Статья 'Инстинктивное знание без знания рефлексивного и vice versa' - журнал 'Философская мысль' - NotaBene.ru
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Philosophical Thought
Reference:

Instinctive Knowledge Without Reflective Knowledge and Vice Versa

Pris' Igor'

Senior Researcher, Institute of Philosophy

220012, Belarus, g. Minsk, ul. Surganova, 1, of. 810

frigpr@gmail.com
Другие публикации этого автора
 

 

DOI:

10.7256/2409-8728.2015.5.15174

Review date:

25-12-1969


Publish date:

29-06-2015


Abstract.

The subject of the present research is the concept of knowledge and, in particular, the case described by Timothy Williams when a subject knows  p in spite of the fact that the available evidence states he doesn't know p. The author of the article interprets this case from the point of view of the difference between instinctive knowledge and reflexive/introspective (and, in particular, phenomenal) knowledge. The author uses a classical definition of knowledge as a justified true belief. The author assumes existence of special causal and standard process of formation of the reflexive knowledge establishing the relation of family similarity between more or less reflexive types knowledge. The main conclusion of the conducted research includes possibility of existence of deeply instinctive knowledge treats without the corresponding reflexive knowledge and vice versa. The author also believes that any knowledge finally has the phenomenal (in a broad sense) nature that allows to close epistemological "failure" between reasonable opinion and knowledge. The author interprets Gettier cases as the cases of true beliefs with incomplete justification.

Keywords: evidential probability, family resemblance, evidence, phenomenal knowledge, reflective knowledge,, animal knowledge, instinctive knowledge, knowledge, possible world, Gettier cases
This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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