Switzerland's good offices in light of the American hostage-taking in Iran (1979-1981)

Khasanov Azat Postgraduate, the Department of Theory and History of International Relations, the School of International Relations, Saint-Petersburg State University 191124, Russia, Saint Petersburg, Saint Petersburg, Smolny str., 1/3, Smolny str., 1/3, office 150 st027367@student.spbu.ru

Relations between Switzerland and Iran before 1979

The first Swiss who appeared in Persia back in the XVII century were watchmakers, some of whom managed to get closer to the shah's family. In 1829-1837, the Christian missionary society "Basel Mission" (1815-2001) unsuccessfully tried to gain a foothold in the country ^{[63, s. 259]}. In the middle of the XIX century, Swiss firms began to settle in Persia. The establishment of cultural ties in the late XIX – early XX centuries was also helped by the activities of the Swiss archaeologist Gustave Jequier (1868-1946), who was one of the first scientists involved in the excavations of ancient Persian cities ^[30].

In 1857, a trade agreement was signed between Persia and Switzerland. Its ratification took place in 1866, after the revision of the Swiss Constitution, which previously restricted non-Christians in the right to freely choose their place of residence on the territory of the Alpine Confederation. Soon this agreement was updated during the state visit of Shah Nasser al-Din (1848-1896) to Switzerland. The Swiss, who in Persia mainly worked as engineers, architects, geologists and hoteliers, managed to benefit for themselves thanks to the Capitulation regime ^{[1, p. 359]}, which operated in the country until 1928 ^[30].

In 1919, the Swiss consulate opened its doors in Tehran (since 1936 – the embassy).  In 1934, an Agreement on Friendship and Trade Relations was signed, which allowed bilateral relations to continue to develop^[5].

The Persians were attracted to educational institutions in Switzerland. In 1910-1914, the future Prime Minister of Iran Mohammed studied at the University of Neuchatel Mossadegh (1951-1953), who defended his doctoral thesis in law there and became the first among his compatriots to receive a doctorate degree from a European university. The high prestige of Switzerland in Persia and the degree of development of bilateral relations was evidenced by the fact that children were sent to study in elite boarding schools not only by Persian aristocratic families (Musaddiks, Davars and Teymurtashi) ^{[28, s.185-196]}, but also by Shah Reza himself (his sons Mohammed and Ali studied at school -boarding house in Rol ^{[28, s. 211-219]} (canton of Vaud)).

During his studies, Mohammed (the future last Shah of Iran (1941-1979)) struck up a strong friendship with a native of Geneva, Ernest Perron. After graduating from the boarding school, Mohammed invited a Swiss friend to work in his country.  Mohammed appointed Ernest Perron as his personal secretary, who held this post from 1954 to 1961. In 1948, Mohammad Reza visited Switzerland on a semi-official visit ^{[28, pp.220-224]}, and soon this country turned into a favorite vacation spot for members of the Pahlavi dynasty ^{[28, pp. 235-242]}.

In the second half of the last century, there has been an increase in the number of Swiss living in the Middle Eastern country (see Table 1).

Table 1. The number of Swiss in Iran (1873-1978) ^[30].

The number of Iranians in Switzerland in the 1960s was approximately equal to the number of Swiss living in Iran.  For their mobility, Bern and Tehran signed an Air Transport Agreement in 1954 (updated in 1972), which allowed the Swiss national airline SwissAir to make regular flights to Iran ^[5]. 

Table.2. Trade turnover between Switzerland and Iran (in millions of Swiss francs) pp^{[28, pp.72-95]}

Eric-Roger Lang – Liaison between Washington and Tehran

In January 1979, Shah Mohammad Reza left for Egypt amid mass riots in Iran, and then went to the United States for treatment. He will never return to his homeland again. But in February of the same year, a fierce political opponent of the monarch, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989), returned to his homeland after almost 16 years of exile in Paris. The Islamic revolution took place in the country.

The revolution has not left a negative imprint on the Iranian-Swiss relations. Due to its impeccable reputation, Switzerland became the fourth country to which the new Iranian government appointed its diplomatic representative ^{[22, pp.52-53]}. It turned out to be the charge d'affaires Mahmoud Lavasani. In our opinion, the Iranians did not want to worsen relations with Switzerland in order to try to nationalize the shah's assets held in Swiss banks.

The newly minted authorities in Tehran planned to carry out a trial of the former shah, demanding that the United States extradite him. Having failed to achieve what they wanted, Iranian students stormed the US Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 and took 63 employees of the diplomatic mission hostage; six employees managed to hide in the house of Canadian Ambassador to Tehran Ken Taylor (1977-1980). Three more American diplomats were captured directly in the Iranian Foreign Ministry building. Thus began the story of their 444-day imprisonment.

By November 8, 1979, the Swiss had notified the Americans of their readiness to provide assistance. Judging by the telegram of the Embassy of the Alpine Confederation in Tehran, the doormen outlined three options for possible participation ^[6]:

• · assistance in the release of hostages;
• · delivery of humanitarian food to hostages;
• · Evacuation of hostages to Zurich (in case of their release).

It is worth noting that the Swiss Embassy in its report indicated an exaggeration of the state of xenophobic sentiments in Iran, and therefore the Swiss diplomatic mission behaved more calmly than other European embassies that recommended their citizens to leave Iran^[12].

The farsightedness of the Swiss is striking. They had already assumed on November 13^[21] that the American administration would use economic leverage by imposing an embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil. The very next day, the Americans banned the purchase of Iranian oil, froze the country's assets in American banks, stopped the supply of spare parts for military equipment.

 The Swiss also expressed their concerns about the forceful resolution of the crisis, which could cause an unpredictable reaction of the USSR. The settlement of the problem was seen by the official Bern exclusively through diplomatic negotiations. As a confirmation of their arguments, the Swiss cited the example of the incident with the American reconnaissance ship "Pueblo" in January 1968^[21], when 82 crew members (including six civilians, including two oceanographers), subsequently released after 11 months of difficult negotiations between official Pyongyang and Washington, fell into the hands of the DPRK authorities.

Nevertheless, in the analytical notes prepared in Bern on November 13, a big stake in resolving the crisis was placed on the new Iranian Foreign Minister Abolhasan Banisadr (at the same time he was acting Minister of Economy and Finance of Iran), appointed to the post only the day before ^[21]. It is also interesting that the residence of the Iranian minister was located next to the residence of the Swiss Ambassador E.-R. Lang ^{[22, pp.91-92]}.

On the same day, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom (1978-1981) sent a telegram ^[7] to Eduard Brunner (1978-1980), Diplomatic Adviser of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, expressing gratitude to the Swiss side for its services. We know from this document that at that time neither the Americans nor the Iranians thought of severing diplomatic relations with each other. 

On the same day, diplomats of the member States of the European Economic Community, of which there were nine in 1979, also applied their efforts to resolve the crisis. On November 13, Danish diplomats presented to the Americans the results of the meeting of nine ambassadors of the EEC countries (hereinafter EEC-9) with A. Banisadr. The Danes assumed that the Irish would play a leading role in presenting the collective views of the EAC-9 with the Iranians ^[32].

According to the documents of the US State Department, on November 10, Washington appreciated the proposal of the Swiss Ambassador Eric-Roger Lang to Iran (1979-1981) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran to release the women hostages as an act of goodwill ^[31]. Taking into account the fact that on November 19, by order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, African Americans and women (a total of 13 people) were released, it can be concluded that E.-R. Lang's proposal did not go unheard in the highest Iranian circles. To repatriate the released hostages, the American side wanted to send a military transport plane to Tehran. The Iranian authorities did not agree with this, fearing the possibility of military personnel arriving on such an aircraft intended for the release of hostages ^{[22, pp.64-67]}. Taking into account the attempted (albeit failed) operation of the American special forces to free hostages codenamed "Eagle Claw", which took place in April 1980, the fears of the Iranian side should be recognized as not in vain.

From that moment on, the Americans began to consider candidates for potential intermediaries for the evacuation of the released hostages. As a result, Washington decided to resort to the services of the Swiss, who offered to withdraw the freedmen through the airline "SwissAir" ^[33].

The choice of the American side was not accidental. Switzerland was one of the main communicators of the United States for communicating with the Iranian authorities ^[9]. To the Swiss Ambassador to Iran E.-R. Lang had to repeatedly appeal to local authorities to allow doctors and Christian clergy to visit three American hostages held in the Foreign Ministry. In addition, the Swiss ambassador had to perform courier functions: deliver letters and parcels to American hostages handed over by their relatives ^{[22, s.69]}.

US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom (1978-1981) noted three important roles performed by the Swiss diplomatic corps in the hostage situation, etc. ^{[22, pp. 71-72]}:

1. served as a communication channel for Washington in Iran;

2. was one of the sources of information about the real situation,

3. Ambassador of the Alpine Confederation to the USA R. Probst was a valuable advisor to the US State Department.

Judging by the telegrams sent from the Swiss Embassy in Tehran to Bern, the revolutionary authorities of Iran also highly appreciated the work of the Swiss diplomatic corps. The advantage for Alpine diplomats was their country's neutrality and vast experience in providing "good offices" ^{[10, 11]}. However, according to the recognition of E. - R. In Iran, they also had a weak point – the lack of contact with the spiritual leaders of the Iranian revolution ^{[26, S.117]}.

Although the Swiss ambassador had a trusting relationship with A. Banisadr, he was a secular statesman, the highest spiritual leadership of Iran was very radical. Despite this, E.-R. Lang, through A. Banisadr, secured an audience with the supreme spiritual leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the holy city of Qom for Shiites. But the leader of the revolution was adamant, insistently demanding the Shah's extradition from the United States. To all his questions regarding the release of hostages, Ayatollah Khomeini succinctly replied: "Read the Koran, my son, and you will get an answer! [26. s.117-118]".

 In this regard, the Americans began to actively look for a new haven for the Shah. As one of the options, the Shah himself considered Switzerland, with which he had been closely associated since childhood and where he and his third wife Farah purchased a villa in St. Moritz (canton of Grisons) in 1968, regularly spending their winter holidays there until 1975 ^{[28, pp.235-242]}. The Shah himself admitted that he would feel much more comfortable either in Switzerland or in Austria ^{[25, p. 92]}. But he soon abandoned this idea ^[34].

E.-R. Lang and E. Brunner were well aware that granting asylum to the Shah on the territory of the Alpine confederation would be fraught both for Switzerland itself and for the United States.  In this case, the Swiss Embassy in Tehran and its employees could face the same fate as their American colleagues. Moreover, the Swiss ambassador remembered lessons from the past, namely the murder in 1829 by an angry crowd of Persians of the famous Russian diplomat A.S. Griboyedov^{[26, S.118]}.

In addition, the Swiss communication channel for the Americans, which at that time was very reliable and important for Washington, could be put at risk. On the other hand, for humanitarian reasons, Switzerland had to accept the Shah, given his close ties with the confederation. The Swiss authorities found a "Solomon's solution", stating that there was no official request for asylum from the former monarch ^{[25, p. 92]}.

A. Banisadr had a hard time because, in addition to leading the foreign ministry (from November 12, 1979), he simultaneously headed the Ministry of Economy and Finance (from November 6, 1979). He was replaced as head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry by Sadek Gotbzadeh (1979-1980), with whom Swiss diplomats in Tehran also found common ground language^[36].  Thanks to this, the Americans maintained a Swiss channel of communication with Iranian officials^{[37, 38, 41, 42]}. 

To show the significance of E.R. Lang in the eyes of the American administration, let us turn to the story of six hostages hiding in the house of the Canadian ambassador in Tehran. They were taken out of Iran on January 27, 1980 thanks to a secret CIA special operation "Argo" / "Canadian trick". It is worth noting that six hostages took off using fake Canadian passports from Tehran to Zurich on a SwissAir flight. In addition, more than a month before that – on December 15, 1979, the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the US State Department, William Bowdler, reported to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (1977-1980) about the nervousness of Canadians about the fate of six diplomats, in case a crowd of revolutionaries decided to break into the territory of buildings in Iran that belonged to Canada. In this regard, the Americans considered the possibility of transferring six hostages to the custody of the Swiss ambassador to Iran as one of the options^[35].

Switzerland as a venue for negotiations on the fate of American hostages

The UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim (1972-1981) himself joined the negotiations on the release of the hostages. On December 31, 1979, he arrived in Iran, but proved powerless to resolve this issue ^[39]. 

Now the Americans had to choose a new negotiator with official Tehran ^[40] from among their contacts in Iran, among which were ^[44]:

· The so–called "Panamanian contacts" represented by Rodriguez "Rory" Gonzalez, assistant and confidant of the Supreme Leader of the Panamanian Revolution Omar Torrijos (1969-1981) and former Panamanian Ambassador to the United States Gabriel Luce (1977-1978), who had contact with human rights activists from Paris – Christian Bourget and Hector Villalon - contacts from the Iranian side;

·         Yasser Arafat (1929-2004) - leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (due to his ties with Ayatollah R. Khomeini);

· Richard Cottam (1925-1997) - Iranist, professor at the University of Pittsburgh, who advised the US State Department on the views of Gotbzade;

·         Mohammed Heikal (1923-2016) was an Egyptian journalist who wrote a book about R. Khomeini;

·         Sadiq Al-Mahdi (1935-2000) - Sudanese political and religious figure, former Prime Minister of Sudan (1966 - 1967** ), who visited Iran in the fall of 1979 and knew the situation in the country very well;

·         Mansur Farhang (1936) – Representative of Iran to the UN (1979-1980);

·         Organization of Islamic Cooperation;

· Eric-Roger Lang (1930) – Swiss Ambassador to Iran.

The State Department, highly appreciating Ambassador E.-R. Lang as a channel of communication with Tehran, considered that his involvement could jeopardize the usefulness of the diplomat in delivering a humanitarian channel for American hostages in Iran^[44]. The choice fell on the option proposed by the Panamanians - the French lawyer Christian Bourget and his Argentine colleague Hector Villalon, who was expelled from his country for his human rights activities. According to their ideological views, they were close to the Iranian opposition group in exile, operating in the Paris suburb of Nofle-le-Chateau, and in which A. Banisadr and S. Gotbzadeh were members^[40]. It was also important that A. Banisadr and S. Gotbazde were candidates for the first presidential elections of Iran (after the adoption of the new constitution in December 1979), which were to be held on January 25, 1980.

Human rights activists proposed to include the Irish public and political figure Sean McBride in the negotiation process, but his candidacy was rejected by the American side^[44].

Through Panamanian connections, human rights activists informed the American side about Sadek's desire Gotbzade to negotiate over the fate of the hostages. On January 19, 1980, White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan (1979-1980) and Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Harold Saunders (1978-1981) arrived in London. S. Gotbzade sent K. Bourget and E. Villalon instead of himself ^[40]; ^{[25, p.114-118]}. Their next meeting took place on January 25 in Washington after S. Gotbzade addressed G. Jordan through Richard Cottam with a request to receive K. Bourget and E. Villalon ^[43]; ^{[25, p. 130-137]}. In order to preserve the secrecy of the negotiations, it was decided to hold the next meeting elsewhere^[13]. The third round, held on February 9-10 in Bern, was already organized by the Swiss side ^[14]; ^[45]. On February 17, S. Gotbzade himself arrived in Paris for negotiations ^[46]. Although moderate A. Banisadr and S. Gotbzadeh conducted negotiations on the fate of the American hostages from the Iranian side, Ayatollah R. Khomeini had to make the final decision on their fate.

            S. Gotbzade, K. Bourget and E. Villalon hosted the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Events in Iran co-chaired by Mohamed Bedjaoui, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the UN (1979-1982) and Andre Aguilar, former Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the UN (1979-1982) in Tehran from March 7 to 11. The commission also included Adib Daudi, adviser to the President of Syria on political issues, Harry Jayawardena, a member of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (now the Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights) and Louis-Edmond Pettiti, a French human rights activist ^[47]. The main snag in the negotiations was the demand of the Iranian authorities for the extradition of Shah Reza Pahlavi, who had been in Panama since December 1979. However, on March 10, there was hope for a resolution of the conflict, associated with A. Banisadr's statement about the release of hostages within 15 days. It was decided to discuss the transfer of American hostages in the Alpine Confederation in a bilateral American-Iranian bilateral format ^[48].

            On March 12-14, 1980, an American delegation consisting of the White House Chief of Staff G. Jordan, Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs G. Saunders and the head of the Iranian Department of the US State Department Henry Precht (1978-1980) met with K. Bourget and E. Villalon in Bern ^{[49, 50]}; ^{[25, p. 193-194]}. At the same time, the first round of parliamentary elections was held in Iran. The announced results of the first round of elections showed that Islamists were gaining more and more weight in the Iranian government, and moderate forces in the person of A. Banisadr and S. Gotbzade were losing it. The issue of the extradition of the Shah, who flew from Panama to Egypt on March 23, 1980, was still unresolved.

In addition, the 15-day deadline for the release of hostages promised by A. Banisadr was expiring ^[51]. In this regard, on March 27 and 29, the White House, through the Swiss Embassy, conveyed a message to the leaders of the IRI demanding that by the end of March the American hostages from the hands of radical students holding them be taken fully or partially under their custody ^{[52, 53]}. Having not received a clear response from the Iranian authorities ^[54-56], and also taking into account the inviolability of positions on the extradition of the Shah and the release of American hostages Ayatollah R. Khomeini ^[57,58], the three-month negotiations mediated by K. Bourget and E. Villalon failed. Jimmy Carter's administration was running out of patience. On April 3, a message was sent to A. Banisadr and S. Gotbzada about the imposition of sanctions against Iran if the Iranian students did not hand over the American hostages to the government of the country ^[59]. Under these conditions, C. Bourget and E. Villalon tried to save the negotiation process by forming a commission, which in addition to themselves included the Swiss Ambassador E.-R. Lang and the Syrian Catholic Bishop Hilarion Capucci^[60]. However, A. Banisadr failed to convince the Ayatollah, and the hostages remained in the hands of the students.

   Switzerland's protective mandate to represent U.S. interests in Iran

On April 7, 1980, J. Carter, after a meeting with members of the US National Security Council, decides to sever diplomatic relations with Iran and impose economic sanctions against it, including a ban on the export of American goods (including medicines) and money transfers to Iran^[61]. Taking into account the above, it was obvious for the White House to choose Switzerland as a protective force in Iran. In addition, Washington has repeatedly resorted to the diplomatic services of a European country. It is only worth noting the very important protective mandate of Switzerland to represent interests in the United States in Cuba (1961-2015) ^[2].

In Bern, already in November 1979, they were preparing for the adoption of a protective mandate from the United States in Iran. According to the Swiss Federal Council, it would be much easier for the Swiss to implement the American protective mandate in Iran if the Swiss represented the interests of Iran in the United States ^[12]. An obstacle for Switzerland in obtaining a protective mandate from official Tehran was the need for approval from the country's highest clergy^[8].  

However, there were different views on this among Swiss diplomats. For example, Ambassador to Tehran E.-R. Lang, realizing that the decision on the possibility of the Swiss side to represent American interests in Iran would be made personally by Ayatollah Khomeini, was very wary of the implementation of the protective mandate^[15]. A completely different opinion was held by the ambassador of the Alpine Confederation in Washington, R. Probst (1976-1980), who believed that Switzerland was obliged to assume the American mandate in Iran^[16]. Arguing his point of view, Probst very rightly noted that the "good offices" of Switzerland are not at all alien to the new revolutionary authorities.

The Alpinists were also given confidence by the fact that the Islamic Revolution in Iran put three more protective mandates in the Swiss piggy bank. After the revolution in February 1979, the new Iranian government began purposefully spoiling relations with two African states – Egypt and South Africa.

The reason for the severance of diplomatic ties with Cairo was the refusal of the Egyptian authorities to extradite the fugitive Shah to the new Iranian authorities.  Since May 9, 1979, to this day, the interests of Iran in Egypt are still represented by Swiss diplomats.

Before the Islamic Revolution, the Shah's Iran maintained close ties with the Apartheid regime in South Africa in the fields of trade, science, defense, medicine, energy and mining. The new revolutionary authorities in Tehran severed relations with Pretoria, then imposed trade and economic sanctions against it.  In addition, the new Iranian leadership began to actively fight the Apartheid regime. All these actions of Iran have nullified the previous relations between the two countries ^[23].

Therefore, both countries turned for help to their trusted partner in representing interests in a foreign country – Switzerland. Bern as a protesting power was well known to Tehran. Switzerland has already represented the interests of South Africa in Iran in 1952-1953. Bern represented the interests of official Pretoria from October 8, 1979 to August 9, 1995; official Tehran in South Africa – from October 17, 1979 to May 10, 1994.^[27]

Official documents of the Swiss Foreign Ministry indicate ^[18,19] that after the official rupture of diplomatic relations between Washington and Tehran, the Swiss were ready to begin fulfilling the protective mandate for the United States without hesitation. However, there was no official request from Washington, on April 24, 1980, the Americans, with the help of their special forces, attempted the military release of the hostages (Operation Eagle Claw). Because of the desert storm, helicopters and planes of the US Air Force could not fly and crashed in the desert. Only after that, the United States was forced to turn to Switzerland with an official request to represent interests in Iran ^{[29, s.111]}. To make the task easier for its diplomats in Tehran, the official Bern sent an additional 10 employees there ^{[22, s.110]}. Since April 24, 1980, Alpine diplomats have been representing American interests in Iran to this day.

During Operation Eagle Claw, 8 American servicemen were killed. Already on April 25, Washington turned to E.-R. Lang with a request for help in organizing the repatriation of their bodies ^[62]. This task has become a headache for him. In this case, he was greatly assisted by the priest Hilarion Capucci, who had already taken part in negotiations for the release of the hostages. By that time, in the Islamic world, I. Capucci had established a reputation as a defender of the rights of Palestinians. His anti-Israeli and anti-American rhetoric aroused only sympathy not only from the revolutionary authorities in Tehran, but also from religious authorities, which helped him get the bodies of the dead soldiers of the American special forces ^[24]. On May 4, 1980, the coffins with the bodies of US special forces were sent by plane to Zurich.

Surprisingly, these events coincided with the day of the death (May 4, 1980) of the leader of Yugoslavia Josip Tito Broz. The Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Pierre, arrived in Belgrade to say goodbye to the head of the SFRY Ober (1978-1987), and Iranian Foreign Minister S. Gotbzadeh. Thus, they managed to talk to each other. According to E. Brunner, after saying goodbye to the Yugoslav leader, the head of the Iranian foreign Ministry did not fly to Iran, but flew to Zurich with P. Ober. S. Gotbzade, during a conversation with P. Ober and E. Brunner, admitted that he was losing his influence in the government^[20].

At the same time, two other neutral European countries, Austria and Sweden, tried to help Switzerland in this difficult situation. In May 1980, a delegation consisting of former Swedish Prime Minister*** and leader of the Social Democratic Party Olof Palme (1969-1976; 1982-1986), Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky (1970-1983) and Spanish Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez (future Prime Minister) flew to Iran to discuss the issue of the release of Americans with the Iranian leadership. Spain in 1982-1996). They failed to get the American hostages out^{[3, p.172]}.

Towards the Algiers Agreements

If the American mandate in Iran was in the safe hands of Swiss diplomats, then the representation of Iranian interests in the United States remained open. The question arises: if Switzerland's "good offices" were not alien to the new Iranian authorities, then why did they not entrust the protection of their interests in the United States to Switzerland? The fact is that in the case of the United States, the newly minted Iranian authorities, fundamentally sought to emphasize their new identity - it was very important to appoint an Islamic country with a revolutionary past as their representative of interests. Such, according to the newly minted revolutionary leadership, was Algeria ^{[22, s.111]}.

The question arises: why did official Tehran in May 1979 choose Switzerland as a protective force in Egypt and South Africa? The reason lies in the fact that due to the rapprochement with Israel, Arab countries have severed diplomatic relations with Cairo. Muslim countries did not have official diplomatic ties with Pretoria, due to South Africa's policy of racial segregation. Therefore, Iran was forced to resort to the diplomatic services of Switzerland in Egypt and South Africa.

The Iranians' choice of Algeria as a protesting force in the United States aroused the enthusiasm of the Swiss Ambassador to Washington, R. Probst. The reason was that the Algerian ambassador to the United States was Redha Malek, with whom R. Probst was familiar from the Franco-Algerian negotiations (1961-1962) held in Switzerland. In addition, the co-chairman of the UN Commission of Inquiry on the events in Iran was the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the UN, Mohamed Bedjaoui.

West German diplomats also managed to contribute to the development of the negotiation process with the clergy of Iran. Here, too, it was not without personal acquaintances. German Ambassador to Iran Gerhard Rizel (1977-1981) had relations with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran   Sadeq Tabatai (1979-1980), who was married to a German woman. S. Tabatai was close to Ayatollah R. Khomeini due to family ties, his sister was the daughter-in-law of the spiritual leader.  But the strong friendship between E.-R. Lang and G. Rizel was explained by the fact that the West German ambassador was closely connected with Switzerland. After Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, Rizel's family fled to Switzerland, where the future diplomat received not only an education, but also a Swiss passport ^{[26, pp.118-119]}.

It seems to us that the reason for the rapid development of the negotiation process with the spiritual leadership of Iran was a series of events in the summer – autumn of 1980. Due to deteriorating health, one of the hostages, Richard Queen, was released on July 11, 1980, after which he went to Zurich for hospitalization. His release was regarded as a step of goodwill on the part of Iran. On July 27, 1980, Shah Reza Pahlavi died – a stumbling block between the American and Iranian authorities. On September 22, 1980, Iraqi troops invaded Iran without declaring war. The long and bloody Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) began. The initial stage of this war was extremely difficult for Tehran, which made it more accommodating in further negotiations over American hostages. 

On November 2, 1980, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived in Algeria. An active phase of negotiations began with the mediation of Algeria, which ended on January 19, 1981 with the signing of the Algerian Agreements ^[1], as a result of which 52 American hostages were released.

*     *     *

After the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran, Switzerland de facto began to represent American interests in Iran (from November 4, 1979; de jure - from April 24, 1980). The US choice of Switzerland as a protesting force was due not only to the neutral status of the Alpine Confederation and the fact that official Washington repeatedly resorted to diplomatic Bern's services. Swiss diplomats, in particular, Ambassador to Iran E.-R. Lang provided a reliable communication channel between Washington and Tehran. In addition, the performance of humanitarian functions fell on the shoulders of E.-R. Lang from the first days.

The Alpinists also managed to establish close ties with the revolutionary authorities of Iran, who adhere to secular views (A. Banisadr and S. Gotbzade). But establishing a connection between Christian Switzerland and the Shiite clergy turned out to be a difficult mission, which is why further US-Iranian negotiations were mediated by Muslim Algeria, which, like Iran, had a revolutionary past. Nevertheless, the new revolutionary leadership was forced to resort to the diplomatic services of Switzerland in Egypt and South Africa.

Both Washington and Tehran highly appreciated the role of Switzerland in organizing secret negotiations, which also took place on the territory of the Alpine country itself. As a sign of appreciation, in 1982, former President Jimmy Carter arrived in Bern, where he expressed his deep gratitude to the Swiss who contributed to the release of American hostages from Iranian captivity^{[29, S.113]}.

It should be noted that Switzerland continues to represent the interests of the United States in Iran today. Iran also does not refuse the diplomatic services of a neutral country, entrusting Switzerland to represent its interests in Egypt (since 1979) and Saudi Arabia (de facto since 2016; de jure - since 2017).

* In 1979, the members of the European Economic Union were: Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and Germany.

** Sadiq al-Mahdi was Prime Minister of Sudan (1986-1989).

*** Olof Palme was Prime Minister of Sweden in 1969-1976 and 1982-1986.

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