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Philosophical Thought
Reference:

Typology of philosophical worldviews. Problems of the naturalistic worldview

Nizhnikov Sergey Anatolievich

ORCID: 0000-0002-3456-2445

Doctor of Philosophy

Professor, Department of History of Philosophy, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia named after P. Lumumba (RUDN University)

117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2

nizhnikov-sa@rudn.ru
Lagunov Aleksey Aleksandrovich

ORCID: 0000-0002-8498-6449

Doctor of Philosophy

Professor, Department of Philosophy and Ethnology, North Caucasus Federal University

355017, Russia, Stavropol Territory, Stavropol, Pushkin str., 1

emaillag@mail.ru

DOI:

10.25136/2409-8728.2024.1.44169

EDN:

JEJPCW

Received:

29-09-2023


Published:

05-02-2024


Abstract: The article proposes a typology of philosophical worldviews: naturalistic, pantheistic and transcendental. The naturalistic worldview, which includes positivism and materialism, is analyzed in detail. On the basis of historical-philosophical and epistemological consideration, the metaphysical nature of the category "matter" is determined. It is shown that in materialism this category is hypertrophied to the status of a pseudo-absolute. It is noted that the logic of historical, philosophical and spiritual development inevitably leads to the formation of the concept of the Absolute, realizing the principle of monism in the interpretation of the fundamental basis of being. This process is considered on the example of ancient hylozoism, through the crisis of atomistics going to the dualism of Plato (idea and matter) and Aristotle (form and matter), removed in the dialectic of Hegel. It is shown that if we proceed from materialistic axiomatics, it is impossible to solve such cardinal philosophical problems as an adequate definition of the ontological status of the category of matter, the establishment of the cause of movement, the creation of theodicy, the explanation of the existence of freedom, the justification of morality and humanism. The unresolved nature of these problems in materialism leads to the need to form other types of philosophical worldviews: pantheistic and transcendental, which have a pronounced metaphysical character, however, although they proceed from the concept of the Absolute, they think it fundamentally differently. In the future, the authors plan to publish articles devoted to the consideration of pantheistic and transcendental types of philosophical worldviews.


Keywords:

naturalism, matter, materialism, hylozoism, atom, metaphysics, Absolute, source of movement, theodicy, worldview

This article is automatically translated. You can find original text of the article here.

Introduction

 

There can be no man without a worldview that distinguishes him from an animal. There is a phenomenon of freedom in human life, and the animal is entirely determined by biologically given instincts, it is deterministic; in this sense, the animal is not mistaken, nature "thinks" for it, which is expressed in instinctive reactions, but a person is forced to consciously act at his own risk — he has a degree of freedom that puts him in front of a choice or some other act. This choice is determined by the worldview, which, explaining the world and the position of a person in it, orients him to a certain behavior. And what determines the worldview itself? Answering this question, we come to the need to identify various forms of worldview that can be classified as philosophical, religious, scientific, mundane and superstitious. We will not go into the explanation of each of these forms, since our goal is to establish and consider the typology of philosophical worldviews. Despite the fact that M. Heidegger denied the ideological function of philosophy, one cannot agree with this in any way. Of course, philosophy is not limited to "worldview preaching" [1, p. 82], however, the unfolding philosophy inevitably generates a corresponding worldview and an ideology based on it. On the other hand, philosophy strives to solve ideological problems and answer relevant questions based on its method, its specificity.

Wilhelm Dilthey, noting the diversity and disorder in philosophical systems, in his work "Types of worldview and their discovery in metaphysical systems" sets himself the task of their ideological classification, creating neither more nor less a science of worldview. First of all, he notes that the worldview is broader than philosophy, it is not only a creation of thinking: "... it is the result of a position taken in life, life experience ..." [2, p. 225]. In this regard, V. Dilthey highlights the worldview in religion, poetry and literature, as well as in philosophy, analyzing the latter in the section "Types of worldview in metaphysics". The philosophical worldview is rational in nature and, in turn, is divided into three types: "naturalism" (Democritus, Hobbes, Holbach, Feuerbach, Buchner, etc.), "idealism of freedom" (Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc., but based on Kant) and "objective idealism" (Heraclitus, Parmenides, Spinoza, Goethe, Schelling, Hegel, etc.). In our opinion, logic is poorly visible in this list, but the eclecticism and neo-Kantian preferences of the philosopher himself are obvious.

We will propose a different scheme, justified, as it seems, by a certain logic. Analyzing the history of philosophy and the variety of philosophical constructions, we can cite the following typology of worldviews, logically proceeding from ontological and metaphysical attitudes: naturalistic, pantheistic and transcendental. The initial axiomatic attitude of consciousness is taken here as a starting point, which then unfolds into the corresponding philosophical discourse. The adequacy of a particular type of philosophical worldview should be judged by the quality of their answers to cardinal philosophical questions, which, first of all, include: the question concerning the arche, the fundamental basis of being, i.e. the Absolute (which is where philosophy began), the second — about the possibility of building a theodicy, the third is related to the justification of freedom and The fourth is with the justification of morality and humanism.

In this article, we will focus on the analysis of the first type of philosophical worldview, the naturalistic one, noting beforehand that it is he who is actualized in the modern world, which is acquiring an increasingly pronounced "pagan" character: "... not in form, not according to the reanimated rituals and rituals practiced in it, but spiritually, worldviews" [3, p. 3]. The naturalistic worldview differs in that it lays the basis for thinking about the world of sensory, empirical experience, and then, abstracting from it, forms the category of "matter", which reduces all the diversity of this experience. This is the "philosophy of life of a sensual person", whose worldview, as V. Dilthey writes, is based on "subordination of the will to animal instincts" [2, p. 238]. Sensualism here acts as a theory of knowledge, and materialism provides a metaphysical justification. To naturalism we can refer both positivism and materialism, which, in turn, are divided into many directions and interpretations. But they are all united by the denial of metaphysics, speculative principles, because they cannot be empirically verified. However, the very development of positivism has shown that it is impossible to describe the whole reality with "protocol sentences", and that science needs some axiomatic positions and categories that it borrows from philosophy-metaphysics.

 

About the concept of "matter"

 

Let's first consider the basic concept of naturalism — the concept of matter. Materialists usually characterize their type of philosophizing as scientific (in the evidentiary sense), however, the central category of matter used by them is still a purely philosophical, speculative category, since it cannot be perceived with the help of the senses — we see and touch only specific objects and phenomena. How it is formed is described by G. Hegel in The Science of Logic: "If we abstract from all definitions, from every form of something, then indefinite matter remains. Matter is something completely abstract. (Matter cannot be seen or touched, etc. — what is seen or felt is already a certain matter, i.e. the unity of matter and form)" [4, p. 498]. Dilthey notes in this regard that naturalism falls into a vicious circle: "It seeks to bring consciousness out of what is given only as a phenomenon of consciousness" [2, p. 239]. Therefore, we can state that matter is the same metaphysical concept as "idea", "spirit", "Absolute", etc.; it is not detectable and not provable by scientific method, one can only believe in it, as in God. In materialism, generating everything from itself, it acts as a demiurge creator. Thus, V. Windelband explains: "In this sense, materialism or natural science monism is the same metaphysics as Plato's doctrine of ideas, because they also talk about universal necessary definitions of existence" [5, p. 280]. Then it turns out that materialism is also idealism, but not realizing its idealism, blind, primitive idealism. As the Russian philosopher A. F. Losev writes: "... matter, in the sense of a category, has a role exactly the same as the idea" [6, p. 218]. "Materialism is based on the domination of the abstract functions of the human mind, the products of which are projected externally and in such an abstract form are absolutized"; it is the "monkey of Christianity" [6, p. 143]. K. G. Jung also writes about this: "And now a new disease has developed in the West — the conflict between science and religion. The critical philosophy of science became, so to speak, negatively metaphysical - in other words, materialistic — on the basis of an erroneous judgment: matter was considered a reality that can be felt and known. But it is an entirely metaphysical concept, hypostatized by uncritical minds. Matter is a hypothesis. By saying “matter”, we are actually creating a symbol for something unknown, which may just as well be a “spirit” or something else, maybe even God... [...] In fact, the conflict between science and religion is caused by a misconception of both. Scientific materialism has only hypostatized something new, and this is an intellectual sin. He gave the higher principle of reality a different name and believed that by doing so he had created something new and destroyed something old. But no matter how you call the principle of being — God, matter, energy or something else - nothing arises from this, but only the symbol changes" [7, pp. 93-95]. A materialist, according to Jung, is a "metaphysician involuntarily" and against his will [7, p. 95].

It is more correct to define materialism not as a "scientific" worldview, but as a "naturalistic"metaphysics," because the scientifically-empirically unprovable concept of matter is the basis of everything. Of course, this is pseudo-metaphysics, vulgarized, and, in fact, unrelated to real philosophy, since nothing can be deduced from its central category. Matter, as well as all its subsequent wonderful world-creating functions, must simply be believed in. "The essence of materialistic metaphysics," writes V. Dilthey, "is in the struggle against religious ideas and against spiritualistic metaphysics" [2, p. 242]. Representatives of materialism position themselves with surprising constancy as worldview atheists, however, we note that an atheistic worldview is impossible in principle, although many people characterize their views in this way. Atheism is a negative concept (other-Greek. ? "without" + "God"), therefore, it is impossible to define a worldview through him, since it is necessary to indicate not what a person does not believe in, but what he believes in. It would be more correct to speak not about an atheistic, but about an atheistic-materialistic worldview — in this case, the concept itself indicates a positive content, the object of faith that is offered instead of the denied God.

Today, the concept of atheism, including due to its absurdity (it is impossible to prove that there is no God, since for this it is necessary to know the whole universe and even go beyond it; moreover, it is already necessary to know what is denied), prefer another and talk about agnosticism. Defining himself as an agnostic, a person wants to say by this that he does not believe in anything due to the lack of a fundamental opportunity to substantiate every object of faith. However, if you think about it, agnosticism is just as impossible as atheism as a worldview, because every person still believes in something, yes: as F. M. Dostoevsky shrewdly said, if a person rejects God, he will definitely worship an idol. Candidates for such idols can be: a certain personality (then a "cult of personality" arises), ideology (totalitarianism, nationalism), material values, even one's own passions and sensual pleasures. In relation to the Absolute, everything else will be private, idolatry is the elevation of the private to the Absolute, but morality and true humanism cannot be based on anything private. According to F. M. Dostoevsky (and in the XX century Erich Fromm, Mircea Eliade, Martin Heidegger and many other thinkers wrote about this), all people are believers, they differ only in the object of their faith. What is called faith in religion is called metaphysics in philosophy. Metaphysics, as M. Heidegger writes about it, "belongs to the "nature of man." It is neither a branch of school philosophy nor a field of whimsical intuitions. Metaphysics is the main event in human existence. She is the very human being." And what we call philosophy "is the setting in motion of metaphysics, in which philosophy comes to itself and to its urgent tasks" [8, p. 42].

What has been said about faith and metaphysics can easily be explained logically. Human consciousness should always be filled with an explanation of the world, it does not tolerate emptiness. But it is impossible to explain the world only empirically and scientifically, since it is boundless (therefore, a holistic scientific worldview is, strictly speaking, impossible). And here philosophical reason and religious faith come to the rescue, which are the only ones capable of this. Faith is also included in philosophical metaphysics, it is its basis, because any philosophical concept is based on certain axiomatic premises, on what can no longer be asked. Here is what Aristotle writes about this in Metaphysics: "... evidence for everything is impossible… After all, the axioms have the highest degree of generality and are the essence of the beginning of everything (997a)" [9, p. 103]. And further: "... but it's ignorance not to know what to look for evidence for and what not to (1006a)" [9, p. 126].

The development of philosophical and religious consciousness in all developed cultures shows the inevitability of the birth of the concept of a single speculative principle, which was revealed in the "axial time" — Tien (Heaven), Brahman-Atman, arche, Absolute. According to Aristotle, if a person's self—consciousness develops naturally, it inevitably comes to the idea of the Absolute (Nusa) - the single source of everything. So among the Greeks, philosophy begins with the search for the origin of being — arche, which is also translated as "power", "domination", "strength". Both the developed religious consciousness and philosophy are monistic: This is the requirement of both logic and the growing spiritual self-awareness of man.

Thus, we found out that the materialistic worldview is also "metaphysical" at its core, although the materialists themselves deny metaphysics, calling their ideas "scientific". G. Hegel writes: "The main mistake of scientific empiricism is always that, using metaphysical categories — matter, force, one, many, universality, infinity, etc. — and guided by such categories, using forms of inference and proceeding from them as presuppositions, does not know at the same time that he himself contains metaphysics, deals with it himself; he thus uses these categories and their combinations completely uncritically and unconsciously" [10, p. 149]. Having eliminated this terminological inadequacy, it would be possible to calm down on this, however, along with the recognition of materialism, other problems of a semantic, philosophical nature arise. According to Hegel, the naturalistic worldview cannot be called philosophical at all, since it is unable to answer fundamental questions about the existence of man and the world. It does not grow to the formulation of spiritual questions and problems at all, representing the worldview of the philistine of bourgeois society, a consumer society that orients a person to the empirical and limits him to sensual pleasures. Philosophy is essentially idealism, because it thinks with ideas and is aimed at comprehending the metaphysical essence of the world. For Hegel, the spirit "is in general a real idealist": "Philosophical idealism consists only in the fact that the finite is not recognized as truly existing. Every philosophy is essentially idealism, or at least has it as its principle, and the question in this case is only how far this principle is really carried out, philosophy is idealism to the same extent as religion, because religion also does not recognize finiteness as true being, something last, absolute or, in other words, something incomplete, uncreated, eternal. Therefore, the opposition of idealistic philosophy to realistic philosophy has no meaning. A philosophy that ascribed to finite existence, as such, a true, final, absolute existence, would not deserve the name philosophy. The originals (Prinzipien) of ancient or new philosophical teachings — water or matter or atoms — are the essence of thought, the universal, the ideal, and not things as they are directly found in existence, i.e. things in sensuous singularity; even Thales' water is not like that; for although it is also empirical water, it is at the same time time is "in-itself" or the essence of all other things, and these latter are not independent, do not have a basis within themselves (in sich gegrundete), but are posited flowing from another, from water, i.e. ideal" [4, pp. 135-136]. G. Hegel considered the dispute between materialism and idealism dialectically: "... one time a concrete, truly existing thing turns out to be ideal, another time its moments are equally ideal, filmed in it; in fact, there is only a concrete whole, from which the moments are inseparable" [4, p. 136]. Hegel also dialectically solved the problem of the relationship between form and matter: "... matter must take shape, and form must materialize" [4, p. 409].

A. F. Losev emphasized that Democritus is the same idealist as Plato, because the atom is also an idea, especially the philosophical concept of the atom. A.V. Semushkin in this regard noted that Democritus "physical and metaphysical worlds lie in the same ontological plane," adding that "atomism proposed the principle of explaining physical and metaphysical worlds." only physical phenomena..." [11], i.e. he identified the philosophical idea of the atom with the smallest indivisible physical particle, and Plato divorced the concepts of ideas and things, although the idea is its essence. This, it seems to us, is the difference between Plato and Democritus' understanding of the relationship between idea and being.

 

Materialism in solving philosophical problems

 

Having shown the metaphysical essence of the concept of matter, let us turn further to its characteristics. Let's say we recognized matter as the primary basis of existence, believed in it (that behind all the diversity of things perceived by our senses lies a certain substance called matter), but how can we deduce existence from it? The most logically developed, "dialectical materialism" tries to solve this problem with the help of dialectics, but it requires bifurcation, paired categories are necessary. Matter in materialism appears as a pseudo-absolute and does not tolerate anything else next to it. In other words, it is absolutized. One can get out of this difficulty only by recognizing matter as the Creator, endowing it with demiurgic functions, will and reason — but materialists deny all this. This is probably why A. F. Losev notes that "dialectical materialism is a blatant absurdity, a complete violation of all dialectics and the most typical bourgeois abstract metaphysics"; "a special kind of mythology" and "some special dogmatic theology" [6, p. 143]. G. Leibniz also noted that God's creation of the world out of nothing is a great miracle, but the self—organization of the world out of matter alone is an unprecedented and unthinkable miracle, a miracle of miracles, because it is absurd.

But let's go further and ask the question: how is movement possible if dialectics is impossible? Without explaining the origin, the source of the movement, it is impossible to build a world. Materialists, on the other hand, claim that motion is inherent in matter. It is impossible to prove this, it is required, again, only to believe firmly. R. Descartes at one time declared: give me matter and motion, and I will build a world out of them, and I. Kant was even more radical, saying: give me one matter, and I will build a world out of it — he believed that so as matter is characterized by attraction and repulsion, it generates motion. However, this will still be a "pseudo-answer"; philosophical thinking searches for the ultimate cause and raises the question: "How and why is matter characterized by attraction and repulsion?" G. Hegel criticized this position of Kant from the standpoint of dialectics, according to him Kant "already assumes the idea of matter and then asks what forces are required in order to to obtain the proposed definitions of it" [6, pp. 158-159]. "Kant constructed matter from the forces of repulsion and attraction" [6, p. 158], and did not derive it dialectically. "This point of view sees only ordinary mechanics, and not immanent and free movement" [4, p. 160], concludes Hegel.

Raising the question of the source of the movement of existence, the very logic of the development of the history of philosophy forced us to come to a division into material (passive) and active (active) causes. It is necessary either to take the source of movement beyond matter itself (since: "Matter, what is defined as indifferent, is passive in contrast to form as that which is active..." [4, p. 409]), or to recognize it as a spiritual being itself, and then again it will be necessary to identify in matter itself the passive and active principle, "soul and body".

Pre-Socratic natural philosophy thought of matter hylozoistically. Thus, in Thales "everything is animated and full of demons" [12, p. 270], his water is alive: at this stage, natural philosophy still thought "animistically", without separating the organic and inorganic. A.V. Semushkin writes: "... Ionian natural philosophy is hylozoistic in its concrete historical form" [13, p. 390], therefore, the very question of the source of movement is removed in it. A living being moves itself, because it has a soul — an active motor principle, and a body — a passive one. Together they are "hylozoistic matter" (although this statement is tautological). In this regard, according to Aristotle, the Ionian philosophers "thoughtlessly bypassed the question "about movement, where or how it came from" [9, p. 75].

But already Democritus's hylozoistic-mythological ideas stop working, the unity of the spiritual and the material disintegrates. Democritus now needed to indicate the source and cause of the movement of atoms, but he fails: according to the surviving statements, he does not give an answer to this question. The only phrase that says this in Simplicius's presentation is that atoms "shake in all directions" [12, p. 329]; but what "shakes" them is not explained. Emptiness itself cannot be a source of motion — gravity is necessary for this, the presence of which also requires an explanation. It must be the soul, as in hylozoism, but atomism is no longer hylozoism, a different explanation is required. Atomistics actually witnessed a crisis in ancient thinking, characterized by a transitional moment from natural philosophical hylozoistic monism to Plato-Aristotelian dualism. Therefore, Democritus could neither solve the problems of the source of motion, nor, accordingly, explain the initial stage of cosmogenesis, nor connect his cosmology with his own remarkable ethics (it stands apart from him), since atomic anthropology is spiritless [14]. Democritus' philosophy is usually defined as materialistic, with which, for example, A. F. Losev categorically disagrees. He explains that "the atomists opposed religion, but not against the gods, which they also consist of atoms. They are not atheists, but deists" [15, p. 475]; "Democritus has nothing to do with materialism" [16, p. 7], since the atom is also an idea, but thought of as the smallest indivisible element of being.

A new path opened up in the subsequent development of ancient philosophy: from Anaxagoras, who distinguished Nous and homeomeria, to Plato (idea and thing) and Aristotle (form and thing). Note in this regard that no philosopher denied the category of matter — without it it is impossible to build a system of the world — however, these "idealist" philosophers did not think of it as an Absolute substitute for everything else. She is Plato's "nurse" and Aristotle's epistemological "nothing". According to Hegel, matter is a "formless identity", "formless indefinite", another form, its substrate [4, p. 408]. As Leibniz explains, "matter is something purely passive... therefore, it is necessary to admit something besides matter, which would be the beginning...". This is something the philosopher has a soul, and "this principle, being active, in combination with the passive, constitutes a complete substance" [17, pp. 383-384]. Everywhere in matter, according to Leibniz, "primary entelechies", souls, are scattered. A complete substance is a monad — this is how Leibniz solved the problem of the unity of the spiritual and the material.

In addition to the insolubility of the problem of determining the source of movement, it is impossible to deduce consciousness and understand the spiritual life of a person from the materialistic worldview; morality is not deducible from it, but it is possible to justify immoralism. This is due to the inability to justify freedom. V. Dilthey writes that "with a materialistic understanding, there is no place for perceiving the world in terms of value and purpose" [2, pp. 242-243]. Materialists love Democritus, they start from him, but the ancient Greek philosopher has everything determined and freedom, even chance, is completely denied. In Ancient Greece, this could still be partially accepted, due to the pagan concept of inexorable fate, which passed into philosophy, but in the European, Christian world, familiar with the concept of freedom, determinism cannot be accepted in any way.

If we recognize matter and believe that it develops, is the source of movement, consciousness, etc., then it will already be a "god", to be more precise, an idol. As A. F. Losev explains, "there is absolutely no absolute evidence in 'empiricism' as such. You have to believe in empiricism — that's the whole point. But this also means that European empiricism is the most ordinary mythology" [6, p. 477]. Thus, materialism recognizes "God" exclusively as matter, denying other teachings about the Absolute. As a result, historically it turned out that the materialist doctrine, realized in society in the form of Marxist-Leninist ideology, turned into a "scientific" pseudo—religion - Marxism-Leninism. However, mythology does not stand still, it "develops" and in the modern world has acquired the form of "liberal democracy" — a secular political pseudo-religion (interpreted, for example, by Francis Fukuyama's "the end of history"). Idols change, but the essence of worship remains the same. When the metaphysical Absolute is eliminated, there remains an earthly faith in building the Kingdom of God on Earth, expressed in various forms of God-fighting chiliasm, which inevitably leads to violence, since the realization of any utopia requires sacrifices.

 

Conclusion

 

Thus, faith and metaphysics are inevitable in ontological, epistemological, axiological and other senses. Therefore, it is necessary to move from veiled "materialistic metaphysics" to explicit metaphysical concepts that really try to solve cardinal philosophical problems: the existence (origin) of all things, the source of movement, theodicy, freedom and morality. Max Scheler in his work "Philosophical Worldview" formulates what was said as follows: "A person has no choice — to form or not to form a metaphysical idea... a person always needs to have this kind of idea and this kind of feeling. His choice is only whether he has a good and reasonable idea or a bad and contrary to reason idea of the absolute. But to have a sphere of absolute being in front of one's thinking consciousness belongs to the essence of man... A person can fill this sphere of absolutely existing and supreme goodness, without even noticing it, with finite things and benefits... This is fetishism and idolatry. [...] And if a person is destined to get out of this state of mind, he must learn two things. He must, firstly, through introspection, realize his “idol”, which has taken the place of absolute being and goodness for him; and secondly, he must smash this idol to pieces, i.e. return this excessively adored thing to its relative place in the finite world. Then the sphere of the absolute reappears — and then only the state of mind of a person allows him to independently philosophize about the absolute" [18, p. 4-5].

The naturalistic worldview does not recognize the Absolute, nevertheless, it tries to represent substance in the form of matter. But the logic of the development of thinking cannot stop at such a representation due to the above-mentioned reasons. Developing thinking necessarily comes to the concept of the one and the absolute, on the basis of which it would be possible to answer the basic philosophical questions. The doctrine of the speculative absolute can be defined as metaphysics, because by definition the One cannot be reduced to the existent — one way or another it has a super-essential character. But the understanding of the super-being can also be presented in different ways, historically it has been expressed in pantheistic and transcendental types of philosophical worldview, which require separate analysis.

 

 

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First Peer Review

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The list of publisher reviewers can be found here.

The reviewed article examines the problem of the typology of worldviews and characterizes one of the three types (according to the author's classification) of the worldview. This topic can hardly be considered "relevant" if the latter means the lack of attention of researchers to it, a small number of publications, lack of scientific discussions, etc. On the contrary, we are talking about one of the most discussed philosophical topics, in any case, since the beginning of the last century, the number of publications on philosophical and ideological issues has increased dramatically and so far, the interest of researchers in it has not faded. In this case, "relevance" should be associated with the novelty, originality, and content of the views presented in the article, and the decision can only depend on the assessment of these sides of the presentation. Familiarity with the text, in the opinion of the reviewer, does not reveal any grounds that could encourage him to recommend it for publication. Let's focus only on those components of it that are most disappointing and raise doubts about the expediency of its publication. The name is already unsuccessful: it is cumbersome ("two-part"), and the reader cannot help but suspect that the material provided is not the realization of the original idea (and this is exactly what we value most in articles on philosophy), but the result of the "division" of some more extensive material that was not thought of by genre and style as a scientific article. Unfortunately, subsequent reading only confirms this suspicion, since the style of the article does not reflect the process of understanding a problem and finding a solution to it, but rather corresponds to the system-analytical nature of the presentation, which we often encounter in "generalizing" lectures. There is no plot in the article, no lively polemic, the author "steadily" expounds what he has known for a long time, and what he does not doubt at all. The beginning of the article is also unsuccessful. Worldview as a "specific feature" that separates a person from an animal? Isn't this a very private sign? And why would animals be needed in an article on such a topic? Strangely, the author does not give any clear definition of the concept of worldview at all, what he says about it in the introduction is difficult to recognize as a definition ("worldview, ... explaining the world and the position of a person in it, orients him to certain behavior, etc."). Often, according to the text of the article, it seems that the author says not about "types of philosophical worldview", but about philosophical directions, and are there any differences between them? If not, then why the "worldview"? (For a wide range of readers, it would be interesting to reproduce the history of the origin of this concept.) Finally, the main part of the text is a polemic against "materialism", but what kind of materialism is this? Is it possible to call those thinkers whom the author chooses as his "rivals" and then easily deals with them the most powerful representatives of that trend in philosophy with whom he decided to fight? Strangely, there is no "German ideology", no "Ludwig Feuerbach", no "Materialism and empirio-criticism" in the bibliography... There is not a single mention of several generations of Soviet philosophers (have their names already been forgotten?). And the literature of the historical and philosophical plan is presented very unevenly, for example, there are no modern publications in foreign languages. It is not surprising that the conclusion in which the conclusions should be presented looks pale and meaningless, more than half of its volume is occupied by an extensive and not too interesting quotation. Unfortunately, we have to admit that the presented material does not introduce anything new into the well-known ideas about the "naturalistic" worldview, I recommend rejecting it.

Second Peer Review

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Review of the article In the scientific article "Typology of philosophical worldviews. Problems of a naturalistic worldview", presented by the author in the journal Philosophical Thought, provides an analysis of various philosophical positions or, as the author calls them, worldviews. The subject of the study is a materialistic (naturalistic) worldview. The author mentions other types in passing (more often he writes about idealism), in cases when it is necessary to contrast or compare them. Based on the "onto-metaphysical attitudes", the author identifies such varieties of philosophical worldview as: naturalistic, pantheistic and transcendental (where does idealism disappear?). The conclusions emphasize that they require a separate analysis, which is undoubtedly of interest. As the author emphasizes in his work, in the future the purpose of his research will be to establish and consider the typology of all the above-listed philosophical worldviews. The relevance of the issues raised by the author of the article is quite obvious, since the status of philosophy in the modern world is changing and requires a comprehensive analysis and serious rethinking. Philosophical thinking, as a rule, implies a value-based approach, and modern civilizational shifts literally force us to reconsider most issues through the prism of anthropological centering, where it is still important for a person to search for meaning. Is philosophy a science and what follows from this in this case? And can philosophy be considered a worldview that has its own specifics? Considering that most textbooks on philosophy for universities still continue to reproduce the same stereotypical statements about the relationship between the concepts of worldview and philosophy, the question raised by the author seems to me very relevant (even fundamental, when it comes to a unified curriculum). The perception of philosophy in the modern world is ambiguous, and therefore any discussion in the professional community of the purpose of philosophy, its engagement in social and political terms, is already timely and even necessary. The author is concerned that the naturalistic worldview is being actualized in the modern world, "acquiring an increasingly pronounced "pagan" character." This statement, of course, is deducible from the realities of our society, but at the same time requires clarification, since, in my opinion, it is quite difficult to grasp any long-term dominant trends in the rapidly changing post-information world. The novelty of the research can be attributed to the very formulation of the question of the fundamental admissibility of the existence of a materialistic (naturalistic) worldview as proven or even scientific. The author tries to show us that the very concept of matter is an integral part of metaphysics, moreover, the definition of matter as an absolute is only possible because it does not tolerate another source outside itself or alongside. The conclusions obviously flow into the plane of moral and ethical judgments. If everything is matter, then there is no place for spirituality in a person's life as a primary source (good), which means there is no higher value, etc. Thus, morality can be justified only within the framework of quite pragmatic (preferably ideological) dogmas and principles. The religious position on this issue is more honest, since it is initially based on faith, suggesting that we ourselves draw a conclusion about the necessity or excess of any rational evidence that is not of fundamental importance to a true believer. The author associates the worldview with freedom, which determines human existence itself. Therefore, the author naturally asks the following question: "What determines the worldview itself?" Along with the philosophical, religious, scientific and everyday, the author also highlights a superstitious worldview. It is a pity that he does not explain his classification in any way. The article specifically states: "We will not go into the explanation of each of these forms ...". In my opinion, this is a rather important issue that affects the substantive elements of the worldview. The main advantage of this article is that it leaves the desire to discuss almost every position of the author and there is a need to get acquainted with his further works, to see how the idea of the typology of philosophical worldviews conceived by the author will be implemented. The methodology of the research is not specifically indicated by the author himself, but it is obvious that the author does not rely on the historical and genetic method in presenting his ideas. The work looks complexly structured, since the author refers to different sources and easily follows from Hegel to Democritus and vice versa. The analysis of the presented typology of worldviews is proposed to be considered based on the quality of their answers to cardinal ideological questions. In the article, for the most part, this is the Absolute, the rest of the issues will probably be presented in subsequent works. In the article, the author refers to well-known sources based on the ideas of ancient thinkers, Leibniz, Hegel, Dilthey, Losev, Heidegger, etc. However, there was a great lack of modern discussions on this issue. I hope that the author will pay attention in his further research not only to the authorities of the past, but also to modern thinkers. In my opinion, it would be interesting to turn conceptually to the works of Russian thinkers, starting with the criticism of materialism by religious philosophers of the late XIX-early XX century, and then touch in more detail on the Soviet period in the person of M. Mamardashvili and other equally well-known philosophers. There are other questions for the author, for example, it is not entirely clear why he so easily identifies the concepts of "materialism", "scientific empiricism", "naturalism" and "realistic position". Apparently, an explanation is required here for each specific mention in a particular context. The title of the article corresponds to the content. The conclusions are presented concisely, but quite informative. The bibliography reflects the research material. The necessary links have been made in the text. The nature and style of presentation of the material meet the basic requirements for scientific publications of this kind. In my opinion, this topic has good prospects, is of a debatable nature and may be of interest to a wide range of audiences. The article may be recommended for publication.
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