The problem of Armenia's integration into the Roman world in the post-Armenian period

Yartsev Sergey Vladimirovich Doctor of History Associate Professor, Department of History and Archeology, Tula State Pedagogical University named after L.N.Tolstoy 300026, Russia, Tula region, Tula, Prospekt Lenina str., 125 s-yartsev.@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Bobin Roman Mikhaylovich Postgraduate student of the Chair of History and Archeology, Tula State Lev Tolstoy Pedagogical University (Tula) 300026, Russia, Tula region, Tula, Prospekt Lenina str., 125 sorcerer071@mail.ru

The state of Great Armenia, located in the north of the Near East, at different times occupied various regions of Asia Minor, the Armenian Highlands and Transcaucasia. Starting from the first century BC, Armenia fell into the spheres of influence of the Roman state and gradually losing its power, increasingly began to turn into a dependent kingdom, for which a constant struggle was waged between the Romans and the Parthians. Soon the history of Armenia as a separate state ended, as it was transformed by Emperor Trajan into a Roman province. In this regard, the Romans even carried out serious administrative and territorial transformations here (Cass. Dio., LXVIII, 21,1) ^{[36, p. 215-225; 16, p. 117-126; 2, p. 95]}. However, after the death of the emperor, Hadrian, who came to power, for some reason unexpectedly "left many provinces conquered by Trajan," including Armenia, including referring to Trajan's secret commission he received (SHA. Hadr., IX, 1-2). The exact reasons for such a drastic change in the foreign policy of the empire are still unknown. This problem continues to cause controversy and researchers do not have a single point of view on its solution. Of course, one can hardly take seriously the version of Adrian's envy of Trajan, because of which the new emperor allegedly wanted to forget the great exploits of his predecessor (Eutr. Brev., VII, 6; Fest., XX) ^{[35, p. 108-112]}. The version looks much more plausible that the new emperor, due to lack of finances and the inability to increase troops in the eastern direction in a short time, was forced to switch to a peaceful policy and return to the old system of using vassal kings in the buffer zone ^{[34, p. 137; 17, p. 12; 18, p. 224; 8, p. 96]}. All this has become an important part of the new foreign policy doctrine of the empire aimed at the strategic defense of the state along the entire perimeter of its borders ^{[27, p. 24; 5, p. 253; 8, p. 98; 13, p. 192]}. At first glance, this statement is quite logical and it would seem difficult to argue with this. However, not everything in this concept looks so unambiguous. These attempts to present Hadrian's temporary refusal from further conquests, without which the sustainable development of the empire was hardly possible, by a thoughtful transition to a defensive strategy of the state, are very confusing.

In this regard, it is worth recalling here, not so much about the image problem, which is certainly important for the Romans, as about the economic reason for the Roman wars and conquests (the need for rich extraction, including slaves, the seizure of new territories with potential taxpayers and natural resources). That is, about the key factor for the development of a state with a developed commodity production, even though not all such aggressive wars instantly led to profit and income ^{[40, p. 151-161, 209-210]}. Could not the conscious pacification of neighbors on the terms of Rome, about which, for example, S.M. Perevalov writes ^{[14, p. 7]}, have some other hidden reasons? Indeed, in the actions of Emperor Hadrian in relation to the same Armenia, starting with the desire to establish full control over the situation on the territory of the neighboring state, there is clearly consistency and prudence, which is poorly consistent with the transition to peaceful defensive tactics along the perimeter of the Roman borders. In this regard, it is quite possible to agree with A.J.Harutyunyan that here we are clearly dealing with balanced and cautious steps of a wise politician ^{[2, p. 96]}, the hidden reasons for whose actions, apparently, have yet to be clarified and clarified. In this regard, the relevance of studies that reveal specific actions within the military-political strategy of the Roman state, leading to the grandiose successes of the Romans in imperial construction, even in conditions of defensive tactics and conditional transition to border protection, can hardly be overestimated.

Thus, the object of our research is the buffer zone of the Roman Empire, located between the ancient civilization and the barbarian world. The subject of the study is Armenia, whose history, first of all, will be considered as a special territory of the Roman-Parthian border during the reign of Roman emperors Hadrian and Antoninus Pius (117-161), as well as during the Parthian-Roman war of 161-166.

Based on the comparative historical method of research, we will analyze in detail such a key aspect of the topic as Adrian's refusal of further conquests and the transition to a defensive strategy of the state. The use of a comparative historical research method will definitely allow us to better understand the poorly sanctified history of Armenia in the sources of this time. First of all, it concerns the Roman cultural expansion towards Armenia in the post-Armenian period and its correlation with the previous experience of adapting Greek culture to local traditions. No less interesting are the anti-Roman actions of Armenians during the Parthian-Roman war of 161-166, their similarities and differences with a similar uprising against the Romans in Judea, several decades earlier.

Turning to the history of Armenia in the post-Armenian period, it is important to note that Rome's control over this state has never weakened. This is clearly evident from the fact that the Emperor Antoninus Pius kept the Parthian king from attacking Armenia, only by messages (SHA. Ant. Pius., IX, 6). However, these messages were reinforced by Roman legions stationed in Syria, Cappadocia and other places on the eastern border ^{[18, pp. 225-226]}, whose strength should not be underestimated ^{[15, pp. 325-326]}. There is no doubt that special attention to maintaining such strict control over the client state should relate to the post-Trajan period, when the new emperor Hadrian allowed the Armenians "to have their own king, whereas under Trajan they had a Roman legate" (SHA. Hadr., XXI, 11). It is believed that this king was the son of Sanatruk Vologda (Armenian: Vagarsh) (117-140) (Cass. Dio., LXIX, 15,2) ^{[28, p. 21; 29, p. 145; 45, p. 70; 7, p. 70; 15, p. 320; 2, p. 96]}. At the same time, it is possible that the establishment of this control over Armenia was the result, among other things, not only of Hadrian's refusal of Trajan's new provinces, but also of the fact of the excessively hostile attitude of the local population towards the Romans revealed during the campaign ^{[18, p. 224; 9, p. 203, note 1]}. If this is the case, then it is logical to assume that the policy of the Romans towards Armenia in the post-Armenian period should include not only the establishment of control over its territory, but also carefully thought-out work with the local population.  In this regard, it is probably not by chance that the subsequent kings of Armenia, such as, for example, Sokhema (140/144 -161; 164-186) or Bakur I (161-163), did not just occupy the throne by decision of the Senate, but eventually became Roman senators (after Sokhema fled to Rome) ^{[9, pp. 209-210]} or even took the Roman generic name of Julius. In the latter case, it is a name reflecting Roman citizenship and possibly even a consulate ^{[45, p. 24-26]}, judging by the epitaph of the II century AD from Rome (CIG, III, 6569; Asin. Quad., Fr. 9; Fronto. Epist., II, I) ^{[26, p. 43; 18, pp. 237-238]}, strangely got along with hatred of the Romans, against whom Aurelius Pacorus (Bakur I) began an uprising and war. After the victory over the traitor, the Armenian throne was returned to Sokhem, who again became the king "given" by the Romans to the "Armenians" ^{[42, p. 255, No. 511-513]}.

The fact that such a thoughtful and purposeful introduction to the Roman political culture of the local elite was not a separate episode, but part of a purposeful and thoughtful Eastern policy, indicates the fact that the Romans assigned the Roman generic name Flavius, including the king of Iberia ^{[26, p. 43]}. At the same time, we agree with S.M.Perevalov that it is not possible to consider following E. Luttwak about a clear demarcation of the Roman borders in the current situation. The real Pax Romana extended much further than the official borders of the Roman provinces ^{[39, p. 60; 35, p. 387-391; 15, p. 325]}. Moreover, the Romans always considered such dependent lands to be part of the empire (Strabo., XVII, 3.25; Tac. Ann., I, 11). Nevertheless, the point of view of E.The idea of the inevitability of these territories becoming part of the state as provinces, in our opinion, is not without reason. It is unlikely, of course, that this process should have taken place, as the scientist believed exclusively in a planned manner and in a certain period from the Flavians to the North (69-235). Criticism of this opinion, therefore, is fully justified ^{[15, p. 325]}. However, it is possible that the Romans still planned the entry of dependent territories into the empire, but only after full cultural and economic integration into the Roman world, initially an alien population. It is possible that in the Caucasus, this process was planned by the Romans in the form of Hellenization, based on the previous experience of adapting Greek culture to local traditions ^{[14, p. 6]}. In this case, this process should have received a new impetus during the reign of Hadrian – Emperor Philhellinus, who was convinced of the beneficial and civilizing influence of Roman civilization on the surrounding barbarian peoples ^{[15, p. 304]}. Arrian, the legate of Cappadocia, showed this feature of the reign of Hadrian most clearly in his essay, clearly marking the border between civilization and barbarism, which, in his opinion, passes primarily through a cultural rift. Even local Greeks are criticized for his remoteness from Greek traditions (Arr. Per., 1,2–2,2; 6,3) ^{[15, pp. 304-306]}.

 In this regard, it is important to note that Adrian himself was nicknamed the Little Greek since childhood ^{[25, p. 16; 8, p. 100]}. In the future, even his beard evoked associations among his entourage, not with the victorious Roman wars, but primarily with the thinkers of Ancient Greece ^{[4, pp. 307-308]}. For his love of Greek culture ^{[10, p. 68]} and incorrect Latin pronunciation, the emperor was often attacked even by the Romans, including members of the Senate (SHA. Hadr., I, 5; III, 1). Nevertheless, at the heart of the emperor's predilection for Greek culture, including his famous pan-Hellenic project, it may well have been not so much personal reasons as the emperor's deeply thought-out foreign policy towards buffer dependent states. The fact is that the creation of a New Hellas – the union of Greek cities around Athens ^{[12, p. 164]}, could well entail the unification of the entire Pax Romana, around this New Panellenium. Moreover, it is possible that it was the Hellenic commonwealth, uniting all the Greeks of the ancient world ^{[38, p. 43]}, that was to serve as the renewed spiritual bond of the Roman world, covering the dependent territories that had yet to be included in the empire. Of course, the Roman religion itself, despite its certain similarity to the Greek, was not suitable for such an important matter as cultural expansion aimed at the surrounding peoples. For the most part, many peoples associated it with the aggressive military and political pressure of the Roman Empire on the surrounding peoples and states. Familiarity with Greek beliefs and spiritual practices took place among many barbarian peoples for quite a long time, starting from the era of the Great Greek colonization and in subsequent times, especially during the Hellenistic period. In this regard, it is possible that the Philhellenic policy  Hadrian and the emperor's desire to unite the classical Greek polis into a single organization were primarily due to the tasks of not only domestic but also foreign policy, including the prospect of peaceful entry of buffer territories into the Roman state as provinces. Indirectly, this is indicated by the fact that, despite Hadrian's archaic ideas about Hellenism, which pushed representatives of some cities to falsify information about their Greek origin in order to include their territories in this union (in order to acquire various privileges), the increase in the latter occurred, including at the expense of non-Greek cities, without any problems recognized as Hellenic ^{[6, pp. 59-60]}.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that most of the Roman-Iranian borderland was the territory of former Hellenistic states, for more than two hundred years of the spread of Greek domination, Hellenism could not take root here not only among the ordinary population, but even among local elites. Many of the representatives of the latter were indeed only superficially Hellenized and actually possessed a dual identity system ^{[11, pp. 59-60]}. Apparently, that is why the Romans needed strict control over the entire specified territory, including the mechanism for obtaining local royal power from one or another emperor, since this provided the necessary legal aspect for the further continuation of the Hellenization of the local population ^{[15, p. 305]}. In this context, we can also consider such features of Roman foreign policy as the principled upbringing of royal heirs in order to introduce them to the Roman cultural environment, granting them Roman citizenship and Roman names, the integration of Roman officers into the local barbaric environment ^{[15, p. 305]} or vice versa, the admission of local natives to Roman military service ^{[3, pp. 24, 33-43]}. In this regard, it becomes clear why in some cases, the emperor did not spare money to support pro-Roman forces even, at first glance, in unnecessary states, spending "his own funds" and "considering it shameful for himself to abandon them, although for the Romans these peoples were unprofitable," and in other cases, refused in such a request, after all, the petitioners "could not bring" the Romans "any benefit" (App. Rom. Proem., 7). It is obvious that the refusal of the emperor's request for admission to Roman citizenship concerned only those peoples who did not belong directly to the buffer zone of the empire, and for this reason there was not yet an acute problem of Hellenization of the local population. As for the buffer zone and, in particular, the territory of the Roman-Iranian border, here in the post-Trajan period, of course, it was necessary to intensify efforts to Hellenize the autochthonous population, making its future peaceful entry into the empire inevitable. The certainty that this was bound to happen sooner or later, apparently, allowed the Romans not to force the process of final annexation of this territory in such regions and for quite a long time to be content with the so-called indirect rule, when the administration of a dependent state was based on the local state apparatus of client kings ^{[15, p. 5-6]}. Nevertheless, the forced orientation of such a dependent and insufficiently Hellenized state to the Hellenic commonwealth, uniting all the Greeks of the ancient world, most likely, according to the Romans, should have accelerated this process. At the same time, it is difficult to say how much the Romans restrained themselves from encroaching on the religious worldview of the dependent Caucasian peoples, especially against the background of cultural pressure from Iran ^{[14, p. 7]}. The fact is that on the example of the cities of Mesopotamia, the Romans could not help but see that in response to their too aggressive policy in the region based on ancient traditions and local pro-Roman residents, Parthia successfully opposed traditional culture in the form of the Achaemenid heritage ^{[30, s. 210]}. Consequently, the Romans, in matters of cultural expansion, especially as they gained experience, had to act carefully and carefully consider their actions.

All of the above directly relates to the policy of lifetime deification of Roman emperors, which was actively carried out, including in the territories of dependent states ^{[33, s. 8-14; 31; 19, pp. 257-261]}. In this regard, it is curious that in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, this particular cult did not even need to be specially introduced, it existed there as a natural continuation of old customs ^{[19, p. 259]}. It is obvious that such deification concerned both Trajan and Antoninus Pius, because this is clearly seen by the ray crowns in which these emperors were depicted during their lifetime ^{[1, pp. 31, 392]}. As for Hadrian, this emperor also did not refuse divine honors, especially paid to him in the East, where, as is known, he consecrated a number of temples in his honor ^{[1, p. 390]}. It is possible that here, as for example in the time of Nero, who wanted to become a god during his lifetime, the local elite was forced to pay divine honors to the Roman emperors. This is directly indicated by Dion Cassius, who preserved the words of King Tiridates of Armenia, who declared to Nero that he worships him as the creator of his fate and happiness, like the god Mithras (Dio Cass., LXIII, 5, 2).

Of course, such a policy of the Roman emperors, on the spread of the imperial cult, was fully justified by the circumstances. A huge power demanded a unified political idea and even renewed beliefs that could strengthen the existing state system. Obviously, there was no better ideology for this purpose than the imperial cult. Moreover, such religious beliefs were confidently transformed into the theological justification of the supreme power, which could not but attract representatives of the latter to such ideas ^{[22, p. 181]}. For the East, such an ideology was best suited, since it intersected well with the Hellenistic tradition of honoring local rulers ^{[42, p. 235-238; 31, p. 1987]}. It is probably not by chance that a statue of the emperor was placed in the famous Armenian temple in Garni in the first century AD, which most likely had a direct relationship to the veneration of Mitra ^{[18, p. 57]}, perhaps even during Augustus, which, as if ideologically, "consolidated" the subordination of Armenia to the Roman Empire ^{[18, p. 60]}. Considering that in the post-Trajan period under Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, there was a significant rise in the imperial cult ^{[1, pp. 390-393; 20, p. 221; 37, s. 78; 32, p. 631; 6, p. 62]}, it can be concluded that there is significant support for the spread of this veneration of the supreme Roman power, including on the territory of dependent states, including Armenia.

Nevertheless, despite his pronounced Philhellinism, Emperor Hadrian in his religious policy, in fact, tried, first of all, to rely on the old Roman religion. This follows at least from his purposeful actions to restore the Pantheon in Rome, support the priesthood and the construction of numerous temples in honor of Roman deities ^{[1, p. 390]}. Moreover, Hadrian not only treated the Egyptian gods with disgust and refused to worship Isis, he did not contribute at all to the spread of the cults of eastern deities and even despised foreign rites ^{[24, s. 221]}. It is difficult to say how much Hadrian changed his true attitude to the same Egyptian religion after the death of his favorite Antinous and the erection of a Serapeum in his Egyptian villa in Canope (Strabo., XVII, 1, 17) ^{[24, s. 225; 42, p. 1935]}. The fact is that he apparently had a biased attitude towards foreign cults even after the death of Antinous, however, as with subsequent emperors, for example, the same Antoninus Pius ^{[24, s. 241]}. In this regard, the issues of coins depicting Egyptian deities by Hadrian ^{[24, s. 230]} and Antoninus Pius (RIC, 3, p. 169, No. 1197) ^{[21, p. 125]}, more indicate the political reasons for such an open demonstration of foreign beliefs than the sincerity of the religious beliefs of representatives of the highest Roman authorities ^{[21, p. 131]}.

In our opinion, this contradiction can be explained by the desire of the emperors to spread the Roman religion to provinces and dependent lands with populations alien to Roman culture. The fact is that the perception of the same Egyptian deities by the highest authority, even at a nominal level, certainly created a favorable image of the empire and the entire Roman world as a whole among the surrounding barbarian peoples. This, in the end, inevitably led to the perception of the Roman gods by an alien population, acquaintance with which, in one way or another, was provided by this Hellenization. As for the representatives of the elite of the alien population dependent on Rome, they were obliged to officially pay divine honors to the emperors, that is, to participate in the official cults of the Roman Empire. At the same time, the Romans, of course, did not require mandatory participation in their own ritual practices. Such an approach, of course, contributed to the consolidation and expansion of the Roman cultural and historical community, and to some extent, protected the Roman religious traditions themselves from excessive barbaric influence.

However, forcing and haste in such an important task as carrying out Romanization in the form of Hellenization of the local population within the framework of Roman cultural expansion led to extremely unfavorable consequences. Here it is enough to recall the reasons for the bloody events of the 132-136 uprising in Judea, when Hadrian first banned some important elements of Jewish religious practice by his edict, and then decided to begin the restoration of Jerusalem with the construction of the temple of Jupiter on the site of the Jerusalem Temple sacred to Jews ^{[38, p. 44]}. That is why, it would seem, we cannot exclude the fact that the Parthian-Roman war of 161-166, which took place, including on the territory of Armenia, also became possible due to the too hasty actions of the Roman authorities to carry out Roman cultural expansion. However, it immediately draws attention to the fact that these events did not begin with a general uprising of the Armenian population, but with another aggravation of relations between the Roman Empire and Parthia. It was the Parthian king Vologda III, immediately after the death of Antoninus Pius, attacked Armenia and deprived the power of the Roman protege Sokhem, raising his candidate Pacorus to the Armenian throne (161-163). The Roman legion that came to the rescue was ambushed and completely destroyed, and its commander, the governor of Cappadocia Severian committed suicide (Cass. Dio., LXXI, 2, 1; Lucian. Alex., 27, Quomodo hist., 21, 25) ^{[18, p. 226; 9, p. 207]}. The following year, the Roman troops, led by the co-ruler of the new emperor Marcus Aurelius Lucius Verus himself and several talented legates, were forced to continue military operations. In the end, the Romans first captured the capital of Armenia Artashat, and later the capital of Parthia, the rights of Sokhem were restored ^{[18, pp. 227-236]}.

At the same time, the main feature of this Roman-Parthian war was that almost throughout its entire course it was accompanied by an acute internal struggle of Armenian society between pro-Roman and anti-Roman pro-Parthian forces ^{[9, pp. 207-211]}. Indeed, we have a report that "when the legate was killed, the legions were slaughtered, the Syrians plotted to be postponed and the East was subjected to devastation" (SHA. Verus, VI, 9). Moreover, Dion Cassius writes about Tiridates, who raised an uprising in Armenia, killed the Roman ally King Geniochs and swung at Vera (Cass. Dio., LXXI, 14). However, we note that the general popular movement directed against the Romans did not happen. There is no such information, despite the desire of some scientists to present this war in the form of a major anti-Roman uprising ^{[18, pp. 229-232]}. Moreover, even with the events of the brutal looting of captured Seleucia by the legions of Avidius Cassius in 165, when the Romans took away the statue of Apollo Komaios, not everything looks so unambiguous. Recall that the inhabitants initially accepted the Romans "as their friends" (SHA. Verus, VIII, 3). Therefore, the true cause of the conflict that broke out remained unknown to us (Cass. Dio., LXXI, 2, 3; Eutrop. Brev., VIII, 10, 2). It is possible that the intrigues of the pro-Parthian party, which opposed the peace agreement of the city's inhabitants with the Romans, really took place here ^{[9, p. 211]}.

On the territory of Armenia proper, during these military operations, the situation is even more contradictory. So, in addition to cases of anti-Roman sentiments and concrete actions in Armenia during the events of 161-166, there were cases directly opposite in their orientation ^{[9, p. 212]}. So, the details of the capture of Edessa by the Romans were preserved by Procopius of Caesarea and they cannot but arouse increased interest. According to Procopius, the victory here occurred because the inhabitants of the city, having raised an uprising and "destroying the barbarian garrison they had, handed over the city to the Romans" (Procop. De bello Persico, II, XII, 29). Of course, the local population, being between the Parthians and the Romans, was forced to make a choice between the opposing sides based on many factors and the specific situation. However, we cannot rule out the fact that the pro-Roman sentiments among the local residents of Armenia were, among other things, the result of the Roman cultural expansion carried out for many years on the basis of the traditional Hellenization of the population. In any case, this corresponds well to our assumption that since Hadrian, Roman expansion, in fact, was not stopped, but simply took other forms (economic and cultural), which were actually supposed to prepare for the peaceful entry of a buffer territory into the empire ^{[23, p. 251]}.

Let's summarize our research. Apparently, in the post-Trajan period, the Romans still planned the entry of dependent territories into the empire, but only after the complete cultural and economic integration of the initially alien population into the Roman world. It is possible that in the Caucasus, this process was carried out by the Romans in the form of Hellenization, based on the previous experience of adapting Greek culture to local traditions. This, in the end, inevitably led to the perception of the Roman gods by an alien population, acquaintance with which, one way or another, was ensured by the increased Hellenization in the region. In this case, this process should have received a new impetus during the reign of Hadrian, the Emperor Philhellinus, who was convinced of the beneficial and civilizing influence of Roman civilization on the surrounding barbarian peoples. Consequently, the emperor's predilection for Greek culture, including his famous pan-Hellenic project, could well have been based not so much on personal reasons as on the emperor's deeply thought-out foreign policy towards buffer dependent states. Thus, the novelty of our research lies in the fact that we have considered the Pan-Hellenic Adrian project in the context of the above processes and as an important component, not only of domestic, but also of foreign policy in relation to buffer dependent states. The policy of the Romans towards Armenia in the post-Armenian period, apparently, should have included not only not weakening control over its territory, but also carefully thought out work with the local population. Therefore, it is possible that representatives of the elite of this state dependent on Rome, as before, were obliged to officially pay divine honors to the emperors, that is, to participate in the official cults of the Roman Empire. The Hellenic commonwealth, uniting all the Greeks of the ancient world, was supposed to serve as exactly that renewed spiritual bond of the Roman world, covering the population of the buffer zone, which had yet to be included in the empire. This is supported by the main feature of the Roman-Parthian war of 161-166, which was accompanied by an acute internal struggle of the Armenian society between pro-Roman and anti-Roman pro-Parthian forces. Moreover, the general popular movement directed against the Romans in these years did not happen. It is possible that all this was the result of a long and systematic work to unite Roman society and the dependent population of the buffer zone into a single historical and cultural conglomerate, in which, despite the negative attitude towards barbaric religions in general from the highest authorities, a positive and attractive image of the Roman state was consciously introduced into the minds of people.

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