New trends in extremist and terrorist crime and measures to counter threats to national security

The strengthening of military threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in 2022 and 2023 affected the state of extremist and terrorist crime. The criminological characteristics of individual crimes have changed while maintaining the dynamics of the analyzed crime as a whole.

Thus, in 2022, the number of extremist crimes increased by 48.2% and amounted to 1,566 ^[1]. Taking into account the indicators of previous years (2020 – 833, +42.4%, 2021 – 1057, +26.9%), such an increase was expected. The absolute figure barely reached its peak in 2017, when 1,521 crimes were registered. Recall that the partial decriminalization of Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which provides for criminal liability for actions aimed at inciting hatred and enmity, as well as the preparation of a corresponding bill ^[2] contributed to a multiple decrease in the level of extremist crime in 2018 and 2019.

In the period January–May 2023, the number of extremist crimes increased by 37.4% (816).

The increase in the number of terrorist crimes in 2022 amounted to 4.5% (2,233), and in the period of 5 months in 2023, on the contrary, there was a decrease of 5.6% (1002).

At the same time, the analysis of the structure of extremist and terrorist crime allows us to come to a conclusion about an intensive increase in the degree of its public danger.

The growth rates of crimes under Articles 280 and 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which accounted for more than half of the registered extremist crimes in previous years, have slowed down. In 2022, their share was slightly more than 40%, for 5 months in 2023 – about a third.

In 2022, the number of public calls for extremist activity (Article 280 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) increased by 9.3% (2020 – 367, +34.9%, 2021 – 486, +32.4%, 2022 – 531), facts of incitement to hatred or enmity (Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) – by a quarter (2020 – 63, +231.6%; 2021 – 86, +36.5%; 2022 – 108, +25.6%).

For 5 months of 2023, the indicators of these crimes decreased by 5.7% (216) and 36.9% (41), respectively.

This leads to the idea that quantitative indicators of these crimes cease to have a decisive influence on the overall dynamics of extremist crime. Increasingly, individuals are being brought to criminal responsibility for other crimes of this category.

The practice of applying Articles 207.3 (Public dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and 280.3 (Public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ...) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which were introduced into criminal legislation in March 2022 ^[3]. p. "d" Part 2 and Part 3 Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is included in the updated list of extremist crimes ^[4]. In our opinion, the absence of Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in the list is an obvious gap.

Similarly, one can speak about Article 207 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Knowingly false report of an act of terrorism), which also formally does not relate to either extremist or terrorist crimes. In modern conditions, these attacks are committed using means of anonymization on the Internet and are aimed at increasing the anxiety of the population, social tension, damaging the work of law enforcement agencies. In 2022, their number increased to 23,247 (+670.3%), in 5 months of 2023 – 7,100 (-29.5%).

Close attention is drawn to the category of extremist crimes against the peace and security of mankind (Chapter 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).

The number of facts of the rehabilitation of Nazism (Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) in 2022 amounted to 46 crimes, for 5 months in 2023 – 13.

The facts of genocide (Article 357 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), which have an exceptional public danger, amounted to 9 crimes, 5 months 2023 – 1. In previous years, isolated cases of genocide were registered.

For example, according to the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation A.I. Bastrykin, only in April 2022, 3 criminal cases were initiated under Article 357 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, including the fact that the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine blew up a container with nitric acid located on the territory of a chemical industry enterprise in Rubezhnoye LNR ^[5].

In the structure of terrorist crime, attention is drawn to the threefold increase in the number of terrorist acts (Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) to 127 (+209.8%) crimes in 2022, and to 98 (+237.9%) for 5 months in 2023. Many crimes were classified as completed, while in previous years terrorist acts were mostly stopped at the preparation stage. The completed terrorist attacks were mainly related to encroachments by Ukraine.

The facts of sabotage were recorded (Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) in 2022 – 9, for 5 months in 2023 - 11. In previous years, these crimes were practically not registered.

In addition, the trends of terrorist crime over the past year are due to a significant increase in indicators on the facts of public calls for terrorist activities or public justification of terrorism provided for in Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (2022 – 564, +43.5%, 5 months 2023 – 285, +24.5%).

According to Professor V.V. Merkuryev, one of the factors of extremist and terrorist activity in the study period was the unprecedented scale of information and psychological impact on the population of the Russian Federation, which is subjected to Russophobic attacks by transnational corporations, non-governmental, religious, extremist and terrorist organizations ^{[6, pp. 137, 138]}.

This is confirmed by the materials of foreign research projects, which provide practical recommendations for the purpose of confrontation with the Russian Federation.

The Analytical Center (Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center), created by the US Department of Homeland Security ^[7], in 2021. a study has been published ^[8] concerning working with pro-Ukrainian users with a large audience (influencers) on Twitter. According to the authors of the study, interaction with them provides for the establishment of contacts, assistance in establishing contacts between the users themselves, including through joint training. In turn, the activities of pro-Ukrainian users imply the dissemination of anti-Russian memes, video content, and the identification of Russian bots.

It is also proposed to identify Russian-speaking users of a "pan-European identity" based on the analysis of social media content, take measures to expand their audience, and provide financial support. In order to preserve the authority and reputation of such users, it is recommended to act through local non-governmental organizations.

In June 2022, this research company published a report on the topic "Russia's efforts to disinformation in social media" ^[9], which is based on materials collected in Ukraine in the period up to 2019. The time of publication of the report indicates that some of its provisions have already been implemented and have lost their relevance.

The report notes an increase in the activity of the Russian Federation in information networks after 2014 as a response to the activities of the West. At the same time, the effectiveness and efficiency of such activities are evaluated ambiguously by researchers due to the low level of organization and investment, on the other hand, the presence of a large audience of Russian media is noted.

Instagram Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Instagram and VKontakte, to increase their presence in social networks; to present a clear and convincing position on high-profile issues, ahead of the Russian information agenda, among other things, are recommended to pay special attention to monitoring of social networks of the United States. The recommendations of the report are addressed to the US military departments, which, among other things, are recommended to pay special attention to monitoring of social networks Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Instagram and VKontakte, to increase their presence in social networks; to present a clear and convincing position on high-profile issues.

In 2023, a report was published on the issues of robotization of the armed forces ^[10]. Despite the fact that the level of such in the Russian Federation is generally assessed low, it is recommended to take measures to counteract the implementation of the tasks of the development of artificial intelligence in the Russian Federation provided for by the National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence for the period up to 2030 ^[11].

With this in mind, extremist and terrorist activities should now be considered in the context of information warfare, implying the use of information weapons and disinformation.

The concepts of information warfare and information weapons are enshrined in the Agreement between the governments of the SCO member states on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security dated 06/16/2009^[12].

Another international legal act should be mentioned, namely, the Decision of the CIS Council of Heads of State "On the Joint Statement of the Heads of the CIS member States on cooperation in the field of international information security" ^[13], which emphasizes the importance of strengthening the fight against disinformation and fake news within the framework of national legislation.

Disinformation is thus recognized as one of the leading tools of information warfare. The phenomenon of disinformation has been known for a long time. It is considered in detail in the educational and methodological literature and methodological materials of military educational institutions. Twenty years ago, such literature raised the question that the legislation of the Russian Federation should provide for norms of criminal and material responsibility for the dissemination of disinformation, for participation in anti-Russian information operations, and the duties of state authorities to prevent violations in the information sphere ^{[14, p.46]}.

Based on this, the following additional measures are required:

taking into account the WhatsApp messenger belonging to the American multinational holding company Meta Platforms Inc, recognized as an extremist organization, it is necessary to work out a legislative initiative to restrict the use of this product for official purposes to persons holding public positions;

to work out the issue of restricting access to YouTube video hosting materials, taking into account the publication of materials directed against the interests of the Russian Federation and the creation of algorithms aimed at their promotion;

take administrative measures in case of violations of Russian legislation by popular services VKontakte, Yandex, Telegram, etc.

Another measure to counter modern extremist and terrorist crime should be called the urgent need to systematize, publish and bring to the international community the information that became known during the investigation of criminal cases initiated on the facts of the genocide of the civilian Russian-speaking population in the period from 2014 to the present, as well as the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War.

The issue of securing the status of the State responsible for terrorism in Russian legislation requires close consideration.

In the USA, the decision to declare the State a sponsor of terrorism ("State Sponsors of Terrorism") is made by the US Secretary of State, who determines that the Government of the State declared a sponsor of terrorism has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism. This implies the application of the following sanctions: a ban on the export and sale of weapons; control over the export of dual-use goods that can significantly strengthen the country's military power; bans on economic assistance; financial and other restrictions ^[15].

In the Russian Federation, a similar function could be performed by the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

In this regard, it is proposed to consider the issue of supplementing Part 2 of Article 14 of Federal Law No. 390-FZ dated December 28, 2010 "On Security", as well as paragraph 4 of the Regulations on the Security Council of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 175 dated 07.03.2020 "On Certain Issues of the Security Council of the Russian Federation", with the following provision:

"consideration of the issue of recognizing the State responsible for terrorism (a terrorist State) and a State sponsor of terrorism.".

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