Парадоксология выбора: выбор в условиях парадоксальности и неопределенности

Зобнин Алексей Владимирович

doi:10.7256/2454-0684.2015.12.16075


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Politics and Society

Reference:

Zobnin A.V. Paradoxology of choice: choice in the conditions of paradoxicality and uncertainty // Politics and Society. 2015. № 12. P. 1633-1652. DOI: 10.7256/2454-0684.2015.12.16075 URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=16075

Парадоксология выбора: выбор в условиях парадоксальности и неопределенности

Zobnin Aleksei Vladimirovich

PhD in History

Associate Professor at Ivanovo State University, Department of World History and International Relations

155524, Russia, Furmanov, ul. Griboedova, 4

alexzobnin1982@gmail.com

Other publications by this author

Article was published in rubric "Politicical behavior"

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0684.2015.12.16075

Received:

06-08-2015

Published:

17-01-2016

Abstract: The subject of this research is the human choice in the conditions of paradoxicality, compared in the series of reviewed precedents with the uncertainty and risk. A special attention is given to the choice in the area of public and political relations. Rational and intuitive choice is being analyzed from the perspective of the influence of rational-logical paradoxes, freedom of choice paradox, and limited choice paradox. The author also draws attention to the examination of the restrictions of human choice, which include gender, rational, procedural, situational, intuitive, etc. The article presents the examples of human choice within the world history and modern political sphere. The scientific novelty of the conducted research consists in the author’s approach towards formation of the analytical spatial model – “foundations/criteria/terms of choice”, which would reflect key variables of the analysis of human choice with the focus upon the information-analytical component of the process. The author also concludes that the intuitive choice requires moderate and rational optimization, which can be achieved by using the information-analytical methodologies of increasing the fullness and structuring of information that lay at the core of the rational choice.

Keywords:

paradox, paradoxology, choice, uncertainty, limitation of choice, paradox of choice, manipulation of choice, intuitive choice, rational choice, freedom of choice

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