DOI: 10.7256/2409-8728.2017.2.21921

Abstract: The problem of sameness of identity within the modern analytical philosophy consists of two aspects: question about identification, and question about re-identification. However, such approach faces the problem of reduplication, which is determined by the modern philosophers B. Williams and D. Parfit in conceptual experiments “Guy Fawkes” and “Teleportation”. In the author’s opinion, there are three main ways of overcoming the problem of reduplication: criticism of conceptual experiments; additional criterion of the absence of duplicates; and four-dimensional model of identity. It is demonstrated that the first two ways lead to substantial difficulties for the psychological theory of the sameness of identity. The conclusion is made that namely the third ways is the most promising for the psychological theories. The object of this work is the problem of sameness of identity within the modern analytical philosophy, particularly the question of re-identification of personality in various moments of time. The subject of this work consists in psychological approach towards the aforementioned issue. According to this approach, one personality is identical to personality in different time, if there is a psychological succession between them. The scientific novelty consists in the author’s proposition on the introduction of the four-dimensional concept of personality. Despite the fact that the psychological approach is the most widespread in modern analytical philosophy, at the present stage there are very few works dedicated to the analysis of this theory. Moreover, there are no special research regarding the ways of overcoming the problem of reduplication from the perspective of the supporters of psychological approach.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2017.1.21669

Abstract: The object of the research of this article is the modern philosophical discourse on the problem of identity of personality. The subject of the study is the substantial approach of R. Swinburne and his place in this discourse. The author analyzes R. Swinburne's approach and, in particular, its main advantages – the ability to solve the problem of personality reduplication. However, as the author of the article shows, the substantive approach itself is not devoid of vulnerabilities. First of all, he is vulnerable to criticism using the verification principle. Swinburne believes that his approach is not consistent only with a strong version of the verification principle. However, as the author of this article shows, even a weak version of the verification principle is a problem for Swinburne's substantive approach. The author presents his own alternative to the substantial approach for overcoming the reduplication argument and interpreting hypothetical situations associated with it. Such an alternative is the perdurant theory of personality. The article presents a study in the field of the history of modern analytical philosophy. Therefore, the key research method used is historical and philosophical. In particular, the study used a textual analysis of the works of philosophers, first of all, R. Swinburne, according to several sources, a reconstruction of his views was carried out. The article also uses the method of comparative analysis, in particular, a comparison of empiricist approaches and a substantive approach to the problem of identity of personality is made. The article is devoted to the substantial concept of identity of R. Swinburne's personality. Despite the fact that this concept represents an important alternative to solving the problem of identity, it has not been studied much, especially in the Russian history of philosophy. The novelty of the article also lies in a detailed analysis of the verification counterargument in relation to the substantive approach. The author of the article also presents his own alternative to the substantial approach, which allows overcoming the indicated difficulties. As a result of the research, the author comes to the conclusion that the substantial approach only partially solves the problem of asynchronous identity of personality, and is most vulnerable to criticism with the help of the verification argument.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2015.6.15091

Abstract: The subject under research of the present article is the problem of free will. The author of the article presents a critical review of one of the most important modern arguments against compatibilism in the free will debate, Derk Pereboom's 'Manipulation Argument'. The Manipulation Argument is built upon the analogy between external manipulation of the agent's actions and causal determination. Based on that analogy, Pereboom concludes that agents who act in a situation of causal determination do not feel moral responsibility. The author of the present article suggests that we should extend the borders of Pereboom's mental experiment. In the course of his research the author comes to the conclusion that the Manipulation Argument does not prove the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. In the author's opinion, Pereboom's argument only proves that moral responsiblity requires an integrated personality and sequential personal history. The method of the present research is the conceptual analysis mostly used in analytical philosophy. The author also conducts mental experiments to illustrate and prove his point of view. The main conclusion of the present research is the author's proof of the failure of Peterboom's manipulation argument. The author of the article shows that the manipulation argument does not prove the statement that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. According to the author, Pereboom's argument only proves that moral responsiblity requires an integrated personality and sequential personal history.