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Theoretical and Applied Economics
Reference:

Internal corporate control and CEOТs dual position

Kudin Larisa

Senior Educator, the department of Corporate Economics, Ural State University of Economics

620144, Russia, Sverdlovskaya oblast', g. Ekaterinburg, ul. 8 Marta, 62, of. 657a

larisakudin@yandex.ru

DOI:

10.25136/2409-8647.2020.3.33170

Review date:

05-06-2020


Publish date:

12-06-2020


Abstract.

The subject of this research is the relations emerging between the participants of corporate management and control, such as board of directors, CEO, and employees of the organization. Special attention is given to such relations with regards to administration of internal and external corporate control, as well as dual position of CEO as an object and subject of corporate control and management. The author systematizes the concepts of corporate control, as well as reveals the factors of internal corporate control. The participants of corporate management are viewed from the perspective of agent theory; the relations “agent – principal” are clarified from the position of CEO. The author’s special contribution into this research consists in simultaneous consideration of CEO as an agent and a principal in relations between the participants of corporate management and control. Balance between the roles of CEO in the corporation – as a subject and/or object determines his capacity to influence the assessment of the effectiveness of management. The conducted research systematizes the measures on reduction of opportunistic behavior between the agents of the described relations. The scientific novelty consist in acknowledgement of CEO’s dual position in the corporate management and control based on the analysis of his status as an agent and a principal.

Keywords: agent problem, principal, agent, corporate control, dual position, performance, CEO, corporate governance, object of corporate control, subject of corporate control
This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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