Статья 'Знание как наиболее общее фактивное ментальное состояние' - журнал 'Философская мысль' - NotaBene.ru
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Philosophical Thought
Reference:

Knowledge as the most common factive mental state

Pris' Igor'

Senior Researcher, Institute of Philosophy

220012, Belarus, g. Minsk, ul. Surganova, 1, of. 810

frigpr@gmail.com
Другие публикации этого автора
 

 

DOI:

10.25136/2409-8728.2017.6.19388

Review date:

04-06-2016


Publish date:

21-06-2017


Abstract.

 
 
The subject of this research is the arguments of Mark Schroeder claiming that the perceptual mental state “seeing that”, as a matter of fact, is not knowledge, and thus, knowledge is not the most common factive mental state. This conclusion contradicts the position of Timothy Williamson. The article particularly analyzes the Schroeder’s positions that the existence of knowledge necessitates the existence of opinion, and knowledge is the norm for an opinion, which he shares with Williamson. Methods of this research consist in the knowledge-first epistemology of Timothy Williamson, and Wittgensteinian in spirit therapeutical method of the analysis of notion of perceptual experience, suggested in the works of Jocelyn Benoist. It is established that Schroeder’s arguments are based on the false prerequisite that the perceptual experience itself can have a representational content. “Seeing that” is not a pure perception, but a conceptualized perceptual experience suggesting knowledge. The author expresses preference towards the position of Williamson. The scientific novelty of this work consists in combination of the analytical and therapeutical methods.
 
 

Keywords: propositional content, knowledge, meaning, judgement, seeing that, seeing, factive mental state, perceptual experience, perceptual defeater, knowledge-first epistemology
This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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