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Incomplete Contraction Under the Conditions of Russian Specific Features. Part 1. The Problems of Weak Protectability of Property Rights
Tsurikov Vladimir Ivanovich

Professor, the department of Advanced Mathematics, Kostroma State Academy of Agriculture

156530, Russia, Kostroma Oblast, township of Karavaevo, Ucgebnyi Gorodok Street 34, office #211

tsurikov@inbox.ru
Другие публикации этого автора
 

 

Abstract.

Object of research is influence of weak security of the property rights to investment decisions of agents and on the size of public wealth. In the conditions of insufficient security of the property rights and the contract law agents, in addition to investment into increase in a comprehensive income, perform additional investments into post-contractual redistribution of negotiation force. In article influence of need of private protection of the property rights or temptation for their redistribution in own favor at investment choice of agents and, respectively, at a size of cumulative usefulness is analyzed. The method of a research consists in mathematical modeling. Within model of the incomplete contract the analysis of behavior of partners in the modes reliably and unreliably protected property rights is carried out. In the conditions of poorly protected rights cases of limited and unrestricted resources which agents have are considered. It is shown that in both cases need of protection of the rights to a comprehensive income turns into decrease in incentives for investment into increase in the income that negatively affects the size of cumulative usefulness. In case of limited resources in respect of creation of additional value the agent yields more effective with other things being equal to less effective agent in that amount of investments which go to redistribution of the rights to the income. The advantage in poskontraktny redistribution of the rights is got by richer and/or less effective agents. The conclusion that less effective and richest owners can be interested in a situation in case of which the property rights and the contract law are protected insufficiently reliably is drawn. In article only the verbal method of a statement of the received results is used.

Keywords: bargaining power , Pareto efficiency, Nash equilibrium, stimuli, economic agent, opportunist behaviour , redistribution of rights, property rights, specific investments, incomplete contract

DOI:

10.7256/2409-8647.2016.3.19856

Article was received:

26-07-2016


Review date:

27-07-2016


Publish date:

16-01-2017


This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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