of Transcendental Idealism", "the reflection of the absolutely unconscious and non-objective is possible only through an aesthetic act of imagination" ^{[12, p. 242]}.

Conclusion

Thus, imagination as a subject's ability to create unique and original images based on the synthesis and transformation of elements of external and internal experience has an a priori creative nature. In the epistemological perspective, imagination is the basis for a person's complete cognition of himself, the subjective world of Another and external objective reality. The ontological determinant of imagination is revealed in its ability to transform existing existence and design a potential future. Qualitatively different from fantasy, productive imagination, characterized not so much by conscious and purposeful, as by irrational and spontaneous elements, appears as an epistemological and ontological source of creativity. Thus, in the space of I. Kant's conceptual constructions, productive imagination is justified as a fundamental condition of cognition and a source of synthesis of sensuality and reason, which determines the very possibility of a cognitive act through which the subject de facto creates his object. At the same time, in the context of F.W.J. Schelling's philosophical views, productive imagination is considered as a divine and human ability to synthesize theoretical and practical, ideal and material, general and special, possibility and reality, and is postulated as a link between the processes of cognition and creativity.

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