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Incomplete Contraction in Terms of Russian Specifics. Part 2. The Influence of Transactional Expenses and Credibility Gap
Tsurikov Vladimir Ivanovich

Professor, the department of Advanced Mathematics, Kostroma State Academy of Agriculture

156530, Russia, Kostroma Oblast, township of Karavaevo, Ucgebnyi Gorodok Street 34, office #211

tsurikov@inbox.ru
Другие публикации этого автора
 

 

Abstract.

The subject of the research is the influence of transactional expenses on agents' investment decisions, volume of aggregate profit and individual benefits. The author demonstrates that additional investments are necessary to overcome inefficient balance created as a result of agents' independent choice of investment volumes s well as to obtain additional benefits. Due to the fact that coordination of any kind results in transactional expenses, the author also analyzes the relation between coordination methods and associated profit and expense balances. The research method is the mathematical modelling. Within the framework of researching an incomplete contract model, the author carries out analysis and comparison of transactional expenses associated with coordination at hybrid and hierarchical forms of economic organisation. The author discovers conditiosn for achieving maximum benefit for both overly low and selectable levels of coordination expenses. The author also demonstrates that a hybrid form of organisation may have an excessively high level of coordination expenses when additional investments do not lead to the growth of aggregate profit. Thus, a high level of resources specificity or/and great volumes of investment combined with a low social capital may create a high level of coordination expenses which may act as an invincible obstacle on the way to overcoming an inefficient balance at hybrid organisations. Hierarchical organisations do not have such a level of coordination expenses. In this research the author has used the verbal method of describing results obtained through mathematical modelling.

Keywords: honesty, stimuli, trust, hierarchy, hybrid form of organisation, coordination expenses, opportunist behavior, specific investments, transactional expenses, incomplete contract

DOI:

10.7256/2409-8647.2017.1.21396

Article was received:

12-12-2016


Review date:

13-12-2016


Publish date:

15-04-2017


This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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