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Publications of Maximov Leonid Vladimirovich
Philosophical Thought, 2019-10
Maximov L.V. - On methodological dilemmas of theoretical ethics pp. 31-40

DOI:
10.25136/2409-8728.2019.10.31666

Abstract: This article reviews the three methodological dilemmas of theoretical ethics on the subject of determination and accentuation of their conceptual relatedness, intersection and complementarity. The detailed analytical procedure gradually permeated onto other dilemmas, potentially could simplify and systematized the historically established multifarious problematic of this area of knowledge, as well as contribute to more productive polemic of the proponents of various methodological approaches. The author’s selection of particular dilemmas is based on many years of experience of his work in the conceptual field of metaethics and analytical ethics; such experience demonstrated that dilemmas, formulated in the terms of “cognitivism – non-cognitivism”, “transcendentalism – naturalism”, and “psychologism – anti-psychologism”, together form a significant part of methodological basis of theoretical (not “normative”) ethics. A “thought experiment” on the subject of possible unification (or convergence) of some multifarious methodological ideas was conducted namely of the presented material. The content of these dilemmas and particular approaches is described in such way, that their connective attributes would be visible in the text itself. In conclusion, the author claims that “non-cognitivism”, “naturalism”, and “psychologism” (as separately taken parties of the indicated dilemmas), practically comprise the uniform complex of “related” approaches, alternative to the other complex, which included the rest of the designated positions. Thus, the three dilemmas, examined individually for the most part, could certainly yield to the one, “integral” dilemma, in the methodological discussions.
Philosophical Thought, 2018-12
Maximov L.V. - Moral duty: the problem of substantiation pp. 35-45

DOI:
10.25136/2409-8728.2018.12.28213

Abstract: In modern meta-ethical literature, the analysis of various approaches towards rational substantiation of morality is one of the leading research trends. If in ethical thought of the past, the object of substantiation was manly the “ethical law” as a peculiar (metaphysical) essence, in meta-ethics it usually means the substantiation of ethical paradigms of the actual subjects of morality, in other words, foregrounding the arguments that can convince a certain nominal skeptically inclined individual to accept and adhere to the norms of morality established by society. In particular, the author notes an inappropriate substitution of reasoning with explanation, moral duty – with other modalities that are formally signified by the same term. The article uses the methods of logical-linguistic analysis applicable to such ethical and meta-ethical discourses that represent the different versions of substantiation of moral duty. The work demonstrates that it is namely intention of the duty, rather than its specific subject vector is the determinant attribute of moral motivation (because the subject content of moral norms and motives can be the object of both, moral duty and immoral incitements). Therefore, the fundamental impossibility of rational substantiation of such intention should be considered the theoretical disputes that touch upon the general problems of substantiation of morality.  
Philosophical Thought, 2017-11
Maximov L.V. - Cognitive science: new life of the old paradigms pp. 11-24

DOI:
10.25136/2409-8728.2017.11.24657

Abstract: The subject of this research is the interrelated reductionist trends that are presents in the modern cognitive science (namely in branches of the philosophy of mind and psychology that are part of the interdisciplinary complex). These are the radical cognitivism – reduction of mental to cognitive (not considering the specificity of emotional-conative components of psyche); and physicalism – reduction of cognitive (interpreted as a synonym of mental) to neurophysiological processes, which in turn are assimilated to the information-calculating operation in computer. Cognitivism and physicalism are very old methodological paradigm (although received their names fairly recently); as a part of cognitive science they appeared in a somewhat new, modified form, not losing the reductionist orientation. Methodology of this work is the anti-reductionism, in other words, criticism of reductionism not as a supplementary (and fully justified in this function) method of scientific propaedeutics, but rather as inappropriate conceptual approach, fraught with grave mistakes in theory and its practical application. As demonstrated in the article, the initially established problematic of cognitive science alongside the formulated by it conceptual and terminological apparatus significantly contributed into the entrenchment of the indicated reductionist approaches it its research programs. Both of the paradigms have formed a unified, solid methodological cluster due to the common concept of “cognitive” interpreted in the cybernetic (theoretical-information) sense. If overcoming of the aforementioned types of reductionism was possible, it would require the substantial changes in the subject and methods of cognitive science.  
Philosophy and Culture, 2016-11
Maximov L.V. - Knowledge and values in the structure of humanitarian disciplines

DOI:
10.7256/2454-0757.2016.11.21062

Abstract: The subject of this research is the equivocal – simultaneously value and cognitive – status of humanitarian disciplines. Despite the obvious presence of the value component in composition of these disciplines (notably, presence not only as the object of cognition, but also as the scholar’s own value position), the are usually qualified in the philosophical-methodological literature as the branches of knowledge, specific sciences (compared with other sciences). The article gives a different interpretation of the structure and functions of humanitarian disciplines. It is demonstrated that in this field have practically established the two interrelated and formally inseparable, but in essence, discordant types of intellectual activity: alongside the humanitarian sciences, which describe and explain the realities of human existence, it is also the value-normative doctrines, which suggest and rationally substantiate certain life orientations of the people. The methodological foundation lies in the non-cognitivist approach that stands for the beyond cognition specificity of the value-normative phenomena of consciousness, as well as their profound irreducibility to knowledge. This approach formed in the last several decades as the alternative to the traditional cognitivist paradigm that interprets human mentality in general as the area exclusively of the knowledge and cognition. The important practical result of discrediting of the cognitivist paradigm consists in the radical retargeting of the methodology of ethical upbringing: rejection of the traditional “educational” orientation (according to which, the values are retransmitting through the transfer of “knowledge” of good, duty, etc.; in other words, by means of moral edifications) in favor of the more efficient methods of psychological and socio-deterministic impact upon the souls of the educates.
Philosophical Thought, 2014-11
Maximov L.V. - Reduction of Consciousness to Cognition as the Methodological Principle of Cognitive Science and Humanities pp. 32-71

DOI:
10.7256/2409-8728.2014.11.1377

Abstract: Object of research and the critical analysis in this article is the epistemological reductionism – the methodological approach defining the main contents and structure of cognitive science. The basis of this approach is made by idea, very widespread in philosophy of consciousness and psychology, that human mentality (spirit, mentality) in general and in all the manifestations can be reduced to knowledge and knowledge and is respectively described and explained in terms of an epistemologiya. In cognitive science the specified traditional approach changed a little, language of a classical epistemologiya gave way to a conceptual framework of the theory of information, however these changes left the general kognitivistsky interpretation of consciousness in inviolability. In article other methodological approach – a nonkognitivizm according to which the consciousness (spirit, mentality) includes a number of phenomena, essentially irreducible to knowledge is opposed to an epistemological reductionism of cognitive science; these are emotions, estimates, interests, the purposes, etc. Novelty of research consists that it allowed to reveal and theoretically to articulate characteristic for "sciences about spirit" a methodological mistake, namely – the unilateral cognitive and information approach to consciousness which is excessively simplifying its structure and by that considerably distorting results of scientific searches in this area. Correction of the specified methodological approach from a position of an anti-reductionism has to promote successful advance of science in the solution of a number of actual problems, in particular – an applied problem of "artificial intelligence", a psychophysical problem and some other.
Philosophy and Culture, 2012-11
Maximov L.V. -
Abstract:
Philosophy and Culture, 2011-11
Maximov L.V. -
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