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Philosophical Thought
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About Kripke’s Skeptical Paradox and Wittgenstein Problem

Pris' Igor'

Senior Researcher, Institute of Philosophy

220012, Belarus, g. Minsk, ul. Surganova, 1, of. 810

frigpr@gmail.com
Другие публикации этого автора
 

 

DOI:

10.7256/2306-0174.2014.1.12096

Review date:

18-12-2013


Publish date:

1-1-2014


Abstract: The article analyzes Kripke’s skeptical paradox, that is the interpretation of the Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of following the rule applied to the addition operation. The paradox states that it is impossible to naturalize the sense and the problem of following a rule in the networks of a classical (non-normative) naturalism. It is suggested to view the problem from the point of view of Wittgenstein’s normative naturalism. The notion of a normative disposition is introduced. The article criticizes the solution of the paradox recently suggested by Ginzborg, particularly her naturalistic “middle way” between the dispositionalism and mentalism. Kripke’s paradox and Ginzborg’s approach are analyzed within the networks of the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s second philosophy which is understood as a normative naturalism of language games that are natural and spontaneous at the same time. It is also found that the paradox appears as a result of neglecting of pragmatics and normative measurements of the operations. Ginzborg’s approach is close to Wittgenstein’s normative naturalism but the notion of primitive normalization which she introduces is not satisfying. It is more correct to speak not about the naturalism with the minimum of normalization added (as Ginzborg does) but about the normative naturalism.


Keywords: Kripke’s skeptical paradox, the problem of following the rule, language game, normative naturalism, spontaneity, family likeness, implicit rule, sense, normative disposition, primitive normalization
This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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