Статья 'Политика США в Ираке в 1990-х – начале 2000-х гг. Последнее десятилетие «недемократического» Ирака' - журнал 'Genesis: исторические исследования' - NotaBene.ru
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Genesis: Historical research
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U.S. policy in Iraq in the 1990s – early 2000s. The last decade of "undemocratic" Iraq

Belousova Kseniya Andreevna

Doctor of History

Associate Professor, Contemporary History of Europe and America Department, History and Policy Institute of Moscow State Pedagogical University

119296, Russia, Moscow, Moscow, Prospekt Vernadskogo, 88, office 337

ka.belousova@mpgu.su

DOI:

10.25136/2409-868X.2023.6.41035

EDN:

IEUOQK

Received:

18-06-2023


Published:

30-06-2023


Abstract: The foreign policy of the United States cannot but be relevant, because, having decided for the whole world that only they can bring order and sow democratic values throughout the globe, their policy and its consequences lead, on the contrary, to discord and chaos. The Middle East region, even without US intervention, is a complex knot of contradictions: the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, the importance of the region as an oil-bearing one, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism sometimes acquiring extreme forms, etc. Iraq, which in essence has never been in the orbit of American influence, has therefore become a threat to US national interests. Using a combination of chronological and case-based approaches, we tried to reveal all the main elements of US policy in Iraq in the last decade of the Ba'ath Party's rule: the issue of sanctions, the problem of the south and north of the country, the activities of the UN commission, etc. "Democratizing" Iraq from 1993 to 2003 the United States pursued an unprincipled and anti-human policy, as a result of which hundreds of thousands of people died, industry was completely disorganized, and in the recent past, under the dictatorship of S. Hussein, a prosperous state rolled back into the pre-industrial era. Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 disintegrated the country, turning it into a quasi-state.


Keywords:

Iraq, US foreign policy, democratization, sanctions, oil industry, S. Hussein, unmanned zones, UN, UNSCOM activities, war in Iraq

This article is automatically translated. You can find original text of the article here.

 

The democratic administration of B. Clinton came to power in 1993. In the 1990s, the United States turned out to be the only superpower: the world organizing system, namely bipolarity, collapsed, the Cold War was over. The so-called "new world situation" has emerged, which has turned the United States into a hegemon on the world stage. It would seem that the United States could return to isolationism and deal with internal problems, which, it should be noted, were more than enough in the country. Moreover, there was no longer such an urgent need to support their NATO allies and spend huge amounts of money on weapons. However, the West and the United States, as its vanguard, continued the policy of expansionism, regionalism was adopted instead of globalism, which meant paying "more attention to local conflicts of low and medium intensity, almost all of which are regional in nature" [20, p. 12].

Based on the fact that "democracies rarely go to war with each other" [16, p. 3] and that all evil comes from the so-called "third world countries", the "new democrats" faced the task of democratizing the entire world community, which meant in fact planting "democracy" all over the world the American model. Proceeding from the axiom that the United States is the most democratic country in the world, this provision fully justified not only the global hegemony of the United States in the world, but also provided, so to speak, a "theoretical basis" for possible interference (up to intervention) in the affairs of those sovereign countries that, from the point of view of the United States, were "undemocratic". Actually, this meant that the concept assumed a new split of the world, but no longer into capitalist and socialist, but into the Western, as the only center of civilization, and "rogue states" that refused to follow the principles of Western-style democracy. Therefore, they were a threat to all mankind and therefore should be isolated from it.

In the period of recent history, relations between the United States and Iraq have developed in waves. Before the 1958 revolution in Iraq, the United States did not claim influence in the country, since the British positions were more than strong. Washington managed to involve Iraq in the Baghdad Pact defense organization, but it did not count on any special role in the country yet. After the revolution of 1958 and before the revolution of 1968, relations between the United States and Iraq depended on which leader was in power. In general, it can be noted that during this decade Iraq could not decide on its orientation: whether to build socialism and rely on the USSR, or allow itself to be drawn into the orbit of capitalist influence. Accordingly, if the leader was pro-Western, then the US position in the country was noticeably strengthened. After the Baathist revolution of 1968, and especially after Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq in 1979, a rather interesting trend developed in the country's foreign policy. In general, the Baathist leadership focused on the USSR, but this did not prevent it from turning to the United States if necessary, i.e. Hussein simply used the confrontation between the USSR and the United States for the benefit of his country. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988), the United States helped Iraq, which, however, did not prevent them from selling weapons to Iran. In general, the US support for Iraq and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the countries allowed the Iraqi leadership and its head, S. Hussein, to believe that now the US will support them in any "initiative". However, Hussein miscalculated. The destabilization of relations in the USSR, and then its collapse, the temporary loss of our country's interest in foreign policy allowed the United States to believe that now only they can "decide the fate of the world." After Iraq's attack on Kuwait, the United States not only did not support Iraq, but also brought down all its might on it.

If Iran received the status of a "rogue state" after the 1979 revolution, then Iraq - in the early 1990s. In 1993, the well–known, but more irrelevant, "doctrine of deterrence" has now changed its objects and name and has become the "doctrine of double deterrence". This doctrine was put forward at Congressional hearings on the future Middle East policy of the United States [30] and briefly meant that the Persian Gulf region remains a sphere of vital interests of the United States, Iran and Iraq threaten the security of the zone, so they must be dealt with from a position of strength.

The operation of the United States and its allies against Iraq in 1990-1991, known as the "Desert Storm", led to disastrous consequences for the country. As a result of air raids, many military and civilian production facilities, bridges and roads were seriously damaged or completely disabled. As for the oil industry, up to 97% of the capacity in the refining industry, which amounted to 32.5 million tons per year in mid-1990, and almost half of the capacity in the extractive industry was destroyed. As a result of bombing and fires, offshore oil export platforms, as well as petrochemical industry enterprises were destroyed [15, p. 28]. The blow fell on the very industry that for many years accounted for more than 60% of Iraq's GDP and gave it 95% of foreign exchange earnings. As a result, oil production in the country fell from the level of 175 million tons per year in July 1990 to 15 million tons in 1991 [18, p. 26-27].

As a result of the raids, Iraq's energy system was destroyed by 96%, which, according to the American administration, exceeded their intentions. 80% of the installed capacities of power plants were put out of operation. The consequences of short circuits in the power system that occurred after the first raids on the night of January 17, 1991 were particularly destructive [15, p. 29]

From the point of view of the head of the UN humanitarian mission that visited Iraq immediately after the end of the Iraq-Kuwait war, "for the economic infrastructure of society, which until January 1991 was characterized by a very high degree of urbanization and mechanization, the results of the recent conflict were close to apocalyptic. Most of the means of ensuring modern life are either completely destroyed or thoroughly undermined. For a certain time, Iraq was thrown back into the pre-industrial era" [17, p. 137].

The military destruction of national economy facilities, significant losses among the military and civilian population, the hardships and difficulties that the Iraqis had to face were repeatedly aggravated by the UN Security Council sanctions. UN Security Council Resolution No. 661 of August 6, 1990 [2] imposed comprehensive trade and financial sanctions against Iraq. Iraq could not export its goods, first of all, oil, it could not count on importing any products to it, except medicines and humanitarian aid. An embargo was imposed on financial assistance from third countries, as well as on the use of ships for trade with Iraq. UN Security Council Resolution No. 670 of September 25, 1990 [3] "advanced" even further in the "righteous cause" of punishing Iraq. It declared a complete air and sea blockade of the country, including a requirement for all UN member states to detain Iraqi ships entering the ports of these countries. It also contained a demand to freeze all Iraqi assets located in the territories of these countries. In fact, these two resolutions did not leave any loophole for Iraq to trade with other States: the country was completely isolated.

It is of incredible interest that the aforementioned UN Security Council resolutions directed against Iraq contradict the Charter of this organization itself [1], namely, the establishment of the most severe economic sanctions against the country, and, therefore, against its people, the imposition of such a policy on the entire world community, etc. For example, Article 50 of the UN Charter gives the right to a country experiencing serious economic problems as a result of the application of sanctions against another state to hold consultations at the UN to resolve these problems, including through compensation [1]. In addition, such sanctions are a clear violation of human rights, which is spelled out in the UN Charter and other international legal acts. One correct conclusion can be drawn. The UN, although conceived by F. Roosevelt, as the "world government", eventually became the "screen of egoculturalism", and after the fall of the influence and prestige of the USSR as a result of the Cold War, the screen of egoculturalism, of course, of the United States.

Sanctions against Iraq have brought not only the country's economy, but also the whole country, to a catastrophic state. It makes no sense to describe here all the horrors of what happened in the 1990s in Iraq as a result of UN sanctions. We will mention only the starving, the death of about 600 thousand children, the actual destruction of the health care system. We should add that D. Halliday, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Iraq in the late 1990s, called the sanctions against Iraq genocide [22, p. 45]. However, in the minutes of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearings of September 28, 1999, the following thought was expressed: "... the State Department believes that the easing of sanctions against Iraq will refute the argument that it is sanctions that starve the Iraqi people, which is bureaucratic nonsense. It is Saddam Hussein, and no one else, who starves the people of Iraq" [19]. Another proof of the perfect callousness of the country's leadership to the fate of ordinary Iraqis was expressed by M. Albright in a TV interview. When she was asked that children were dying in Iraq due to sanctions due to a shortage of medicines and food, she replied: "I think it's a difficult choice regarding the goal of US policy and the price of achieving it, but I think we have to pay this price" [13, p. 359].

Already in March 1991, the Baathist leadership adopted an economic development plan, which established the order of work on the restoration of the economy. However, the lack of imported raw materials and spare parts due to sanctions forced the enterprises of the national industry to work with a load that did not exceed an average of 25% of their declared capacity. UNICEF experts in 1999 came to the sad conclusion that the country's economy had entered a stagnant phase. Not only Iraq's main industry, oil production, was in a deplorable state, but the production of the agricultural sector also fell. According to representatives of the expert community, unemployment has reached 50% of the able-bodied population, and the annual per capita income has fallen from 3.5 thousand dollars in 1989 to less than 500 dollars" [10, p. 245]. Thus, the once prosperous Iraq has become one of the poorest States in the world.

In 1996, Iraq agreed to the oil-for-food program, as a result of which the country's GDP began to grow slowly, but mainly due to the oil industry. Back in 1991, UN Security Council Resolution No. 712 confirmed that the country could purchase food and medicines from Iraq's annual oil sales worth $1.6 billion. When the UN experts realized that these were half measures and that this money was not enough to overcome the humanitarian crisis in the country, in April 1995 they allowed Iraq to sell oil for $ 1 billion, but every three months. Despite the fact that the program was introduced during the Clinton administration, and, therefore, with his approval, Secretary of State M. Albright did not fail to accuse the Iraqi leadership that it spends the money received on the construction of new palaces [34, p. 3].

In April 1999, Washington banned foreign companies from investing in the Iraqi oil industry. This again significantly limited the country's ability to increase the production of hydrocarbon raw materials and, accordingly, to purchase essential products, primarily food, as well as medicines.

Although in 2000, UN experts claimed that the aid received under the oil-for-food program was the only way for an ordinary Iraqi to make ends meet, Washington bent its line, assuring that the program fully meets the humanitarian needs of Iraq. Clinton directly said that if there is a shortage of food or medicine in the country, it is the fault of the Iraqi leadership and S. Hussein personally [21].

Contrary to the assurances of representatives of the United States and Great Britain that this program makes life easier for Iraqis, the UN Security Council sanctions committee only blocked vital contracts for the country under this program. Thus, the number of blocked contracts for 2002 reached 1,200 worth more than $2 billion.

Moreover, during this period, Iraq has already exported oil for almost $ 32 billion, but about $10 billion of this amount was spent on compensation payments. and one billion dollars has been spent on the technical and administrative needs of the relevant UN structures. Only $8.3 billion was spent on meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, while the remaining funds in the amount of $10 billion needed for the purchase of civilian products to meet the needs of Iraq were frozen due to obstacles put up by representatives of the United States and Great Britain in this committee [15, p. 15].

It should be noted that the sanctions against Iraq initiated by the United States affected not only Iraq, but also those countries that had active economic relations with Iraq. The United States suffered to a lesser extent, since it had already diversified the supply of Iraqi oil.

As you know, Iraq was not a single country in ethno-confessional terms. The Shiite south of the country has always gravitated towards Iran, and during the Iran-Iraq war, the al-Bakr family supported Iran. According to the calculations of international statistical bodies, Shiites make up 55-60% of the total population of the republic in Iraq. Another problem was Iraqi Kurdistan, which sought secession and independence. The Baath Party has always faced the problem of preserving the territorial integrity of the country in the face of centrifugal tendencies on national and confessional grounds. After the Iran-Iraq war, and especially after Operation Desert Storm, centrifugal tendencies intensified, the situation became more complicated, and it was possible to observe a clear weakening of the central government over the outskirts. Thus, one of the main tasks for S. Hussein was to defend the unity of the republic.

This was quite a difficult task, since back in the 1980s the Kurds had contacts with the CIA, which subsequently led to the fact that Iraqi Kurdistan became the main location of American intelligence in Iraq. However, when in March 1991, during the uprising, the leadership of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (hereinafter - the PUK) turned to Washington for support [11, p. 251], the Americans limited themselves to humanitarian aid.

In 1991-1992, the central government conducted a military operation against the Kurdish rebels. At the same time, the Baathists waged an active propaganda campaign against Kuwait, the United States and the UN Security Council. From our point of view, it was a mistake of the Iraqi leadership, because the United States immediately took advantage of it. Up to the 36th parallel from the northern border of Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), under the pretext of protecting the Kurds from armed intervention from Baghdad, NATO forces were introduced. Government troops, as well as Iraqi aviation, were forbidden to cross the 36th parallel; the United States created the so-called unmanned zone. Actually, there was not just direct interference in the internal affairs of the country, but actually aggression, which demonstrated the forceful line of behavior of the United States towards Iraq, a "rogue state".

To control the unmanned zones, Washington maintained its military presence, including "more than 20 thousand soldiers, 200 aircraft, and 150 ships of various sizes. During the period from 1991 to 2001, American and British aircraft made 280 thousand sorties against Iraq, bombing military and civilian facilities, locations of the armed forces, resulting in the death of hundreds of civilians" [10, p. 245].

The leading political parties of Kurdistan – the PUK and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (hereinafter - the KDP) took advantage of powerful external support and began to create self-governing bodies of the region, namely, the government, parliament and local authorities. Having failed to divide power, an armed conflict broke out between these two groups in May 1994, which only proved that they were fighting not for the interests of the people, but for the interests of the ruling elite. As a result, Iraqi Kurdistan increasingly fell under the influence of the United States. Back in 1996, Washington made attempts to unite the Kurds against the Baath Party, but their leaders M. Barzani and J. Talabani then could not divide the power among themselves. Only in 1998, "the American administration managed to achieve reconciliation and cooperation between Talabani and Barzani in order to control the situation in Northern Iraq" [8, p. 113].

The efforts of the central government to defend control over the northern regions of the country were rebuffed by US and British aviation, which shot down Iraqi planes and helicopters crossing the 36th parallel both from the air and from the ground.

Repeated attempts to establish a political dialogue between Baghdad and the KDP have led to nothing. Moreover, since the summer of 2001, the Jund al-Islam militant group associated with Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization, which conducted operations against the PUK, has been operating in the north of the country. Thus, the political situation in Iraqi Kurdistan was sharply complicated and destabilized.

The same difficult situation was observed in the Shiite south (up to the 32nd parallel already from the south), whose territory was also patrolled by American and British aircraft. The Iraqi armed forces and aviation were also not allowed there until their destruction. However, clashes between the Iraqi military and aviation and the forces of the so-called "international coalition" occurred periodically, often taking the nature of serious military operations. They were especially large-scale in 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and in the fall of 2001, American-British aircraft bombed objects on Iraqi territory from aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, being inaccessible to Iraqi air defenses, since they were forbidden to respond to flights of foreign aircraft [37, p. 922-925; 38, p. 1870-1872].

Despite the forceful suppression of attempts by the central government to prevent the country from splitting, the United States had no intention of helping the Iraqi Kurds or Shiites to establish their statehood. So, the US Secretary of Defense U. Peri noted: "Our interest in the Kurds is not vital for national security" [23, p. 51].

The establishment of no-fly zones for Iraqi aviation in the north and south of the country was also a decision of the UN Security Council, and had no legal basis. Although these documents did not mention any bans on the flights of foreign aircraft over the territory of Iraq, but there was also no permission for the use of foreign force to maintain the status of unmanned zones.

This decision was taken by the United States and Britain unilaterally, although they tried to justify their legality with the already anti-Iraq resolutions of the UN Security Council. And it turns out that they were guided by the United States and Great Britain, carrying out combat sorties, as a result of which thousands of civilians were killed.

It should be noted that not everyone was happy with such a shameless policy. France recognized the illegitimacy of these actions by refusing to patrol the territory of Iraq jointly with the United States and Great Britain back in 1998. Of the numerous anti-Iraqi coalition that supported Operation Desert Storm, only Canada and Kuwait expressed open support for the US-British bombing of Iraq in February 2001.

Another campaign that Washington launched against Baghdad was attempts to accuse Iraq of developing and storing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Washington relied on the UN Security Council resolutions and claimed that Iraq was violating them, which, according to the US logic, meant that a forceful solution to the problem would be required.

From our point of view, the United States, of course, was bluffing. Iraq would not have been able to develop such a large-scale and expensive project as the production of its nuclear weapons without external support, as well as after two devastating wars for it. However, since 1998, the IAEA commission has searched in vain for these weapons in Iraq.

Back in April 1991, after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution No. 687 [4], a Special United Nations Commission (UNSCOM) was established to monitor Iraq's compliance with the requirements for the destruction of chemical, biological and missile weapons facilities. But again, despite the fact that the commission was formally supposed to represent the world community and be unbiased, it often acted in the interests of the American ruling elite. Firstly, in its reports to the Security Council, the Special Commission often sent distorted and sometimes incorrect information. It looked like Iraq did not want to cooperate with UNSCOM, to which the UN Security Council responded with new resolutions that imposed even more restrictions on Iraq. The United States responded by force, resorting to bombing attacks. Secondly, when all stocks of prohibited weapons in Iraq were destroyed, and the Special Commission was only supposed to monitor, the issue of partial lifting of sanctions was deliberately delayed.

In response to this, the Iraqi Parliament decided on October 27, 1997 to cease cooperation with UNSCOM inspectors. In addition, apparently the personal resentment of S. Hussein, and indeed the entire Baathist leadership, against the United States was so strong that on October 29, the parliament refused American citizens to be inspectors in the Special Commission. The UN Security Council made a unanimous decision that Iraq should cooperate with UNSCOM without any conditions and restrictions.

As for the United States, the administration began preparing a military strike against Iraq, and President Clinton said that since Iraq violated the resolutions, the administration does not exclude the use of "any measures" [39, p. 1879].

Additional ships, including the aircraft carrier Washington, were sent to the Persian Gulf, which was already the focus of American military forces. At the same time, on November 17, 1997, intense consultations were held between Russia, the United States and Iraq to prevent a forceful solution to the crisis. Only after negotiations in Geneva, on November 20, between the foreign ministers of the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China, the crisis was averted. It was decided that UNSCOM should work to improve the efficiency of its activities.

Despite the fact that Iraq allowed the resumption of the commission's activities on its territory, the United States continued military preparations in full swing. Clinton approved the plan of military operation against Iraq "Thunder in the Desert", "which provided for four-day round-the-clock bombing of Iraqi military facilities using aircraft and cruise missiles" [10, p. 248].

The head of the Special Commission, R. Butler, gave an interview to the New York Times newspaper, in which he said that Iraq could wipe Tel Aviv off the face of the earth, since it has bacteriological weapons and their means of delivery [24]. This information prepared the public opinion of the country for a forceful action against Iraq, although it should be noted that the public of the country already perceived Iraq as a "worldwide evil".

Another crisis around UNSCOM's activities began in 1998, when in March the Iraqi leadership restricted the activities of inspectors, and later, in August, refused to cooperate with them. Despite the fact that it was a unilateral action on the part of Iraq, it was accompanied by a scandal related to the activities of the Special Commission. It can be said that the leadership of this commission specifically provoked S. Hussein to such aggressive actions. This is confirmed by the testimony of the former head of UNSCOM, S. Ritter: he "accused the American administration and personally the new head, R. Butler, of choosing objects for inspections not to detect WMD, but out of a desire to provoke S. Hussein to a sharp reaction and create conditions for the invasion of Iraq" [8, p. 112]. In addition, according to Ritter, CIA agents in 1996-1997, with the help of UNSCOM inspectors, tried to find out details about Hussein's personal guards, internal plans of his residences, etc., in order to carry out a coup [32, p. 5-8].

Another evidence that the US administration exerted pressure on the inspectors of the Special Commission, writes E.M. Primakov. To his question why, having no evidence of the presence of WMD in Iraq, the commission is still continuing inspections, Butler replied: “It all depends on whether you agree with the United States" [14, p. 311].

The administration tried to refute Ritter's accusations. Thus, Deputy Secretary of State M. Indyk, speaking before the Senate subcommittee, tried to whitewash R. Butler and insisted that the main task of the United States in Iraq was full cooperation with UNSCOM, and Iraq was solely to blame for the disruption of its work [33, p. 4-9].

Despite the administration's attempts to justify itself, materials appeared in leading American newspapers that investigated the facts of foreign ministry officials exceeding their powers. Observers concluded that the Clinton administration was pursuing its own selfish goals with regard to Iraq [29; 36]. There were also voices in Congress accusing the administration of exceeding its powers [33, p. 12, p. 16].

As you know, another political scandal broke out at that time, in which B. Clinton was personally involved. The impeachment vote was scheduled for November 1998. Thus, the situation of the presidential administration was very difficult, and it faced the need to get out of the crisis as quickly as possible. Of course, in such a situation, the United States preferred military action against Iraq.

On November 15, 1998, the United States agreed to hold additional consultations with the UN Security Council on the issue of restoring the activities of the Special Commission. However, as we see it, all this was just a screen of preparation for a military operation. Clinton stated that the United States was ready to strike Iraq the day before, and that this would reduce the latter's ability to produce WMD [40, p. 1978].

It is not at all clear why the United States needed consultations with the UN when they had already decided to conduct a military operation. The UN Security Council did not give the United States the go-ahead to hold it, which was followed by a whole chain of accusations and comments from the American establishment, judging by which the UN is not at all a governing body, but only hinders the United States in implementing its global and righteous goal. Thus, the US representative to the UN, B. Richardson, said that the UN ban is not an obstacle for the US to use force against Iraq, State Department spokesman J. Rubin stated that he sees no point in asking the Security Council's permission to conduct the operation again. B. Clinton stated that since Iraq violates UN resolutions, the United States does not need any additional resolutions to punish it [35; 27; 28]. The Congress for the most part also approved the administration's position: it was suggested that since the United States is a law-abiding state, they do not need to obey the UN; and since S. Hussein poses a threat to all mankind, a military action against Iraq would be "legitimate" [25; 26].

Thus, from December 16 to December 19, 1998, the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain conducted an operation with another beautiful name "Fox in the Desert", which consisted in launching missile and bomb attacks on Iraq. The purpose of the raids was to destroy the military-industrial potential and government infrastructure of the country.

The results of the military action cannot be called positive for the United States. Although the presidential administration stated that the operation caused Iraq enormous damage, especially in terms of its ability to create WMD [41, p. 2134]. It was not possible to confirm the results of the American military action, since the activities of the UN Special Commission in Iraq were terminated, thus the Iraqi issue was not resolved under President B. Clinton, and the crisis itself moved into a protracted phase.

According to the Russian researcher A.A. Kireev, the results of the policy of "double deterrence" were not successful for the United States: "Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, although squeezed in the grip of economic sanctions, continued to exist and by this alone created instability in the Persian Gulf zone. Iran has not abandoned any part of its anti-American course" [10, p. 262].

The continuity of the policy of the administration of George W. Bush (2001 - 2008) with the administration of B. Clinton was to continue the "spread of democracy" around the world, and especially in the Middle East. Bush Jr. also urged Hussein to allow UNSCOM into the country and warned of negative consequences for Iraq if he refused. The American and British military continued to control unmanned zones and carry out raids on the territory of sovereign Iraq.

The tightening of George W. Bush's policy towards Iraq occurred after the terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001. It should be noted that even before these terrible events, the United States was concerned about the growth of terrorist organizations, accusing, in particular, the leadership of Iraq of supporting them, including Al-Qaeda, however, when it affected them directly, Washington has launched a real vendetta against countries that, from its point of view, were accomplices of global terrorism. Moreover, in the new foreign policy doctrine, the main emphasis was placed not so much on the fight against terrorist organizations themselves, as on those countries that, from their point of view, covered these terrorist groups.

Later, an element of preventive war was included in the doctrine, built on the principle of unilateral actions and consisting in the fact that the United States can displace regimes in other countries that pose a potential or perceived threat to US security, even if it is not immediate. The paradox of the doctrine is that although the United States is the initiator of the intervention, the potential aggressor is the object of the intervention.

It should be noted that the Iraqi leadership condemned the September 11 attacks. In his address to the peoples of the United States and Western Europe on September 15, 2001, S. Hussein [12] pointed out, and very rightly, the possible causes of this tragic event and called for a critical assessment of the actions of the United States that could have caused this terrorist attack. In fact, the words of S. Hussein revealed the depravity of Western, in particular, American politics, its essence. Few people have spoken out so openly against the West since the collapse of the USSR. It was a very bold move by Hussein, and he, of course, paid for it.

However, the US did not immediately attack Hussein. Their first target was Afghanistan, the invasion of which began in October 2001. When, in early 2002, the Taliban were removed from power, the United States "remembered" Iraq and again demanded the return of UN experts from it. In the summer and autumn of 2002, the situation about the return of the UN Special Commission resembled the previous ones: the United States threatened Iraq with invasion, and S. Hussein refused to receive experts. As a result, under pressure from the United States, on November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1441, in which Iraq was charged with accepting UN experts [5]. The Baathist leadership agreed to adopt this resolution, and again a Special Commission arrived in Iraq to detect the production of WMD. At the same time, Washington made every effort – through the media and international platforms – to prove that S. Hussein's power poses a threat to the entire world community, since, from his point of view, Iraq continued to develop WMD, and was also associated with international terrorist organizations, primarily Al-Qaeda. The Special Commission again found no traces of WMD, and the CIA data said that the Baathist government had no ties with al-Qaeda [31]. In fact, during this period, there were so many falsifications of the United States in relation to Iraq that a separate article can be devoted to this. We see no point in dwelling on these details, because, from our point of view, the unscrupulous behavior of the United States towards its "enemies" is beyond doubt. There is also no doubt that all these falsifications and provocations pursued only one goal: to overthrow the regime of S. Hussein, and then establish a convenient government in the country.

Shortly before the invasion of Iraq, the United States and Great Britain developed a draft resolution, the main idea of which was the use of force against Iraq. They planned to hold this resolution in the Security Council, but even at the stage of resolving this issue, representatives of Russia, China and France made it clear that they would "veto any resolution containing an ultimatum allowing the use of force against Iraq" [8, p. 116], since Baghdad's involvement in both anti-American terror and to the storage of WMD, has not been proven.

Ignoring the UN, the United States and Great Britain launched a military operation called "Iraqi Freedom" on the morning of March 20, 2003. When, during this long operation, the Americans failed to detect WMD in Iraq, the emphasis was placed on the need for democratization, and, of course, on the American model. And in the most democratic way, they overthrow and execute Saddam Hussein. Although, in fact, the results of the national referendum on confidence in President Hussein held back in November 1995 showed that the majority of Iraqis support the existing government.

U.S. activities to support the opposition in Iraq were carried out during the Clinton presidency, since January 1999, when M. Albright created a new position in the State Department: coordinator of the Iraqi opposition. After the troops entered Iraq, P. Bremer was appointed head of the Interim Coalition Administration of Iraq. He approved UN Security Council Resolution No. 1483 of May 22, 2003 [6], which lifted sanctions imposed on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, with the exception of the military embargo.

Subsequently, the main positions of the state were occupied by people who held pro-American positions.

The "plot" of Yugoslavia, when the country was divided into several independent states, did not fit Iraq from the point of view of the United States. If the formation of an independent Kurdistan was still acceptable, although it concerned the sore points of the governments of Turkey and Iran, then the independence of Shiite Iraq would lead not only to the strengthening of Iran, but also the positions of Shiites in all Arab states, primarily in US-friendly Saudi Arabia. Thus, the American administration considered, first of all, the option of federalization of the state. Iraq had to be divided into three regions - Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish – each of which would have not only autonomy, but also had its own constitution, army and police. The central government was to be responsible for the oil industry and the sphere of foreign policy. "This project could be presented as granting the right to self-determination, and, consequently, the victory of democracy" [8, p. 118].

During the Iraq War, which should rather be called an intervention, there was one doctrine, or rather a concept called "Shock and Awe", developed back in 1996. It was based on the propaganda of American values, designed not so much for the military, but rather for the population of Iraq as a whole. The war scenarios, staged as in movies, were designed for three "audiences": actually, residents of the USA, Iraq, and third countries [7]. The well-thought-out operation "Shock and Awe" was simultaneously part of the military operations in Iraq, as well as an information and psychological war.

As for hydrocarbons, UN Security Council Resolution No. 1483 of May 22, 2003 [6] granted the United States and Great Britain broad powers to control the oil industry in Iraq, up to the formation of a "representative and internationally recognized government."

In his article, K.V. Butba writes that "according to eyewitness accounts, during military operations in Iraq, the American armed forces protected the oil industry, while medical institutions, museums and other industries were looted and destroyed" [8, p. 117]. Moreover, contracts for the restoration of all the most important industries in Iraq were received mainly by American companies.

The Baath Party and its leader S. Hussein fought for the integrity of their country as much as they could, but it was objectively impossible to resist the United States. The US war in Iraq in 2003 led to the disintegration of the country and the formation of quasi-states in Iraq. In his article, A.V. Kiva writes that according to the testimony of unbiased Western and Russian journalists who visited Iraq, "during conversations with Iraqis, they almost unanimously say: under the dictatorship of Hussein, they lived incomparably better than under the current democracy" [9, p. 82].

The current state of affairs in the country demonstrates that the US policy during the 1990s and the aggression of 2003 only deepened the contradictions, not only did not democratize, but also "rolled back" the previously prosperous state.

References
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When the socialist camp collapsed in the early 1990s, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred (Russian President Vladimir Putin described this event as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century), many researchers - political scientists, sociologists, economists (including the ever–memorable F. Fukuyama) – regarded this event not only as a triumph of liberal doctrine, but also as the establishment of a monopolar world led by Washington. The events of recent years have shown the unjustifiability of not only the opinions of experts, but also the positions of the North American colossus: The modern transition to a multipolar world, although it takes place in a difficult struggle, both geopolitical and economic, nevertheless meets the urgent requirements of the world community. It is noteworthy that it was Iraq that became the focus of attention of the West, in general, and the United States, in particular, both in 1991, when Operation Desert Storm actually marked the transition to multipolarity, and in the early 2000s, when the first serious cracks in the US hegemony began to appear. These circumstances determine the relevance of the article submitted for review, the subject of which is US policy in Iraq in the 1990s - early 2000s. The author sets out to trace the US position towards Iraq both before 1991 and after, to determine the reasons for the intervention of the Western coalition in the internal affairs of Iraq, as well as to identify the consequences of the defeat of the regime S. Hussein. The work is based on the principles of analysis and synthesis, reliability, objectivity, the methodological basis of the research is a systematic approach, which is based on the consideration of the object as an integral complex of interrelated elements. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the very formulation of the topic: the author, based on various sources, seeks to characterize the positions of Washington and Baghdad in the 1990s, as well as to determine the reasons for the decision of the Western bloc to forcibly "democratize" Iraq. Considering the bibliographic list of the article, its scale and versatility should be noted as a positive point: in total, the list of references includes over 40 different sources and studies, which in itself indicates the amount of work that its author has done. The undoubted advantage of the reviewed article is the attraction of foreign literature, including in English. From the sources attracted by the author, we note normative legal acts, published documents from the collection of the President of the United States, periodical materials, memoirs of statesmen, etc. From the research used, we point to the works of K.V. Butba and A.A. Kireev, whose focus is on various aspects of U.S. policy in the Middle East in the 1990s. Note that the bibliography of the article is important both from a scientific and educational point of view: after reading the text of the article, readers can turn to other materials on its the topic. In general, in our opinion, the integrated use of various sources and research contributed to the solution of the tasks facing the author. The style of writing the article can be attributed to a scientific one, at the same time understandable not only to specialists, but also to a wide readership, to anyone interested in both the Middle East region in general and US politics in particular. The appeal to the opponents is presented at the level of the collected information received by the author during the work on the topic of the article. The structure of the work is characterized by a certain logic and consistency, it can be distinguished by an introduction, the main part, and conclusion. At the beginning, the author defines the relevance of the topic, shows that after 1991, the concept of the United States assumed "a new split of the world, but no longer into capitalist and socialist, but into the Western, as the only center of civilization, and "rogue states" that refused to follow the principles of Western-style democracy." The paper shows that "the continuity of the policy of the George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) with the Clinton administration was to continue the "spread of democracy" around the world, and especially in the Middle East." Revealing the reasons for the American aggression, the author draws attention primarily to Washington's interest in controlling the Iraqi oil industry. The main conclusion of the article is that the US policy towards Iraq "during the 1990s and the aggression of 2003 only deepened contradictions, not only did not democratize, but also "rolled back" a previously prosperous state." The article submitted for review is devoted to an urgent topic, will arouse readers' interest, and its materials can be used both in training courses and within the framework of strategies for relations between Russia and Western countries. In general, in our opinion, the article can be recommended for publication in the journal Genesis: Historical Research.
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