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Philosophical Thought
Reference:

The Problem of Access in the Theory of Epistemological Disjunctivism

Pris' Igor'

Senior Researcher, Institute of Philosophy

220012, Belarus, g. Minsk, ul. Surganova, 1, of. 810

frigpr@gmail.com
Другие публикации этого автора
 

 

DOI:

10.7256/2306-0174.2014.10.1364

Review date:

10-11-2014


Publish date:

24-11-2014


Abstract.

The solution of the problem of access to theories of an epistemological disjunctivism proposed by Duncan Pritchard who claims is stated and analyzed that in paradigmatic cases of perception the agent knows that p, owing to the rational bases for his opinion that p which are at the same time available reflections and factual, that is with need attract existence of the fact, p. The problem of access consists that acquisition of knowledge about belonging to the outside world (that is empirical) the fact by means of only one reflection (that is a priori) is impossible. This problem, however, in the theory of an epistemological disjunctivism is illusory. It is offered to treat an epistemological problem (any, and not just perceptual) knowledge in close connection with a problem of an explanatory failure in consciousness philosophy which in turn can be treated in terms of a Wittgenstein problem of following to the rule. In case of knowledge "failure" between the rational bases for opinion and the fact (knowledge) is closed pragmatically, or phenomenologically in a broad sense. In this sense any knowledge, and not just knowledge perceptual, has phenomenological measurement. Classical definition of knowledge as reasonable true opinion remains provided that justification assumes the rootedness in the fact, that is is justification original (full). The knowledge can also be defined as "successful opinion".

Keywords: externalism, internalism, problem of access, rational reasoning, perceptive knowledge, perceptive experience, epistemological disjunctivism, explanatory gap, following the rule, pragmatism
This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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