Статья 'О двух подходах Дэвида Папино к феноменальным концептам' - журнал 'Философская мысль' - NotaBene.ru
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Philosophical Thought

On the Two Approaches to David 's Phenomenal Concepts

Pris' Igor'

Senior Researcher, Institute of Philosophy

220012, Belarus, g. Minsk, ul. Surganova, 1, of. 810

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In article evolution of views of David Papineau on phenomenal concepts is considered, and, in particular, two of its are in detail stated the main approach to them (Father's-2002, Father's-2006). The emphasis is placed on property of phenomenal concepts at the same time to mention and use phenomenal experience which is offered to be interpreted in the context of the vittgenshtaynovsky concept "uses" (language game). Within such interpretation the "used" phenomenal experience makes the contribution to the cognitive act. For Papineau, on the contrary, the experience associated with the use of phenomenal concepts allows to explain only existence of illusory intuition about a so-called explanatory failure in psychophysical identities, but in semantic and epistemological meanings is neutral. Similarity between phenomenal concepts and concepts perceptual, and also "similarity" between phenomenal concepts and phenomenal experience, is interpreted in the vittgenshtaynovskikh terms of family similarity. Approach Father's is compared to Ned Blok's approach. At both philosophers the solution of a so-called problem of an explanatory failure contains pragmatical measurement in psychophysical identities. In more general plan evolution of views Father's can be characterized as rapprochement with a pragmatism of vittgenshtaynovsky type which relieves of illusion of existence of an explanatory failure. "The minimum approach" Father's-2014 to concept of a phenomenal concept is limited to introduction of only one essential property of phenomenal concepts – their aprioristic independence of theoretical/scientific concepts that allows to relieve this concept of many standard objections. It is possible to agree with Father's-2014 that in effect, antimaterialistic arguments are based only on aposteriorny nature of psychophysical identities.

This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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