Скептицизм как высшая форма дискурсивного реализма

Гусев Дмитрий Алексеевич

doi:10.7256/2306-0174.2014.9.13496


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Philosophical Thought

Reference:

Gusev D.A. — Scepticism as the Highest Form of Discursive Realism // Philosophical Thought. – 2014. – № 9. – P. 21 - 68. DOI: 10.7256/2306-0174.2014.9.13496 URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=13496

Scepticism as the Highest Form of Discursive Realism

Gusev Dmitrii Alekseevich

Doctor of Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy, professor of the Philosophy Department at Moscow State Pedagogical University

115432, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. 2-Oi kozhukhovskii proezd, d. 12, str. 1, of. 317

gusev.d@bk.ru

Другие публикации этого автора

DOI:

10.7256/2306-0174.2014.9.13496

Review date:

22-10-2014

Publish date:

05-11-2014

Abstract.

The concept of realism is considered as a philosophical discourse in the context of which in the history of philosophy and science eyelids put and solved a complex problem of the attitude of our knowledge towards reality. The naive realism usually is understood as so-called natural installation of consciousness according to which the world is such what we see it, – the installation which is most of all coinciding with common sense, life experience and habitual expectations. It is possible to call the following and higher step of realism scientific realism: the science which is under construction on theoretical thinking doesn't trust common sense, is beyond empirical data, and allegedly gets into an essence of things, finding out as the world "actually" is arranged. However scientific theories and pictures of the world often are mutually contradicting, competing and change each other in the history of science owing to what the question of their relation at the objective world remains open. The last and highest step of realism is the philosophical realism which represents no other than scepticism. A methodological basis of research is the unity of etymological, logical and historical approaches, and also the principle of systemacity and some germenevtichesky receptions (in particular, interpretation and understanding). Also the method of historico-philosophical reconstruction which includes receptions primary (by consideration of sources) and secondary (at different attraction of literature on the studied subject) researches at selection of necessary material, methods of the immanent interpreting analysis (in the analysis of philosophical concepts of antique sceptics) and the komparativistsky analysis (when comparing epistemological ideas of the Hellenistic, or late ancient philosophy with modern concepts in the field of science philosophy) and a synthesis method as compounds of the interpreted material in new quality is used. Scepticism as the self-doubting doubt is a philosophical realism - the last and highest form of diskursivny realism after naive and scientific realism. One of essential differences of scepticism from traditional types and forms of philosophical thinking is that skeptical "the world picture" is essentially mobile and plastic, and, as a result, skeptical philosophical concepts usually don't lead to any certain results, but at the same time they are open for various points of view and therefore are alien randomly and unsubstantially, finally, to the adopted provisions, nothing "put outside brackets" thanks to what see correctness (as well as a wrongfulness) any philosophical idea owing to what scepticism is a search of truth, but not denial of possibility of its achievement as the skeptical philosophy is rather often interpreted. Antique scepticism made reopening of a question of the nature of truth and was original attempt of a reflection of theoretical knowledge, having in many respects anticipated modern not only epistemological, but also social and philosophical concepts.
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