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Philosophical Thought
Reference:

The Ethical Thought of the Bengal Renaissance:
A Discovery of Morality in Indian Tradition (1815–1870)

Skorokhodova Tatiana G.

ORCID: 0000-0001-6481-2567

Professor, Penza State University

440046, Russia, g. Penza, ul. Krasnaya, 40, kab. 12-218

skorokhod71@mail.ru
Other publications by this author
 

 

DOI:

10.25136/2409-8728.2023.8.40991

EDN:

WDFFDI

Received:

13-06-2023


Published:

05-09-2023


Abstract: The origin of Modern Indian ethical thought is described in the article. The author depicts the genesis of ethics as originated from the works by key personalities of the Bengal Renaissance XIX – early XX century. The juxtaposition with traditional Indian thought permits to present the intellectual process in Modern Bengal elite minds as ‘discovery of morality’. Based on hermeneutic analysis of the texts on moral problematics from Rammohun Roy and the Brahmo Samaj thinkers to Krishnamohun Banerjea, the author reconstructs the becoming of Indian ethical thought in the context of their striving for the moral regeneration of traditional society. For the first time the genesis and becoming of thinking of Indian intellectuals about morality in its connections with the present condition of social decline in colonial India are disclosed in the research. The experience of Bengal thinkers of 1815–1870th demonstrates the solution of super-task to find ethics in ancient sacred texts and next to build religiously based ethics. The super-task had been settled by the method of interpretation that permits to see high moral precepts in high faith in One God of original religion as it opposed to polytheistic Hinduism. The result of applying the method was embodied in the creative and high conception of Hindu morality based on ethical God Creator. The Bengal thinkers are firmly convinced that displaced into periphery of Hindus’ consciousness morality as a code of normative ethics must be revived and turned into leading imperatives of consciousness of people.


Keywords:

Modern Indian philosophy, the Bengal Renaissance, ethics, morality, sacred scriptures, tradition, dharma, monotheism, Rammohun Roy, The Brahmo Samaj thinkers

This article is automatically translated. You can find original text of the article here.

The outstanding philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in his "Indian Philosophy" (1923-1927) described the ethics of each religious tradition (Vedic, Jain, Buddhist) and each of the six orthodox schools (astika darshan), seeking to prove the inconsistency of the accusation of the lack of moral character in Indian philosophy and the proper "ethical philosophy in Indian antiquity" [1, p. 38]. By the time Radhakrishnan's work was published, this criticism coming from Europeans was no longer new, as was the Indian thought about ethics and morality, which was formed in Modern times and whose line of defense of the indigenous ethical tradition was reproduced and developed by the Indian philosopher. However, European scientists had serious grounds for doubt: there was no special discipline engaged in understanding good and evil, virtue and sin, values and norms of behavior and other ethical categories in the Indian philosophical tradition, although it is also incorrect to speak about the complete absence of ethical thought. Unlike the European philosophical tradition, where ethics as a doctrine of morality appeared in the period of the ancient classics (and Aristotle gave it a name), in Ancient India, ideas about norms, good, good and evil, good and bad were included in different dimensions of spiritual and social life and did not contribute to the formation of moral and ethical issues in a special a field similar to the "practical philosophy" of Europe.

V. G. Lysenko notes the initial inscribability of good and evil "in the natural course of development of both the universe (...) and society and the individual" — hence the absence of their strict opposition and "unambiguous distribution of roles between the forces of good and evil" [2, p. 360]. Hence the relative relativity of both concepts in religious life and the practice of social behavior. An analogue of the concept of "morality" in the Indian tradition is the Sanskrit concept of "dharma", which, however, is much broader in scope, and as "the most important conceptual universal of Indian thought, untranslatable into European languages by any one term because of its fundamental ambiguity" [3, p. 373], includes the meanings of religion, religious laws, rights and norms of behavior (universal and quite specific social, differentiated by varnam and jati). Therefore, different philosophical schools, comprehending morality, consider dharma in its general and concrete manifestations — for example, as the opposition of dharma and adharma, virtue and vice in the ethics of the Vaisheshika school [4, p. 220]. Including at the general level universally valid moral principles (non-harm (ahimsa), non-adultery, truthfulness, non-possessiveness, etc.), dharma is differentiated according to the multitude of beings united in groups (jati), each of which occupies its place in the hierarchy of the universe and performs a specific dharma (svadharma). In this sense, it is preferable for a person to fulfill svadharma (social duty) according to his varna (estate), jati (caste) and at the same time the stage of life (ashram) according to the prescriptions of the sacred texts (smriti) [2, pp. 361-362].

The area of individual behavior, also associated with dharma, but assuming "a person's personal moral responsibility for his actions and, accordingly, a moral assessment of these actions" [5, p. 439], in the Indian tradition describes another law — karma. Ethical issues of the correlation of good and evil are raised here, a connection is established between an individual's act and his later life and subsequent births. V. G. Lysenko emphasizes that despite the abstract and passive nature of responsibility for the actions of a past life and the fatalism of karma, it is "inextricably linked with free will and this differs from the fatalistic view of the world", — conscious action meets the challenges of fate [5, p. 439].

Existing inseparably with religious beliefs and cultural universals of dharma and karma, as well as moksha (liberation from the chain of endless rebirths (samsara) as a goal and value), morality in the form of a set of ideas about values, norms and rules of behavior regulated social life, but was not a special object of comprehension. Ethical thought is more clearly expressed within the framework of heterodox (Buddhism and Jainism) and orthodox (Vaisheshika, Vishishta-Advaita and Advaita-Vedanta) darshanas, but it has not been determined in a special area of philosophical knowledge with a wide problem field. The situation with ethics resembles the absence of social philosophy in Indian antiquity: in the presence of a once and for all developed social doctrine of Brahmanism, in which the existing inequality and hierarchies are fixed as a proper social order, society did not become worthy of comprehension in the eyes of philosophers of India until Modern times.

The genesis of ethical thought as an independent field of philosophical knowledge in Modern India dates back to the time when its peoples were involved in modernization processes from the late XVIII — early XIX centuries . A peculiar ethical turn in Indian philosophical thought occurs at the beginning of the national-cultural renaissance in the regions of India, which became colonies of the British East India Company and the meeting place of Indian culture with the West [6-8]. The awakening of interest in morality as a social phenomenon is fixed in the thoughts of representatives of elites who have come into contact with European culture and institutions (primarily education, science and law) and at the same time are well aware of their socio-cultural tradition. Before taking shape in a special line of thought, in a special kind of "practical philosophy" on Indian soil, ethics itself at first turns out to be a philosophical problem. Its source was the question of the presence of morality in the native religious tradition, which is rooted in antiquity and is in no way inferior to the high morality of other religions and cultures. Answering this question, the thinkers used the traditional method of reading and interpreting sacred Sanskrit texts, in which they found the high morality they were looking for. This discovery of morality was part of a special intellectual phenomenon that J. Nehru called it "The Discovery of India" — the comprehension of the native country, its people and culture in all the richness of its manifestations both in historical retrospect and in modern times [9, pp. 160-206]. At the same time, the search for moral principles and normative ethics against the background of knowledge about other religions and ethical systems was to a certain extent a super-task, since this required not only a fresh adogmatic interpretation of the content of traditional texts, but also a certain understanding of religion that sets the approach to morality and ethics.

The beginning of the all-Indian intellectual and cultural process of discovering and comprehending one's own tradition and heritage in search of a way out of the crisis situation of the Western challenge to society in economic, political, social and spiritual life was associated with a vast region of the northeast of India — Bengal; it was under the control of the colonial administration earlier than other territories, and its elites were the first to enter into dialogue and the West, its culture and civilization, heritage and achievements [10-12]. In Bengal, new intellectuals involved in interaction with the colonial authorities in the administrative, legal, economic, educational, cultural and scientific spheres seek to comprehend the state of society in its various dimensions; the most obvious result of this comprehension is understanding it as a moral decline. In terms of A. J. Toynbee's philosophy of history, this understanding of the situation as a moral crisis looks like the transfer of the external challenge of the West into the internal field of society, about which an answer is required. This transfer and transformation of an external challenge into an internal moral challenge to society, according to Toynbee, is committed by "troublemakers" (challengers), who thereby initiate an adequate creative response to an external challenge and stimulate the growth of civilization [13, p. 216].

From the very beginning of the Bengali Renaissance, in the texts and public practice of reformers and enlighteners — starting with the founder of the era, philosopher and public figure Rammohan Rai (1772-1833) — there is an acute and lively interest in moral and ethical issues. He became a troublemaker who described his contemporary society in India in terms of social decline. The core of the latter, in fact, is the decline of morality associated with the degradation of the religious life of Hindus from ancient monotheism to polytheism with its "idolatry", ritualism and ritualism. Rammohan's verdict was impartial and categorical: it was the oblivion of high morality and humanity itself that led society to the large—scale spread of all kinds of social evils - from the infection of consciousness with superstitions and prejudices that plunge "a huge part of the Indian people into social and family inconveniences and deprive them of useful aspirations" [14, vol. II, p. 315], and to inhumane ritual practices like sati (self-immolation of widows). Rammohan calls into question the very civility of such a way of life of compatriots, marked by a touch of barbarism [14, vol. II, pp. 352-354]. The reformer also pointed out the causes of the moral and social crisis; it is primarily the fault of the brahmins, who created and protected the caste order, which creates a total dependence of each person on elites and society and suppresses free action and initiative [14, vol. I, p. 21; vol. IV, p. 930], and also fully regulates life with ritual prohibitions.

Thanks to Rammohan, morality and ethics were actually designated as problems: the first — in the practice of social life, since it requires changes in the moral consciousness and behavior of people; the second — in the field of thinking, since it requires a developed tradition of philosophizing about the ethical foundations of human existence. Since then, the motive of moral decline and degradation has become one of the dominant ones in Bengali public thought. "We cannot be satisfied with the current state of affairs in any way. We are sorry that we are surrounded by such unhappy and degraded compatriots, and we would like to be proud of wiser and more perfect minds and be inspired by a steadfast civic spirit" [15, p. 22], — declared in 1838 the younger contemporary R. Raya Krishnomohan Banerjee (1813-1885). Over time , which arose in R. The idea of Paradise rebirth as "improvement" – national in general and in various areas of life, from spiritual to secular (enlightenment, culture, politics) [14, vol. II, pp. 316, 472-473] and as development [14, vol. II, p. 446] — is directly associated with a change in the moral state of society, first of all, the Hindu community. "... The moral revival of our country depends on its intellectual, social and political revival," a young politician Surendronath Banerjee (1848-1925) said in 1876 [16, p. 241]. In the light of two ideas — moral decline and the urgent need for moral revival — the ethical thought of the Bengali Renaissance arises and develops.

Chronologically, the development of ethical thought can be divided into two conditional stages. The first, which will be discussed below, begins with 1815 — the year of the beginning of the reform activity of Rammohan Rai and ends with the 1870s - the time of the formation of cultural nationalism with its increased attention to the basics of Indian tradition and identity. Founded by R. Rai "Brahmo Samaj" (1828; "Society of [worship] Brahmo (to the One God)") It became the spiritual environment that stimulated reflection on ethical issues, and it is not surprising that the Brahmoists can be rightfully recognized as the founders of Modern ethics in India — as a field of philosophical knowledge and as a social problem rooted in the peculiarities of consciousness and behavior of fellow Hindus. Not without the influence of their efforts, over time, in the artistic culture of Bengal, literature and theatrical art of the 2nd half of the XIX century, the phenomenon of moralizing developed — the depiction of phenomena and behavior of people from the position of moral assessment of events and actions for the sake of moral education of compatriots [17]. The 1880s-1910s were the second stage at which the ethical concepts of neo-Hindu philosophers Bonkimchondro Chottopaddhaya, Swami Vivekananda and Aurobindo Ghosh were formed; the process of development of ethical thought goes beyond Bengal – public figures and cultural creators of different regions show interest in the moral aspects of social and political life [18].

The origin of ethical thought can be traced already in the first of Rammohan Rai's famous treatises "The Gift to Believers in One God" (1804) [19], written as a kind of outcome of the dialogue of religions in his mind [20],[9, pp. 314-317] and an exposition of religious and philosophical ideas of ethical monotheism, which will be developed after the beginning of his reformatory activity since 1815 Under the obvious influence of Islam, experienced while receiving a traditional Muslim education, Rammohan postulated in the treatise the ethical character of God, which is extremely important for the bearer of the Hindu tradition. Despite the presence of ethical components in the teaching about Brahman (the Absolute) in the Upanishads and the identity of the cosmic order to the moral (the Vedic concept of rita), A. Schweitzer specifically noted that Brahman is superethical, and that, knowing about the particle of the Universal Soul in all beings and in oneself, a person is obliged to treat "all beings with participation and compassion", but the brahmins "did not demand it" [21, p. 50].

According to Rammohan, the ability of man to distinguish between good and evil comes from God; it contains one of the foundations of the existential equality of people. Ethics is conditioned by religion, but the diversity of religions has given rise to different versions of it because of the differences in the ideas of different peoples about virtue and sin. The humanist Rammohan understands sin as harm done to a person, while various religious leaders and religious teachers distort this idea, subjugating communities of believers and manipulating them. The ignorant majority is therefore inclined to believe in the leader in the name of "liberation from sins" that harm their spirit and are harmful to society [14, vol. IV, p. 945]. In sin (bad action) — Rammohan distinguishes two dimensions: spiritual – violation of moral prohibition, and social – evil for other people. In order to protect people from harming themselves and others, societies create systems of rules supported by the prospect of receiving "reward and punishment for good and bad deeds committed in this world", and people "refrain from committing illegal acts" [14, vol. IV, p. 947] thanks to ethics that promises punishment for sins.

In The Gift, Rammohan raised the problem of traditional moral consciousness for the first time in New Indian thought: are all the rules of behavior absolutely useful to a person and society in maintaining morality? After all, among them are food and other prohibitions, rules for maintaining ritual purity, etc. His answer is quite clear; ritual rules and prohibitions are useless and bring hardships and difficulties to both people and society: "If these imaginary things had any real impact, it would have to be common to all peoples of different beliefs and would not be limited by the faith and customs of an individual people" [14, vol. IV, p. 949]. Only the rule correlated with a high faith in God and the action/behavior set by him seems moral to Rammohan.

Applying this ethical measure to the empiricism of Indian social life and observing the behavior of co-religionists, Rammohan saw their moral decline. He regarded the available practices of social and religious behavior as "a moral humiliation of a race that I cannot help, but which, I think, is capable of better actions, a race whose receptivity, patience and gentleness of character will lead to a better fate worthy of it" [14, vol. I, p. 74]. In his religious community, he noticed what the culturologist Nirad Choudhury formulated in the twentieth century. as a lack of ethical values: "moral precepts are only a part of the impressive mass of prohibitions that regulate every aspect of the life of the Hindu" [22, p. 523]. This became obvious to Rammohan against the background of the moral precepts of Another religion – Christianity, which he studied from the original texts of the New Testament. In 1817, he reported that "he found the instructions of Christ more consistent with moral principles and more adapted for use by intelligent beings than any others I know" [14, vol. IV, pp. 928-929]. His commandments from the four Gospels, Rammohan published in 1820, convinced that "it is the moral commandments, separated from other topics contained in the New Testament, that are most acceptable to produce the desired effect on improving the hearts and minds of people of different faiths and different levels of understanding" [14, vol. III, pp. 484-485]. Meaningfully, they covered four aspects of ethics: 1) sin, understood as "evil thoughts and bad deeds" coming from a person's heart in relation to a neighbor; 2) the imperative of following moral commandments to abstain from sin in thought and behavior, and the unchangeable possibility of repentance; 3) the imperatives of mercy, forgiveness and compassion as an active manifestation of the commandment of love for one's neighbor; and 4) the idea of social service guided by love for God and neighbor. Hence, Rammohan has a broad sense of morality as a concept that extends to "our behavior towards God, each other and ourselves." [14, vol. III, p. 560]. His universalist religious philosophy assumed common ontological principles in each of the religions existing in the human world, and therefore in Hinduism, Rammohan emphasizes the presence of a "moral system", although in a form subordinate to religious goals (self-knowledge and comprehension of God). A younger contemporary of Rammohan , Chondroshekhor Deb , conveyed his statement about the relationship of morality and creed in the Vedas in comparison with Christianity: "the moral commandments of Jesus are something absolutely outstanding. The Vedas contain the same moral lessons, but in a fragmented form" [23, p. 97]). From the comparison and dialogue of Hinduism and Christianity, Rammohan and his spiritual heirs appear and solve the problem of finding and substantiating normative ethics in Hinduism, in its sacred texts.

Rammohan found "moral lessons" in the early Upanishads and in the Vedanta Sutra - his translations into Bengali, Hindi and English were published in 1815-1819, even before the "Commandments of Jesus". In addition to substantiating ethical monotheism as the true content of Hinduism, the philosopher highlights the moral requirements and principles mentioned in the texts and gives them a fresh interpretation.

In the "Summary of Vedanta", the moral principle is declared "part of the worship of God", the duty (with reference to the "Veda") is approved as following this principle through a person's control over his passions, feelings and especially bad inclinations, and the accomplishment of good deeds [14, vol. I, pp. 14-15], which is certainly useful and for earthly life, and for ultimate salvation (eternal bliss). The oblivion of the moral principles of the Vedas is closely connected by Rammohan with the monopoly of the Brahmins on reading and interpreting texts [14, vol. I, p. 3]; they are guilty of displacing monotheism and high morality to the periphery of the consciousness of believers, replacing virtuous behavior with scrupulous observance of ceremonies, rituals and rules of caste [14, vol. I, p. 15-16].

The most authoritative Isha-Upanishad, which deals with true knowledge and the Highest Principle [24, p. 24-25], turns, thanks to the interpretation set forth in the preface, into a text about true morality and about the wrong path chosen by people striving for righteousness and salvation — the path of ritual and worship of many gods [19, p. 377-379]. A relatively short translation-interpretation, together with a small Introduction to it, is a real symbol of the revolution in Indian ethical thought produced by Rammohan. It consists in the statement that the high morality of Hinduism contained in its "holy scripture" should be rediscovered, read, comprehended and made the basis of the human and social life of co-religionists, while "the true essence of morality is hidden from their eyes" [14, vol. I, p. 74] for a number of reasons described in the "Preface" to the translation; but it is possible to open it again – "together with the full acceptance and implementation of this great and universal principle: do to others as you wish to be done to you" [14, vol. I, p. 74]. The Golden rule of morality set the content of the interpretation of the verses of the Isha Upanishad: in it, the following sayings correspond to it: (1) "distract your consciousness from worldly thoughts, keep yourself from arrogance and do not be envious of any person's property" [14, vol. I, p. 75] (Cf. translated by A. Y. Syrkin: "... enjoy renunciation, do not be attracted to someone else's good" [25, p. 171].); and (6) "The one who comprehends the entire universe in the Supreme Being (...) and who also comprehends the Supreme Being in the entire universe (...) does not feel contempt for any creatures" [14, vol. I, p. 76]; (Cf. translated by A. Y. Syrkin: "Truly, who sees all beings in the Atman, and the Atman in all beings, he is no longer afraid" [25, p. 171]). Against this background, the real morality of Hinduism does not simply correlate with the exalted faith in One God and the true good of man, but is also based on a misconception of sin, which is considered to be a violation of food and behavioral prohibitions to maintain ritual purity, and not at all bad deeds and even crimes against neighbors [14, vol. I, pp. 73-74].

The moral life of the community is actually destroyed by polytheistic beliefs and worship ("idolatry"), crushed by ritual and ritualism, which in turn feed irrationality, superstition, prejudice and general ignorance [14, vol. I, p. 66]. The veneration of "fictional images" of the deity to keep people "from vicious temptations" has long gone into the past [14, vol. I, p. 64], which in fact served the moral purposes of abstinence from sin. The text of the Isha Upanishad, retold by Rammohan, demonstrates the depravity of blind ritualism and ritual practices (rituals are not discussed at all in the Sanskrit original) - without knowledge of God, truth and genuine righteousness. They clearly contradict the goals that the Supreme Being "eternally defines for all creatures" [14, vol. I, p. 76]; (Cf.: "Properly distributed [in their places all] things for eternal times" [25, p. 172]). In modern times, ritualism and polytheism provoke conflicts and direct violence in the community [14, vol. I, pp. 67-68], which clearly does not contribute to the good of people. Thus, normative ethics is found in the sacred text – through the discovery of the golden rule of morality in it through interpretation; in other words, Rammohan solves the super-task of defining and discovering ethics in a tradition that has not been asked such questions before.

The solution of this super-task continues in the translation of the Katha Upanishad; in the Preface to it, the "system of true religion" with a fundamentally different morality" is opposed to the "code of idolatry". The latter supports religious and social practices that alienate people from each other both in the community and from other groups and communities, and therefore knowingly feed the humiliation of people's dignity and allow inhumane actions. According to the philosopher, a society consisting of "idolaters" is on the path of disintegration because of prescribed "crimes of such a vile nature that even the most savage peoples will be ashamed to commit them..." [14, vol. I, p. 45]. True religion "defines sin as evil thoughts coming from the heart, without any connection with the observance of dietary regulations and other formal issues" [14, vol. I, p. 46]. To substantiate high ethics in the Katha Upanishad, sections 2 and 3 of Part 1 came up, where the good (shreya – knowledge of Brahman) and the pleasant (preya – knowledge of the mundane), i.e. moral and material values, are distinguished [24, p. 269]: "It is good for those who adhere to the good, perish the goal is for the one who chooses the pleasant from them" [25, p. 101]. Linking the good with the knowledge of God, Rammohan translates "pleasant" as "rituals performed for the sake of retribution" — they exclude the "eternal bliss" sought by believers [14, vol. I, p. 50]. Moral behavior is revealed to man only on the path of knowing God: "No one can gain knowledge about the soul without abstaining from evil deeds; without control over [his] feelings and mind, but he cannot gain it with a firm mind full of desire for retribution" [14, vol. I, p. 53], – translates Rammohan, remembering the traditional idea of non-attachment to the result of an act (Cf. translated by A. Y. Syrkin: "Not retreating from bad behavior, restless, unassembled, // restless mind, truly, will not achieve it even with the help of cognition" [25, p. 104]).

Rammohan Rai not only became a critic of established ideas about moral life, but also proposed his own method of solving the super-task of finding ethics in the Indian religious tradition: when going to criticize "popular" polytheistic Hinduism in terms of personal and social behavior of people, one should look for high moral precepts correlated with high faith in one God in sacred authoritative texts the original religion. The texts of Rammohan are permeated with criticism of the immoralism of the Hindu community; he sees its origins in the behavior of the gods, which are narrated by the puranas and tantras, giving believers dubious examples of moral behavior [14, vol. I, p. 99]. Being brought up on them — in fact, on "a long series of debauchery, sensuality, treachery, ingratitude, perjury and betrayal of friends" [14, vol. I, p. 112] — Hindus reproduce such behavior from generation to generation, inspired by the biographies of their favorite gods — Krishna, Kali, Shiva [14, vol. I, p. 112]. pp. 99, 119]. When the gods "completely trample on every moral principle," then people brought up in respect for such beings cannot follow high morality; as a result, the whole society goes to the "destruction of social well-being" [14, vol. I, pp. 98, 112]. An appeal to the ancient moral precepts in the Vedas and Upanishads, although scattered, but quite real, accessible to understanding, can change the situation. It is especially important for compatriots to rely on their own ancient spiritual heritage in discovering and confirming the high ethics of Hinduism — we are talking about its existence before and revival now. And the fact of publishing the "Commandments of Jesus" in the conditional method of Rammohan complements and contributes to the development of co-religionists: an appeal to another outstanding religious and ethical teaching will enrich moral consciousness and feelings, serving as an addition to Indian ethics proper.

Initially, the heirs of the Rammohan method and the successors of his ethical thought were Brahmo — public figures and religious reformers. Among the founders of the Brahmo Samaj was R. Rai's younger associate, entrepreneur and philanthropist, patron of education and culture Darokanath Tagore. In the period after the death of the reformer, he supported the Society, and his son Debendronath (1817-1905) headed the Brahmo Samaj at the turn of the 1830s-1840s and gave it a new impetus to development. Among a number of initiatives of Debendronath Tagore, a special place belongs to the substantiation of normative ethics "by the method" of Rammohan Rai and the development of ethical thought.

In the late 1840s, after a thorough study of the texts of the Vedas (Samhit) and Upanishads, Debendronath, in search of a justification for Brahmoism (a common creed in Samaj), focused on creating "Brahmo Dhormo Grontho" - a new sacred book, since the texts of the Hindu tradition did not meet this goal [26, pp. 180-189]. Among the issues that occupied the reformer at that time, according to his own testimony, was the question of sin committed in earthly life and its consequences for the believer. A virtuous life according to the dictates of God seems to be due to him in order to gain eternal life in the other world [27, pp. 76-78]. In his reflections, he relies on the early Upanishads, talks about "Vedic truths", although he interprets them critically; he considers it possible to atone for sins after death "in the sphere of sin" — retribution with further forgiveness and transition to "appropriate sacred spheres" [27, p. 77]. But it is on earth, in the world, that a person acquires wisdom, virtue and holiness, which allow the soul to follow the "holy and divine path" to the "kingdom of Brahman" in the posthumous existence [27, pp. 77-78]. In fact, then Debendronath refuted the traditional idea of the transmigration of souls, reflected in the Chandogya Upanishad (V. 10. 3-6) and associated with the idea of karma: "The soul is initially born in human form, after death it will take appropriate forms and move from sphere to sphere to receive retribution for its advantages and disadvantages, and more don't come back here" [27, p. 77].

Hence, Debendronath follows the paramount importance of the "precepts of virtue" described in the "Book of Brahmo Dharma". He came to them from the conviction that "Only those whose hearts are purified by good deeds can strive to worship Brahman, and this is a self-evident truth" [27, p. 83]. Designed for the "daily improvement of the character" of every Brahmoist, the precepts of the "moral code" are found in the traditional texts of the Mahabharata and Bhagavad Gita, some tantras and especially the "Laws of Manu". Already in the first chapter, the moral ideal of life in a family based on love and tolerance, respect and service to each other is described. Ten chapters of 16 are devoted to normative ethics in the form of prescriptions and recommendations: duties and behavior of spouses (2-3), conformity of word and deed (6), virtue (8), manifestations of mercy (9), self-control (10), moral precepts (11), avoidance of slander (12), renunciation of sin (14) [27, p. 84]. In terms of content, this is an individual normative ethics that fits perfectly into the traditional Indian idea of the individual nature of human efforts to gain salvation, liberation, achieve religious goals, etc. But this has already been a serious achievement in the ordering of moral imperatives – based on the indigenous tradition, but in the light of the requirements of modernity, acutely felt by Brahmo.

Debendronath Tagore also addressed the problems of normative ethics in sermons at services in the Brahmo Samaj. He often proceeded from the specific sayings of the Upanishads and reflected on the relationship of man to God and the righteous life as their manifestation in the world. In particular, in one of the sermons, the conformity of thought and action to moral laws is recognized as one of the immutable conditions of knowledge of God in accordance with the commandments of the ancient rishis [27, p. 163]. Debendronath lists these moral laws that God "silently communicates ... to the consciousness" of people — among them truthfulness and justice ("Speak the truth. Act justly."), the inadmissibility of unfair earnings, envy, adultery, rejection of extravagance and stinginess, the need to forgive one's neighbor's sins, patient fulfillment of duties and dedication of life to the call of duty, moderation in everything and the creation of goodness; mercy to the poor and oppressed, etc. [27, p. 164]. In this list of the commandments of due, many things resemble evangelical motives — along with traditional Hindu norms, although Debendronath was not an admirer of Christianity and the Bible; according to his son Shotendronath, "Indian sacred books were enough for him. His religion was Indian in origin and expression, Indian in ideas and in spirit" [27, p. ix]. Especially noteworthy is the command "Do not neglect your worldly and spiritual well—being (my italics — T. S.)" [27, p. 164], like a reminiscence of Protestant ethics, which recognizes earthly well-being as a sign of special grace and the result of hard work guided by the spirit. So the whole life should be permeated with an ethical principle if it is dedicated to God and the goal of salvation of the soul.

Another sermon based on the verse of Atharvaveda (IV, 16) about the presence of God (Varuna) always and everywhere near people, Debendronath begins with the call: "Realizing the constant presence of God among us, be afraid to commit sin and diligently devote yourself to the implementation of good deeds" [27, p. 168], as out of fear before his anger and punishment, and out of love for him and for the sake of his beneficial support and love for man. Finally, according to the motive of distinguishing the good (shreya) and the pleasant (preya) from the Katha Upanishad (I.2.1-2), Debendronath reflects on the problem of the conflict between the genuine good and pleasure ("virtue and the mundane"). A colorful description of the sensual temptations that haunt a person — worldly pleasures, wealth, power, fame — serves as an illustration of the power of this force that opposes Righteousness. Renouncing the temptations of the Mundane does not solve the conflict yet, because a person goes through a spiritual crisis in search of a path to the true Good. Deliverance, according to Debendronath, comes through revelation in the soul: "Virtue should be followed for its own sake, both in happiness and in trouble. Remember that this world is not the goal of human existence; this is the state of a person in this life — a state of testing, learning and training. Through sorrow and suffering, through danger, risk and self-sacrifice, he moves along the path of virtue, and under certain critical circumstances, he may even be called to gladly give his life for the will of God to be fulfilled." The reformer emphasizes that virtue itself is the reward for it, and "the tacit approval of conscience is the reward of God himself" [27, p. 179].

Relying on the authoritative texts of the Hindu spiritual tradition, Debendronath Tagore created a kind of model of the movement of ethical thought: speeches in shruti and smriti about morality, commandments and prescriptions serve as a starting point for thinking about normative ethics; ethical ideas and concepts of other traditions and cultures can get into them in different ways and fit in when interpreted as part of their own tradition. God as a moral Being becomes the ideal with which both moral norms and the reflections on ethics themselves correlate, which makes it possible to consistently represent normative ethics as an integral part of genuine/true Hinduism.

If Debendronath Tagore thought mainly about moral feelings, consciousness and behavior of the individual, then his colleague, public figure, scientist and writer Okkhoikumar Dotto (1820-1886) wrote about the social content of morality. The book "Ethics" ("Dhormoniti"), published in 1856, became, according to D. Kopf, "the pinnacle of ideological search in the field of applying his concept of natural law to ethics in order to harmonize social relations and promote progress. His main points were: the confirmation of his deist belief that the word of God resides in his creation; the discovery of ethical principles governing creation and intended by God as real factors of social improvement; and the responsibility of man for the application of these ethical principles in politics, economics and other areas of society for the sake of the progress of the human race" [28, pp. 51-52]. Written for compatriots and generously provided with examples from everyday Bengali life, the ethics of the Okkhoikumar is educationally universal in ideas about the general nature of human morality, "natural laws", a tendency to social life (as opposed to loneliness), as well as in the belief that norms, rules and laws have their origins in God. Even the native Indian concept of dharma was interpreted by Okkhoikumar as "conformity to the laws of nature", thereby making it "secular" or "naturalistic" [29, p. 244; 338]. In social thought, he was the direct heir of Rammohan Rai, for whom he had great respect, and whose works "taught him the critical method of studying Indian religions, society, mores and customs" [30, p. 40]. With his critical attitude to the Vedas (eventually supported by D. Tagore), Okkhoikumar did not need the sacred authority of the text, believing that "The whole world is our Holy Scripture. Pure knowledge itself is our Mentor" [30, p. 44], and that God is Nature.

O. Dotto's ethical thought develops under the strong influence of European philosophy and Modern science. He proceeded from the God-given nature of the norms that a person must follow if he wants to achieve happiness: "... The more our intellectual abilities and piety are gradually developed, the more successful we will be, the more the horizon of our happiness will expand" [31, p. 164]. However, this happiness is achieved due to a reasonable balance between following a person's own interests and his attention to the interests of other people and cooperation with them in the common pursuit of well-being and happiness, i.e. egoism and altruism [31, p. 167-168; 32, p. 155]. Okkhoikumar Dotto focuses on the social problems of his society, which in fact turn out to be a violation of the natural laws of morality. They manifest themselves in one of his most characteristic associations — in the family. Here, child marriages (the moral violence of the father over children), and the lifelong widowhood of women, and polygamy, and the subordination of women to men are the main culprits of the present situation. Convinced that man is created and lives for happiness and has the "instinct of happiness" [32, p. 154], the thinker takes for granted the state of happiness and harmony in the family, and therefore considers it necessary to overcome this "decline in society". To do this, on the one hand, he refers readers of Ethics to the sacred texts of the sastras, where he finds norms of gender relations that differ from modern ones (the second marriage of widows and even the right to divorce in case of dissimilarity of characters or cruelty), and on the other hand, he defends gender equality, the ideal of monogamous marriage in the prime of life, concluded by equals by the level of education of the spouses, etc.).

Since the manifestations of immorality are obvious in other areas of public life — as, in particular, in oppression, direct violence and crimes against the peasantry of those in power [31, pp. 168-172] — Okkhoikumar Dotto sees a way out primarily in the development of moral education as an essential component of universal education for compatriots. It should begin in the family (for all its members) and continue in modern educational institutions. "Through education… we learn the physical and spiritual rules of God," he writes, noting that it "shapes our behavior, enlightens us about our moral responsibility to each other," because "by treating others well and creating conditions for their happiness, we make human society happy" [28, p. 53].

The intention of social reformation and education of the consciousness of co–religionists, led by Okkhoikumar Dotto, allowed him to substantiate an ethical approach to understanding social reality, in which all events, states and processes are checked for compliance with the requirements of morality - whether religious or secular; and already based on inconsistency or direct violation, a way to solve the problem and overcome social vices in strict correlations with the ethical ideal.

In 1861, Krishnomohan Banerjee's book Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy was published in London [33], where, in addition to criticizing the Indian orthodox schools of Nyaya, Sankhya and Vedanta from a "Christian-centered" position, there was a discussion of the morality of Hinduism. The author, a Brahmin by origin (Bondopaddhai clan), a disciple of G. V. L. Derozio, who converted to Christianity and became a priest of the Anglican Church, proposed a solution directly opposite to the Brahmo solution to the question of the presence of normative ethics in the sacred texts and darshanas of Hinduism. Moreover, according to critical and logical analysis, the morality of Brahmanism and its philosophical schools looks not just undeveloped, but practically absent — which Krishnomohan proves with references to original Sanskrit texts, including the Upanishads.

In particular, discussing the Vedanta doctrines, Krishnomohan defines the identity of God and man, God and the world as pantheism, whose moral consequences are fundamentally contradictory. "The founder of the system himself is concerned that his followers constantly fulfill their duty towards God and man. But if God and man are identical, then in life there can be no relationship between them that would give rise to a specific idea of duty. If there is only one entity in the whole world, then “who is responsible or performs duties, and in relation to whom?” — say the Upanishads (Brihadaranyaka. — T. S.). Where there are differences between personalities, one can fulfill obligations to the other. But such a mutual exchange of obligations is impossible where everything is one. It would be absurd to say that anyone can honor himself or worship himself. Note that this identity of atman and Brahman confused Debendronath Tagore, who rejected it for the same reason and for moral reasons, as a source of pride and egoism: "... That I myself am the Supreme Deity, such boasting is the source of all evil and it should be condemned. We, limited by thousands of worldly vanities, immersed in despondency and sadness, sins and evil — what could be more strange than that we should consider ourselves as eternal, free and self-existent?" [27, p. 100]. Similarly, according to K. Banerjee, the Vedantist authors confidently assert that they do not obey any law, no rules, and that there is absolutely nothing like virtue or vice, prescription or prohibition" [33, p. 381]. Hence the rejection of every distinction between right and wrong – all morality, religion, science and philosophy, which leads human nature into a state of chaos and therefore destroys both spiritual, social, and family life, since all this is vyavaharika, i.e. conditional ideas. The general tendency of the texts, according to K. Banerjee, is rather immoralism, moreover sanctified by the authority of the Vedas.

The fundamental disadvantage of all the systems of Indian thought considered by K. Banerjee is the lack of connection of moral principles with the nature of God. Thus, mimansa Jaimini turned out to be "a law without a legislator, a revelation without God" [33, p. 77], because he was only interested in adherence to the ritual of the Vedas, and what he said about God denies "His providence and His moral governance of the world" [33, p. ix]. Nyaya is very little interested in ethics, her teaching recognizes the eternity of all souls who are "miniature gods in themselves" — self-existent and independent, without any connection with God, the Moral Ruler of the universe; hence the actual recognition of "a million independent principles, i.e. gaurava — an unnecessary multiplication of causes, anti-philosophical and anti-religious, and therefore which is violence against our moral beliefs and religious institutions" [33, pp. 165-166; pp. 214-217]. The Sankhya school, which is essentially atheistic, denies the highest source and cause of morality, therefore the "freedom of the soul" declared in it (purusha — T. S.) it does not imply her moral greatness at all: "There can be no moral greatness without moral force (agency), as well as moral force without a choice of action," including opposition to bad temptations and evil [33, p. 261]. After considering the moral precepts of the sastras and examples of the behavior of the heroes of the puranas and Mahabharata, K. Banerjee came to the conclusion that there is a persistent tendency in Brahmanism "to moral deterioration", as evidenced by the absence of rejection and condemnation of the immoral behavior of the gods and heroes of the puranas and other popular legends among believers [33, pp. 519-520]. K. Banerjee addresses a reproach to his contemporaries for the formality of the moral prescriptions of the texts: "You claim that your system of moral dignity inspires compassion for all of God's creatures. But it seems that your maxims are intended only for elegant essays and eloquent speeches. You don't even have a thought to put them into practice in life" [33, p. 9-10].

K. Banerjee outlined the antithesis of the Brahmo intention to prove the moral nature of God, the ethical nature of the monotheism of the Vedas and the presence of strict morality in Hinduism through a new interpretation of sacred texts. At the same time, he retained a critical attitude going back to Rammohan Rai towards the gods of the pantheon of Hinduism, demonstrating immoral behavior, and reflections characteristic of Brahmo Samaj thinkers on the need for a higher source of morality found in the relationship between God and believers. Krishnomohan is distinguished by a different position in the understanding of ethics: Christianity and its morality serve as an ideal with which Hindu ideas in this area are compared and do not show similarities with it.

It is not surprising that in the Brahmo Samaj, after the appearance of the young leader Keshobchondro Sen (1838-1884), deeply passionate about Christ and Christianity, there was a decrease in interest in interpreting sacred Sanskrit texts to justify innovations and reinforce reform initiatives. His ethical reflections are built around the idea of God as the "moral ruler of the universe", his commandments and the idea of sin. Morality, according to Keshobchondro, differs from religion only in the scope of application in human practice; they have a "common root" (a person's relationship and duties to God): "To see God is religion, to hear Him is morality" [34, p. 61]. Ethics cannot exist without religion, because there is a God in morality, who not only exists in man as a spirit, but also works in him — "actively teaches and guides us", and people, realizing him as a commanding voice in the soul, follow their moral intuition — conscience. Hence ethics — "the science of obedience to God", which a person knows [34, p. 61]. The core of Keshobchondro ethics is the golden rule, known since antiquity and universal, confirmed in the sacred texts and sayings of the prophets. "The Hindu scriptures inspire this doctrine with the words: Atmanam sarva bhuteshu (There is a similarity of atman in all living beings. — T. S.); a parallel fragment in the Bible sounds like "Love your neighbor as yourself" [34, p. 138], — says Keshobchondro, noting its value for social relations and behavior. Morality begins with self—love and awareness of the need to love others as children of the common family of God; hence the increase in love for others, which is manifested in doing good to them, caring for the welfare and convenience of others, for their happiness [34, p. 140]. Here the semantic, and by no means meaningful, coincidence turns out to be only the starting point of reflections on universal ethics and explanations of its content. Only in the later texts ("New Realization", 1883), Keshobchondro Sen turns to the interpretation of the sacred texts of Hinduism in accordance with his new eclectic-universal teaching, but there ethics is only one of his many other topics.

The experience of searching for normative ethics among Brahmoist thinkers is interesting in solving a special super–task: from disparate judgments and ideas conditioned by different epochs and social contexts of ancient Indian civilization and present in different texts - from the Vedas (Samhit) and Upanishads to the texts of philosophical schools to build an orderly and religiously grounded content of ethics. The super—task was solved by the method of interpretation of the most authoritative texts available and the traditional reflections on morally correct human behavior adjacent to them, in comparison (explicit and implicit) with other ethical teachings and ideas about morality, primarily of Judeo-Christian origin. The solution of the super-task is seen in the creation of a sublime idea of the morality of Hinduism, which developed in ancient times due to the awareness of the ethical character of God, the Creator of the world and man. Morality is a set of prescriptions of normative ethics, which over time has been pushed to the periphery of the consciousness of Hindu believers by various vicissitudes of social history, but in modern times they urgently need its revival and transformation into the leading requirements of moral consciousness for people's behavior. At the same time, the revived ethics is introduced into the general context of universal human morality and is understood as equivalent to other similar ethical teachings.

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The author of the reviewed article returns to the well-known historical and philosophical problem of determining the specifics of ethical thought in the tradition of Indian philosophy. As shown in the first paragraphs, there are widespread ideas among European researchers that in Indian philosophy (and more broadly, culture) Special attention was not paid to reflection on the place of good and evil in human life, they have certain grounds. In any case, in the tradition of Indian philosophy there is no "special discipline engaged in understanding good and evil, virtue and sin, values and norms of behavior and other ethical categories." However, the author agrees with those who point to the presence of an ethical component "in different dimensions of spiritual and social life," which, of course, prevented the constitution of ethics as a "special area" of philosophy, as was the case in the European tradition. It should be noted that the lack of differentiation of the subject area of philosophy in Indian culture, which is familiar to Europeans, may also indicate the weakness of the individual principle in Indian philosophy, since in the Western tradition, along with objective factors, it was the "limitations" (abilities, interests, aspirations, etc.) of individuals that significantly influenced the formation of the disciplinary structure of philosophical knowledge. The situation changed only at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, when Indian thought met with Western influence: "A peculiar ethical turn in Indian philosophical thought occurred at the beginning of the national cultural renaissance in the regions of India, which became colonies of the British East India Company and the meeting place of Indian culture with the West." Only the contact of "Indian elites" with "European culture and institutions (primarily education, science and law)" contributes to the formation of socio-ethical thought as an independent element of a peculiar Indian philosophy. The main part of the text is devoted to the description of this process, which, according to the author, took place throughout almost the entire 19th century. Its completion occurred in the 70s, the time of the formation of "cultural nationalism with its increased attention to the foundations of Indian tradition and identity," limiting the possibility of this interaction with Western culture. It should be noted that the author describes the process of searching for ethical foundations in the Indian tradition and their systematization in a very professional and fascinating way. "Pushed to the periphery of the consciousness of Hindu believers by the various vicissitudes of social history," moral and ethical teaching had to be revived and introduced into the "general context of universal human morality" - the solution to this "super task" is the result of the efforts of Indian scientists of Modern times. Evaluating the article as a whole very highly, it is necessary to point out some of its shortcomings. Most of the text is descriptive in nature, the "analytical component" manifests itself only "at the micro level", where the author speaks about the content of specific concepts. It seems that the text can be significantly reduced in this regard without prejudice to the conceptual component (especially since the volume of the article is more than 1.2 a.l.). It also seems advisable to structure the text by providing it with subheadings. And if in the introductory part (not highlighted, however, in a separate fragment) the author quite successfully presents the "beginning" of the entire narrative, then there is no clear conclusion, the brief remarks of the last paragraph can hardly be considered as an answer to the questions formulated at the beginning of the article. However, these remarks do not prevent the possibility of recommending an article for publication in a scientific journal.
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