Верификационизм в среднем Витгенштейне

DOI:

Received:

Published:

Abstract: In this article Loreti analyzse the concept of verificationism as it was presented by neopositivists and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The author of the article examines the versions of the verification principle in Carnap's and Schlick's works. The author notes that the main purpose of the Vienna Circle philosophers was to develop a criterion for demarking between sensible and senseless sentences, science and metaphysics. According to the author of the article, in the mid-period of his academic career Wittgenstein followed another version of verificationism according to which the meaning of a sentence was to be found empirically. The author of the article views Einstein's relativity theory and Brouwer's intuitionism as the sources for verificationism in middle Wittgenstein's researches. The author has applied the principle of objective textual analysis and tried to describe Wittgenstein's views and opinions through direct quotations of Wittgenstein. The author also provides quotations from works of such academicians as Schlick, Carnap, Russell and Hacker. Verificationism played an important role in Wittgenstein's philosophy, particularly in the mid-period of his philosophical writing. Wittgenstein's version of verificationism differs from the neopositivist formula. However, the teaching of verificationism brings us to even a greater philosophical issue. If we apply the veritification principle to all researches, historicans and scientists will have to only describe mere facts and data while non-application of verificationism will lead to empty and senseless statements taking into account that we have no criteria for using most of known terms both in our scientific and everyday language. That was the problem late Wittgenstein encountered and solved.