DOI: 10.7256/2454-0706.2019.8.43263

Abstract: The subject of this research is the idea of the “open structure” of legal language proposed by the British legal philosopher Herbert Hart. The author carefully examines what Hart implied under the “open structure”, as well as its semantically similar notions as uncertainty and ambiguity. Special attention is given to the linguistic analysis of the legal concepts with “open structure”, their intentional and extensional meaning. The link between the “open” legal concepts and cluster concepts development in the modern linguistic is established. In the course of this work, the author applies the method of conceptual interpretation aimed at solving a set of tasks on explication of the fundamental legal concepts, and methodology of semantic analysis of the legal language. The main conclusion consists in the established link between the legal concepts with “open structures” and cluster concepts. It is demonstrated that in certain cases the concepts with “open structure” manifest as cluster concepts: in order for an object to be included into the scope of such concepts, it should not bear all the elements that comprise this concept.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0706.2016.8.19753

Abstract: This article demonstrates that within the legal language there have been discovered the so-called ascriptive legal utterances (ascriptions), which differ from the descriptive statements. The author determines that the ascriptions in law help realize a special function of the language – the performative one, or taking action using words. It became possible as a result of implementation within the legal language of a methodological and conceptual apparatus of the theory of speech acts, developed by an English language expert John Austin and American philosopher Searle. The methodology of philosophy of common language, as well as the conceptual apparatus of the theory of speech acts was being used in the course of this work. The author’s main contribution consists in establishment of semantic specificity of the ascriptive legal utterances, and development of the linguistic formula of ascriptions, which reflects theirs special character and importance for the legal language. It is also highlighted that ascription represents a separate speech act, which mostly occurs in the legal environment.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0706.2016.8.42978

Abstract: This article demonstrates that within the legal language there have been discovered the so-called ascriptive legal utterances (ascriptions), which differ from the descriptive statements. The author determines that the ascriptions in law help realize a special function of the language – the performative one, or taking action using words. It became possible as a result of implementation within the legal language of a methodological and conceptual apparatus of the theory of speech acts, developed by an English language expert John Austin and American philosopher Searle. The methodology of philosophy of common language, as well as the conceptual apparatus of the theory of speech acts was being used in the course of this work. The author’s main contribution consists in establishment of semantic specificity of the ascriptive legal utterances, and development of the linguistic formula of ascriptions, which reflects theirs special character and importance for the legal language. It is also highlighted that ascription represents a separate speech act, which mostly occurs in the legal environment.