The Role of Rustavi-2 TV Channel in the Preparation and Implementation of the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia

Naumov Alexander Olegovich ORCID: 0000-0002-8366-5934 Doctor of History Professor at Moscow State University, Department of International Organizations and Problems of Global Governance 119192, Russia, g. Moscow, Lomonosovskii pr., 27/4, of. A817 naumovao@my.msu.ru Other publications by this author

Naumova Anastasiya Yur'evna PhD in History Senior Researcher, Institute of Eurasian and Interregional Studies, RSUH 119602, Russia, Akademika Anokhina, 38, k.3, p.7, sq.392 region, Moscow, Akademika Anokhina str., 38 anaoumova@yandex.ru

Twenty years ago, in 2003, the first "color revolution" took place in the post–Soviet space - the "rose revolution" in Georgia. It represented a coup d'etat carried out with the help of "soft power" technologies imported from abroad, and was among the operations to change political regimes that took place at the beginning of the XXI century in the countries of Transcaucasia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, once part of the USSR.

The socio-political crises that ended with the overthrow of the rulers of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, who had been in power for a long time, were based on both objective and subjective factors. The first, first of all, should include the reasons of a socio-economic nature: low standard of living of the population, social inequality, widespread corruption, unemployment, lack of working social elevators, etc. Political aspects also played an important role in the emergence of the protest movement, namely: the long-term irremovability of power, serious flaws in the public administration system, the lack of a common ideology, regionalism and separatism, national-religious and clan contradictions.

However, in the genesis of the "color revolutions", the role of an external factor should not be underestimated, which was clearly manifested in the comprehensive support of "revolutionaries" from abroad. To implement the "color" scenarios of the West, a multi-level infrastructure was created and used. Its upper level was occupied by American, Canadian and European governmental and semi-governmental agencies, various public and private foundations, foreign and international non-governmental organizations. Under the guise of various socio-cultural and humanitarian programs, the United States and its allies gradually increased their interference in the affairs of foreign countries, starting their activities to shake the foundations of semi-authoritarian (but quite legitimate) regimes long before the immediate beginning of the "color revolutions". At the local level, political parties, national non-governmental organizations, youth movements, and finally the mass media, created on the initiative and with the financial and organizational support of the West, operated.

In this paper, the focus is on studying the role of the media in the preparation and implementation of the "rose revolution". The fact is that it was the opposition media, along with the political opposition and the Kmara youth organization, that played a key role in the coup in Georgia in 2003. It is worth noting that in modern Russian scientific discourse, this issue has practically not been addressed. It is possible to note only general studies on the activities of the mass media during the "color revolutions" ^{[1, 2]}, as well as an article presenting the results of an analysis of the television market of post-Soviet Georgia ^[3].

During the reign of Eduard Shevardnadze (1995-2003), who took a course towards rapprochement with the West and authorized the implementation of so-called programs to promote democracy, there was a whole range of independent media in the country (from the ruling regime, but not from its foreign sponsors), which openly criticized the president and the government. As the American researcher L. Mitchell aptly noted, for many Georgians, the main barrier to obtaining critical information was not state censorship at all, but frequent power outages that interrupted television broadcasts, as well as poverty that prevented them from buying printed publications ^{[4, p. 345]}.

Rustavi-2 TV channel, which became widely known due to its consistent and uncompromising struggle against the ruling regime, stood out among the media outlets not controlled by the Georgian authorities. The TV channel was founded in 1994 in the city of Rustavi, located near Tbilisi. At first it was a small local television station crammed into several rooms in a local hotel, but after a couple of years Rustavi-2 moved to the capital, and even then began receiving consulting and financial assistance from such structures as the United States Agency for International Development, Internews International and the Eurasia Foundation. This fact provided the TV channel with a solid financial base and allowed it to immediately declare itself. P. Miel, Director of Internews International training Programs, rightly noted that "Rustavi-2 has always stood out not only in Georgia, but throughout the former Soviet Union. They knew what they needed to learn and constantly required more and more complex professional training. Content production and management were at the level of the best Russian stations" ^{[5, p. 15]}.

In a short time, Rustavi-2 managed to reach a wide audience coverage and gain a reputation as an authoritative news source. The investigative journalism conducted by the TV channel was particularly popular among the Georgian population. In addition, a number of socio-political talk shows were launched, the most successful and resonant of which was the weekly program "60 Minutes", which was characterized by unprecedented openness in Georgia, actively criticized the actions of the government, placing special emphasis on the problems of corruption in the highest echelons of power. Another product of Rustavi-2, the Night Courier program, also raised the most topical issues for the Georgian public, analyzing all significant events in the country.

Reports critical of the ruling regime and the fact that it was the only media outlet with nationwide coverage besides state television turned Rustavi-2 into the most watched channel in Georgia by the end of the 1990s ^{[3, p. 83]}. Of course, this could not but cause discontent and irritation of the authorities, who did not want to share the monopoly on providing information to the public. Relations between the Shevardnadze regime and the independent TV channel deteriorated every day. And on July 26, 2001, a huge scandal broke out: the young presenter of the "Night Courier" G. Sanaya, who was dealing with the most pressing issues of Georgian politics, was killed right in his Tbilisi apartment by a shot in the back of the head at close range. Despite all the efforts of the official authorities, they have not been able to convince the public that this contract killing is not directly related to the professional activities of the deceased. Sanai's death stirred up the public and turned Rustavi-2 into a real hotbed of resistance to the Shevardnadze regime.

The TV channel continued to expose numerous facts of corruption among high-ranking Georgian officials with triple energy; in response, the authorities began to exert increasing pressure on it. On October 24, Minister of the Interior K. Targamadze accused Rustavi-2 of subversive activities carried out with foreign funds. A week later, employees of the Ministry of National Security of Georgia conducted a search of its headquarters in order to find certain financial documents. However, quite unexpectedly for law enforcement officers, right during the investigative actions, the company's journalists began broadcasting the raid of the security forces live. Rustavi-2 was supported by a number of members of parliament, and the very next day several thousand protesters gathered at the headquarters of the TV channel, many of whom were mobilized by the Institute of Freedom, which was part of the network of structures of J. Soros. The protesters not only demanded an end to pressure on Rustavi 2, but also insisted on the resignation of President Shevardnadze, the government and the dissolution of parliament. It is important to note that these protests have received significant support from abroad, especially from influential international journalistic non-governmental organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists ^{[5, p. 17]}. A few days later, the head of the National Security of Georgia, V. Kutateladze, was forced to leave his post, and then Shevardnadze dismissed the entire Cabinet of Ministers.

This crisis was a kind of rehearsal for the "rose revolution". It led to the resignation of two of the most prominent representatives of the younger generation of Georgian politicians, who were allies of Shevardnadze, but after the events around Rustavi-2 turned into fierce opposition to the ruling regime, and then led the "color revolution" in Georgia. We are talking about M. Saakashvili, who defiantly resigned from the post of Minister of Justice in September 2001 and promptly formed the anti-government "United National Movement", and Z. Zhvania, who refused the post of Speaker of Parliament in protest and subsequently organized the United Democrats party.

For a year and a half, the confrontation between the authorities and Rustavi-2 was in a relatively latent mode. Six months before the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2, 2003, Shevardnadze's regime went on the offensive. Several libel and disinformation cases were initiated against the TV channel, which Rustavi-2 lost in court and was obliged to pay substantial monetary fines ^{[5, p. 18]}. On the eve of the vote, the Central Election Commission of Georgia tried to revoke the license of Rustavi-2 altogether and cancel the accreditation of the TV channel, accusing it of pressure on the CEC and direct attacks on its employees ^{[6, p. 81]}. However, the government's attempts to curb or destroy Rustavi-2 did not lead to any significant results and only strengthened the authority of the TV channel in the public consciousness.

During the election campaign, Rustavi-2 became a key media ally of the opposition, openly supporting the political leaders of the Rose Revolution, M. Saakashvili, Z. Zhvaniya, N. Burjanadze and the Kmara youth movement. He regularly provided the airwaves and persistently called on Georgians to participate in protest actions. According to research conducted immediately after the "rose Revolution", more than 90% of the adult population of Georgia watched news releases on the state-owned Channel One, but only about 10% of viewers trusted the information transmitted to them. The situation with Rustavi-2 was completely different: a slightly smaller number of citizens watched it - about 85%, but almost 70% trusted it ^{[7, p. 45]}. At the same time, it is worth noting that the TV channel covered the events and presented information in a biased and biased manner, in a way beneficial exclusively to the opposition. Rustavi-2's reports on the rallies had an important technological feature: opposition demonstrations were always broadcast from close range, strictly avoiding aerial shots that could make it clear that there were actually not so many protesters and they crowded into a relatively small space. The image of anti-government actions on the television screen was so different from reality that the audience really got the impression of the existence of a mass movement that actively supported M. Saakashvili and other opposition leaders, which, in turn, led to an increase in the number of protesters. While ordinary citizens considered the TV channel a model of objectivity, the journalists themselves, according to E. Kitsmarishvili, General Director of Rustavi-2, "covered the events in Tbilisi (the Rose Revolution – A.N.) exclusively one-sidedly" ^{[8, p. 32]}.

A few weeks before the parliamentary elections, Rustavi-2 began to actively promote the conduct of opinion polls, which convincingly showed a decline in the popularity of the pro-presidential forces and, conversely, predicted the victory of the opposition. The data from these polls, which, of course, found an important place in the broadcast network of the TV channel, demonstrated, for example, a sharp increase (from 8 to 23%) in electoral support for Saakashvili's party in the first two months of autumn 2003 ^{[8, p. 14]}. At the same time, there were constant warnings in the televised debates that the government was preparing to rig the elections. Together, this led to the fact that even before the elections, the Georgian voter was prepared for possible violations in the vote counting procedure and the struggle to protect his own choice.

During the active phase of the "rose revolution", which began after the parliamentary elections on November 2, Rustavi-2 TV channel widely informed the population about the growing protest wave, broadcast rallies and marches of the opposition around the clock, covered the preparation and progress of convoys of buses and cars led by Mikhail Saakashvili from the province to Tbilisi. After each news release, there were calls to join the protesters. Political bias was evident even in the weather forecasts for Rustavi 2, which included the following remarks: "It's raining this morning, but by the time the opposition rally starts, the sun will be shining over Tbilisi." In prime time, Kmara commercials were shown on the air ^{[9, p. 172]}. The channel has repeatedly shown the documentary "Overthrow of the Dictator", which told about the fall of the regime of S. Milosevic during the "bulldozer revolution" in Serbia in 2000. The Secretary General of the United National Movement, I. Merabishvili, frankly stated to Western journalists: "This film played a crucial role. All the demonstrators knew by heart the tactics of the revolution in Belgrade, because they had watched a film about it. Everyone knew what to do. It was a copy of that revolution, only brighter."^[10]

On election day, live broadcasts were conducted from polling stations, journalists immediately notified about the detected violations, both voters and international observers spoke in front of cameras and microphones ^{[1, p. 90]}. Together with the British Council, the Open Society Georgia Foundation and the Eurasia Foundation, Rustavi–2 sponsored a parallel counting of votes in the elections, which was carried out by the non-governmental organization Global Strategic Group ^{[11, p. 9]}. This fact, as subsequent events showed, was extremely important for the growth of the socio-political crisis in the country.

According to preliminary data announced by the official authorities immediately after the closing of polling stations on the evening of November 2, the first place with 21% was occupied by the pro-presidential bloc "For New Georgia" created specifically for the elections in April 2003. The Union of Democratic Revival of Georgia party of Abashidze, Shevardnadze's ally– received 18%. The same indicators were demonstrated by the Saakashvili–National Movement bloc; several other opposition parties and blocs entered parliament, gaining 7-8%, including Burjanadze–Democrats. The opposition and international observers immediately accused the Shevardnadze regime of falsifications ^[11]. It should be noted that in these conditions, there was no unity among the political elite of Georgia on further actions. Instead of insisting on the victory of the "For New Georgia" bloc, some of Shevardnadze's confidants offered to enter into negotiations with the opposition or even hold new elections ^{[8, p. 10]}. In these circumstances, the opposition went on the offensive.

On the night after the parliamentary elections on November 2, 2003, Rustavi-2 TV channel published data from "independent" exit polls, which were strikingly different from official reports and gave a confident leadership to M. Saakashvili's bloc. A Wall Street Journal journalist aptly noted that "exit polls funded by the United States and NGOs, broadcast on Rustavi-2 TV channel, showed everyone exactly how the parties supporting Shevardnadze stole the elections" ^[13]. After the voting was completed, Rustavi-2 organized a telethon, during which data on the results of the will of the Georgian people were provided online. The screen showed official data indicating the victory of the government party, but next to these figures were exit polls and parallel vote counting data provided by Western-backed non-governmental organizations, which gave a clear victory to the opposition ^{[5, p. 7]}. All this, in the fair opinion of the Georgian researcher I. Khaindrava, made it possible to create an atmosphere of rejection in society of the voting results voiced by representatives of the Shevardnadze regime ^{[14, p. 108]}.

Mass protests against election fraud began in the country, which were led by M. Saakashvili, Z. Zhvania and N. Burjanadze. A few days later, demonstrators began demanding the immediate resignation of President Shevardnadze. At the same time, most of the protest rallies took place exclusively in Tbilisi and were relatively few in number, but most Georgians did not see them with their own eyes, but watched them on TV, primarily on Rustavi 2. The protests were covered around the clock, if the broadcast was interrupted, then only for interviews and round tables with opposition leaders, at which they brought information about upcoming demonstrations and actions to the attention of the population ^{[14, p. 108]}.

On November 20, 2003, the final election results were announced: E. Shevardnadze's bloc "For New Georgia" received 21.32%, A. Abashidze's political force – 18.84%, and Saakashvili's bloc was satisfied with only 18.08% ^[15]. The opposition refused to recognize the official results of the elections and brought thousands of its supporters to the center of Tbilisi, many of whom were transported by buses from the regions to the capital in advance. On November 22, during the solemn opening of the session of the parliament of the new convocation, right during the speech of President Shevardnadze, oppositionists led by Mikhail Saakashvili burst into the hall. Soon the entire parliament building was in their hands, and towards nightfall, without encountering any resistance, the opposition seized most of the government buildings in the capital.

All this, of course, was broadcast live on Rustavi-2 and was presented as a triumphant victory of the freedom-loving Georgian people over the autocrat Shevardnadze. In general, the contribution of this TV channel to the victory of the Rose Revolution cannot be overestimated. The capabilities of Rustavi-2 to promptly and professionally transmit critical information determined its main role in the operation to change the ruling regime, since it was through the media that the Georgian opposition was able to achieve emotional rejection by society of the elections held in November 2003 and their results, which became the direct reason for the start of the "rose revolution". At the same time, it was Rustavi 2 that helped to convey the ideas of Shevardnadze's displacement to the province ^{[16, p. 42]}. The future chairman of the Georgian Parliament, D. Usupashvili, who worked as deputy head of the Rule of Law program funded by the US Agency for International Development on the eve of the Rose Revolution, identified the TV channel as the most active part of the opposition coalition ^{[6, p. 94]}. And the American ambassador to Georgia, R. Miles, later openly admitted that Rustavi-2 "almost crossed all boundaries in trying to contribute to the overthrow of Shevardnadze," playing a crucial role in "the opposition's ability to focus attention on what was happening and keep people on the streets, despite the bad November weather" ^{[5, p. 18]}.

As the Georgian researcher G. Nodia rightly noted, "Rustavi-2 became a genuine revolutionary television... he had good reasons for this: it was obvious that if the regime won, it would try to destroy Rustavi-2" ^{[17, p. 120]}. This time, the channel turned out to be on the winning side, however, after the victory of the Rose Revolution, one of the founders and CEO of Rustavi-2, E. Kitsmarishvili, opposed the new president and government, whom he, in fact, brought to power, after which he was forced to leave Georgia. In the future, Rustavi-2 suspended a number of programs that were inconvenient for the Saakashvili regime, especially those that highlighted corruption, which continued (albeit in a slightly different form) to flourish in the country at the state level.

In conclusion, it should be noted that as a result of the "rose revolution", carried out with the very direct participation of the Rustavi-2 TV channel, Georgia has not turned into a prosperous democratic rule of law state, has not joined either NATO or the EU. Moreover, as a result of M. Saakashvili's adventurous policy, official Tbilisi finally lost control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the ex-president himself turned into a professional "color revolutionary" roaming other countries, eventually ending up in places not so remote in his homeland.

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