Abstract: This introductory article presents the results from the work of the conference held in Volgograd in 2014, the proceedings of which are published in this journal. The discussion entails the achievements in modern German studies by Russian and German scholars, as well as the issues that are still debated. The democratic potential of the German revolution of 1918–1919 was implemented only at the level of declarations and legal texts, yet it did not become the guiding line in policy-making neither for the active population, nor for the government agencies. The conference articles substantiate this conclusion on the example of the ideological climate of the Weimar republic, the conduct of its military and political elite, and of its diplomatic corpus. These articles address practically the whole range of topics and views comprising the modern historiography on Weimar Germany. The author underlines the thematic continuity and genetic inseparability of the Russian and Soviet scholarships in the study of the first formative years of Weimar history and at the same time focuses his attention on the newest trends in the modern perception of Germany after the end of the First World War. Some question that were previously actively discussed, above all the socio-economic transformation during the establishment of the Weimar republic, today have become of secondary importance and are not popular topics among the younger generation of scholars.

Keywords: Reichspräsident, Reichswehr, democratic transition, Weimar republic, German revolution, First World War, diplomacy, fascism, historiography, elites

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67009

Keywords: Reichspräsident, Reichswehr, democratic transition, Weimar republic, German revolution, First World War, diplomacy, fascism, historiography, elites

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16519

Abstract: This article analyses the achievements of German historiography in elucidating the role of historical memory of the First World War in the life of the Weimar republic. The author critically reviews a series of conceptions made popular in recent years, summarising the results of the new approaches to the history of this great war. Noting the positive influence of the culturological turn in historical studies, the author addresses the complex question of the formation and evolution of political myths which played a particularly significant role in the German mass conscience during the interwar period. Examining historical memory inevitably poses the rather politicised problem of continuity and of the particularities of Germany’s historical path during the last two centuries. After citing the most intrinsic arguments of the main historiographical lines on this subject, the author presents a critical analysis of them. The author also addresses in detail the particularities of the used terminology and of source interpretations, selected on the basis of a priori advanced hypotheses. From the study’s results the author comes to the conclusion that historiography has overcome the previous stereotypes, but notes the necessity for additional studies in bridging the comfortable yet simplifying interpretations of the history of the Weimar republic and of the radical militarist organisations operating within it, for which today all the necessary foundations have been laid.

Keywords: continuity, brutalisation, National-Socialist German Workers’ party, myth, historical memory, Weimar republic, Freikorps, veterans, violence, Thirty-years war

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67010

Keywords: continuity, brutalisation, National-Socialist German Workers’ party, myth, historical memory, Weimar republic, Freikorps, veterans, violence, Thirty-years war

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16525

Abstract: In modern historiography and in public consciousness the November revolution of 1918 in Germany is considered to be an “almost forgotten revolution”, although lately there has been a rise in interest surrounding its events. This article presents an analysis of the fundamental approaches in interpreting this revolution. Citing relevant publications of German historians, as for example Alexander Gallus, Andreas Wirsching and Wolfgang Niess, the author subjects to a critical evaluation both the classical topics of discussion and the new tendencies and directions. Additionally, the author gives particular attention to the relationship between the discussions of the November revolution and of the peaceful revolution in German Democratic Republic 71 years later. In this age, when the socialist dream has more or less disappeared, the question of whether the socialist revolution had missed its chance has also lost its previous relevance. At the heart of today’s discussions lies the question of the durability of the democratic system that came as a result of the revolution. The idea that the peaceful revolution of 1989 in German Democratic Republic is the first successful revolution in Germany contains within itself an indirect criticism of the November revolution. The author criticises the sidedness of such a position, which does not consider the complexity of the historical conditions surrounding the first democratic revolution in Germany during the modern period.

Keywords: Federal Republic of Germany, social-democratic movement, Bolshevism, democracy, Weimar Republic, November revolution, First World War, German Democratic Republic, USSR, peaceful revolution

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67011

Keywords: Federal Republic of Germany, social-democratic movement, Bolshevism, democracy, Weimar Republic, November revolution, First World War, German Democratic Republic, USSR, peaceful revolution

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16544

Abstract: The author demonstrates the genetic link and differences between the Soviet and post-Soviet/Russian stages in the historiography of the Weimar republic, and also elucidates the modern trends in its study. The source base for this article is comprised of some 200 dissertations, thesis abstracts, monographs, articles and theses from mainly 1960–2010s. The author subsequently came to the following conclusions. Firstly, in the study of the early history of the Weimar republic between the Soviet and Russian epochs there is a marked continuity in the choice of scientific research topics, as well as in the training of the next generation of scholars. Secondly, while the post-Soviet/Russian period saw breakthrough results, especially in the assessment of the party-political system of the Weimar republic, Russian historiography remains on the same Soviet-era level in the study of the November revolution. Thirdly, the methodological and methodical pluralism in modern German studies expanded the research horizons in general. Among this the main line of study is dominated by the tendency to search for answers regarding the history of Weimar Germany during the processes of the First World War’s concluding stage, the time of the maturation and formation of new forces, ideas, programs and leaders that determined the development of the German state for decades to come.

Keywords: Treaty of Brest, First World War, November revolution, Weimar republic, Kaiser Germany, post-Soviet historiography, Soviet historiography, constitution, party political system, “Spartakusbund”

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67012

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16517

Abstract: The aim of this research is to examine the activities of the “Weimar democrats ‘of the first hour’” at the formative stage of the Weimar republic. The analysis is carried out from a critical viewpoint towards the widespread opinion that the Weimar republic was a “democracy without democrats”. The author differentially considers the composition of the ruling political elite of Weimar Germany, singling out the representatives of the Social-Democratic party of Germany, the Centre party, and the Civic-Democratic party which held government positions in the first cabinet. The founders of the first German republic aimed to create a model democracy starting with meetings in Weimar, the European spiritual centre, and adopting the “most democratic constitution in Europe”. However, the given experiment was complicated in the first place by the defeat of Germany in the First World War and by the overthrow of the monarchy. In addition, the “Weimar democrats ‘of the first hour’”, caught between the political past comprehensible to the masses and the democratic present comprehensible only to a handful of leaders, were subjected to attacks from the right- and left-radical forces. The perfectionism of Weimar democrats was met with serious resistance from the electorate, army, officials, and justice system. The German society was not ready to function on the democratic principles proposed by the “Weimar democrats ‘of the first hour’”, and even less ready to accept democracy as a value.

Keywords: “democrats ‘of the first hour’”, Reichsminister, Reichskanzler, Treaty of Versailles, Weimar constitution, first German democracy, Weimar republic, political elite, law, tradition

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67013

Keywords: “democrats ‘of the first hour’”, Reichsminister, Reichskanzler, Treaty of Versailles, Weimar constitution, first German democracy, Weimar republic, political elite, law, tradition

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16551

Abstract: This article focuses on the little studied in Russian historiography political group of Germany – the “June club”, formed in 1919. Its creation was related to the efforts of the conservative elite living in Berlin to develop a new position under the conditions of the monarchy’s overthrow and the proclamation of a democratic republic. The opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, concluded in June 1919, was extrapolated on the entire Weimar system. The “June club” presented a centre for the new conservative direction, known in German historiography as “Conservative revolutionary movement”. This club considered its main aim to be the creation of a new conservative, antidemocratic elite which is associated with a national renaissance of the German state outside of the liberal-democratic system, the formation of the new “third Reich”. The “June club” chose as its political and theoretic leader Moeller van den Bruck, one of the main theorists of the “conservative revolution”. The article analyses the background of the named political organisation, the rather variegated political composition of the club, its main participants, and publication activity. Particular attention is given to the description of the “Political boards on national-political education and training”, created with the aim of politically educating the German youth into the spirit of revolutionary-conservative values.

Keywords: anti-Bolshevism, nationalist, conservatism, fall of monarchy, First World War, Weimar republic, Germany, conservative revolution, conservative clubs, Treaty of Versailles

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67014

Keywords: anti-Bolshevism, nationalist, conservatism, fall of monarchy, First World War, Weimar republic, Germany, conservative revolution, conservative clubs, Treaty of Versailles

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16490

Abstract: The revolutionary events in Germany during 1918–1919 posed a serious threat to the officer corps of the Kaiser army. The system of soldiers’ councils that developed during the unfolding of the revolution strove to become the foundation for the new armed forces, electing commanders and removing the established officers in the military hierarchy. This article examines the question of the relationship of the German officer corps towards the activity of the soldiers’ councils in military units and its attitude towards those seeking commanding authority among the collective government bodies. The article also analyses the relationship principles between the soldiers’ councils and the officers during the German revolution. This research is based on documents pertaining to the activity of the soldiers’ councils, the orders of the Supreme command, transcripts from Pan-German council congresses, memoirs and correspondence of members of the officer corps and civil authorities. The author comes to the conclusion that the soldiers’ councils were seen by the officer corps as a potential channel for the spread of the revolution, a source for inciting breach of discipline among the troops. This appraisement of the soldiers’ councils by the officers, based largely on hypothetical apprehension rather than on actual experience, determined the elaboration by the military commanders of a common strategy, jointly with the civil authorities, directed at the dissolution of the council system within the army.

Keywords: Ebert-Groener pact, Paul von Hindenburg, Friedrich Ebert, Wilhelm Groener, council of representatives, German revolution, soldiers’ councils, German officer corps, Pan-German congress of deputies, Hamburg articles

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67015

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16510

Abstract: This article examines the transition process of the military elite from the Kaiser army to the Reichswehr of the Weimar republic, complicated by revolutionary events, conditions of military defeat and the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. With all the particularities of the military elite of Germany, its attempt not to submit to the political situation of the period like never before forced the German military to seriously take into account the various political factors in achieving their goal – the creation of a stable armed force capable of coexistence with a republican government, leaving at its head representatives of the elite, thus ensuring continuity from the old army. In many ways the conditions posed by those at the source of the Reichswehr seemed almost to contradict them, nor did the elite possess the necessary unity within itself and maintained a continuing distrust towards the centre-left forces that came to power, but towards the spring of 1921 the most turbulent period of the transformation was over. The military elite demonstrated a high level of autonomy and stability during the next decades, but it was unable to influence the formation of the Nazi government in Germany.

Keywords: Groener, Reinhardt, Putsch, monarchists, Freikorps, Weimar republic, military elite, Reichswehr, Versailles, von Seeckt

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67016

Keywords: Groener, Reinhardt, Putsch, monarchists, Freikorps, Weimar republic, military elite, Reichswehr, Versailles, von Seeckt

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16506

Abstract: This article examines the perception of the Weimar republic by the German middle class. The author’s attention is focused on the so-called “old” middle class: representatives of medium and small enterprises, as well as of liberal professions. At the heart of this study lie the events and factors that had a decisive influence on the opinions of that milieu regarding the first German democracy – from the particularities of the German burghers’ political culture to the hungry post-war daily life of defeated Germany. The study of this question permits to determine the many components which motivated the negative attitude (as in the overwhelming majority of cases it was negative) among the middle class towards the November revolution and the Weimar republic in general. As a rule, there developed a specific perception of the new republican reality as a foreign living environment in which the German burghers felt uncomfortable and unsafe, especially under the conditions of revolutionary confrontations and ideas of socialisation. The bourgeois felt themselves pare from the new world. Besides that, the analysis of the given topic allows to discover the origins of the future successes of the “nazi” among this population group, which played, as has been established in historical studies, a decisive role in the successes of the National-Socialists during the Reichstag election at the turn of the 1920–1930s.

Keywords: bourgeoisie, “Spartans”, social democracy, Treaty of Versailles, National committee, Soviet Bavaria, November revolution, “old” middle class, socialisation, “Berlin talk”

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67017

Keywords: bourgeoisie, “Spartans”, social democracy, Treaty of Versailles, National committee, Soviet Bavaria, November revolution, “old” middle class, socialisation, “Berlin talk”

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16512

Abstract: This article examines the initial period in the history of the Weimar republic when the question of the first German democracy’s existence stood particularly acutely. The author’s focus is placed on those political forces and their representatives that threatened this democracy from right and left. Special attention is dedicated to the situation in the Eastern Prussian territories: Poznan, Upper Silesia, Eastern Prussia. The attitude of the authorities of Weimar Germany towards the territorial losses at the expense of Prussia is also addressed, as well as the activities of the German Freikorps and their leaders. The author indicates the reasons for the failures of the left-radical (communist) coup d’état and of the right-radical coup on Prussian territories. Additionally, the author discusses the situation in Upper Silesia, where the interests of the Social-Democratic party of Germany, representing the democratic authorities of the republic, clashed and the right- and left-radicals. The last acted within the framework of the Communist party of Upper Silesia, using the ideas of Upper Silesian separatism and Soviet organisation. They were opposed by the representatives of the Prussian officer corps, which organised the defence of the region from Poles and employing there the Freikorps.

Keywords: German Communist party, Freikorps, “Eastern territories”, history of Germany, history of Prussia, Weimar republic, German Social-Democrats, Upper Silesia, Upper Silesian separatism, councils

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67018

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16513

Abstract: The demobilisation of the army, as well as of the economy, acquired great importance for Germany in 1918–1919 largely because this difficult process took place under the conditions of an acute revolutionary crisis. The Department of economic demobilisation / Demobilisation administration, headed by the pragmatic and conservative J. Koeth, was already created during the period of the revolution by yesterday’s opponents, unions, and entrepreneurs, and took upon itself to carry out the major part of the extensive socio-political reforms. These reforms were developed both as a concession to the revolutionary-minded masses and as part of a general reconstruction process after the war. The main focus of its activities was directed at reforms in the spheres of insurance, hiring workforce, and regulating wage agreements. Germany as a result was equipped with the foundation for a systematic social policy as a means of achieving socio-political consensus and the government’s role as an active mediator and regulator of economic and social processes was validated. The radicalisation of the revolutionary processes was averted by the person who was far from the ambition of changing the world and from a theoretical construction of social relations, but a person committed to the necessity of establishing a firm government and stable order to resolve the socio-economic crisis. In this aim he was not spared from opposition by left-wing and right-wing forces, but the results of his efforts allowed Germany to endure the difficult situation of general discontent and to lay the groundwork for the stabilisation of the economy and of social relations on a new – republican – basis.

Keywords: demobilisation, “work cooperation”, unemployment, Demobilisation administration, social reforms, revolution, Weimar republic, social policy, government regulation, J. Koeth

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67019

Keywords: demobilisation, “work cooperation”, unemployment, Demobilisation administration, social reforms, revolution, Weimar republic, social policy, government regulation, J. Koeth

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16520

Abstract: Reviewing the history of Weimar Germany, the author puts forward the thesis that freedom was lost not in 1933 when Hitler came to power, but even earlier – in 1920. This view is presented through the lens of an analysis of the transformations in the Kaiser army and of the role of the German soldiers in the early stages of the new republic. Despite defeat during the First World War, the change in political power, the limitations imposed by the peace treaty of Versailles, the army still sought to defend its independence and to remain not the government’s tool, but its personification. Military leadership constructed its relationship directly with government representatives. The author underlines the inconsistency of the social-democrats’ political course, the incoherence of the government actions aimed at reforming the army according to the expectations of the party members, the weakness and inconsequence of the political control over the army. The command of the Reichwehr, though formally adhering to the Versailles agreements and constitutional frames, organised a professional army and developed plans for the continued realisation of Germany’s policy of world supremacy. On the one hand, this aroused protests from the pacifist movement in which representatives of the democratic community, as well as officers-pacifists took an active part. On the other hand, the militaristic spirit contributed to the emergence of paramilitaristic forces that became the pillar of the national-socialists.

Keywords: Kapp-Putsch, Freikorps, Reichswehr, Weimar Republic, Treaty of Versailles, First World War, German revolution, pacifism, paramilitarism, Gustav Noske

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67020

Keywords: Kapp-Putsch, Freikorps, Reichswehr, Weimar Republic, Treaty of Versailles, First World War, German revolution, pacifism, paramilitarism, Gustav Noske

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16545

Abstract: This article examines the phenomenon of the ideology behind the “conservative revolution” within the intellectual space of the Weimar republic in Germany. The author gives a general description of the “conservative revolutionary movement” in the context of the development of German conservatism in the Weimar republic and notes that the “conservative revolutionary movement” was an attempt to create new German conservatism and nationalism of a radical nature. The “conservative revolutionaries” were not satisfied with the system of values and with the political concepts of traditional German conservatism, which is why the author addresses in detail the problem of the correlation between traditional and modernist traits in the ideological heritage of the “conservative revolutionaries”. On the example of the ideological and political concepts of the leading representatives of the “conservative revolution” O. Spengler, A. Moeller van den Bruck, K. Schmitt, E. Jünger, E. Niekisch, the author analyses their views on modernism and their individual contribution to the formation of a general modernist trend in the intellectual phenomenon of the “conservative revolution”. The author comes to the conclusion that the “conservative revolutionaries” took up a search for contemporary forms and methods of representing their views, which were positioned by them as a “new worldview” and a “new ideology”. For this aim they used modernist categories to convey their ideas to the masses and to develop contemporary methods for theoretically combatting their ideological opponents. The ideology of the “conservative revolution” became one of the forms of right-wing modernism.

Keywords: right-wing modernism, nationalism, traditionalism, modernism, Germany, Weimar republic, “conservative revolution”, O. Spengler, K. Schmitt, E. Jünger

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67021

Keywords: right-wing modernism, nationalism, traditionalism, modernism, Germany, Weimar republic, “conservative revolution”, O. Spengler, K. Schmitt, E. Jünger

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16500

Abstract: This article presents as a methodological experiment an analysis of the first German democracy – the Weimar republic – from the point of view of the theory of democratic transition (transitology). This is not a new theoretical approach for Western historiography, but it has only recently been taken up by Russian scholars and can be considered as a separate methodological direction, taking into account the criticism it has received during its development (from the beginning of the 1970s). The criteria for the transition from authoritarianism to democracy proposed by the two founders of the theory – Walt W. Rostow and Dankwart Rustow – have rarely been applied on the history of Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, although the November revolution was in fact one of the forms of democratic transition and brought about the formation of a democratic government. While the Weimar republic basically did not have a single of the necessary preconditions for the establishment of a democratic government proposed by transitology as a criteria of “transition”, nonetheless the accepted historiographical paradigm of the Weimar epoch accepts it as the first German democracy, though not as long-lasting and successful as the traditionally paralleled with it history of the second German democracy – the Federal Republic of Germany. The theory of democratic transition has its limitations and advantages, and gives a new look at Germany’s primary issue of the 20th century that of the glide between authoritarianism and democracy.

Keywords: theory of modernisation, transitology, democratic transition, first German democracy, Treaty of Versailles, Weimar republic, interwar period, First World War, Germany, population mobilisation

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67022

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16527

Abstract: The end of the world war, the collapse of the Hohenzollern empire and the revolution of 1918 all contributed to significant changes in the German foreign policy, including in relation to Russia. Instead of its traditional geopolitical interests, the political elite’s fear of “world Bolshevism” took over and found its voice in the rise of anti-Soviet propaganda. The coordination of the German foreign policy was carried out by professional diplomats who worked both in the political department of the German Ministry of foreign affairs and in the country’s embassies in some of the largest European states. The focus of this research is on the informal network dubbed as the “Russian department” and is based on the documents from the Political archive of the German Ministry of foreign affairs. This network included officials from the Kaiser era, as well as newly selected diplomats. They were united by their knowledge of Russia’s pre-Revolution realities and at the same time by their inability to assess the new priorities of the Soviet foreign policy, including with regard to the Weimar republic. Consequently the “Russian department” of the German Ministry of foreign affairs in the first half of 1919 became a hindering factor in the stabilisation of the two states’ relations and ultimately they found themselves as outcasts in the Versailles system of international relations.

Keywords: Communist international, world proletarian revolution, German diplomats, German Ministry of foreign affairs, Soviet-German relations, Versailles system, Weimar republic, Bolshevik party, Treaty of Brest, Rudolf Nadolny

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67023

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.16511

Abstract: This article addresses the pan-Germanic concepts of state power and structure in Germany after the November revolution of 1918. The leaders of the Pan-German league (H. Class, L. von Vietinghoff-Scheel, A. Müller) based their vision of the necessary government restructuring on the principle of dictatorship. The idea of dictatorship was tied by some with the sole rule of a leader (Class), by others – by popular representation, chosen from the number of the “true” patriots of Germany (Vietinghoff-Scheel). The author underlines the continuity between Pan-Germanism and National socialism. In the history of Pan-Germanism the Weimar period is of particular importance. This is due to the fact that during the period of Weimar parliamentary democracy the supporters of Pan-Germanism developed significant changes in their views, political thinking, and course of action in the direction of their radicalisation. Despite the sharpness of their statements against government authorities, Pan-Germanists were forced to admit the real political power of these authorities, as well as the absence of a united opposition front due to the fragmentation of the antigovernment forces. Until the middle of the 1920s the Pan-Germanists actively supported antigovernment speeches, but later sought to achieve their goals through legitimate means, as their attempts of violent coups were not successful. Because of this they formulated concepts of political reorganisation, the propaganda of which aimed to unite German society around the Pan-German league.

Keywords: Weimar republic, dictatorship, Freikorps, national socialism, Bamberg declaration, Pan-Germanism, Pan-German league, parliamentarism, November revolution, “Beer Putsch”

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2015.3.67024