DOI: 10.7256/2454-0706.2020.9.33997

Abstract: In my research, I propose to place new emphasis on known facts through the application of the Coase theorem, which justifies the choice in state regulation that carries less social costs. The Kousian theorem of social costs gained its fame by refuting the absolute necessity of prohibiting harmful activities in all cases where harm is established. It turns out that it is not always necessary to fight malicious activity, but only when the implementation of malicious activity will entail costs for the whole society higher than those that society would have if this malicious activity were stopped. Coase's theorem is particularly applicable to the problem of environmental pollution, in which everything is complex and interdependent, and government regulation is associated with uncertainty about the consequences of its implementation due to the lack of complete and reliable information about all possible social costs. Based on the study of theoretical works on political economy and content analysis of international and national documents adopted to combat climate change, I come to the conclusion that the context of taking measures on greenhouse regulation plays a determinant role in their choice: hypothetical risks of global warming and real risks of decarbonization of the economy make rescue efforts incompatible. the planet and maintaining the well-being of citizens for those countries whose budgets depend on oil and gas. The context of national institutional development dictates the choice, and it is obvious – either sheep or wolves. It is impossible to decarbonize production at the level of interstate cooperation without reducing the availability of consumption at the national level.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0706.2020.9.43392

Abstract: In my research, I propose to place new emphasis on known facts through the application of the Coase theorem, which justifies the choice in state regulation that carries less social costs. The Kousian theorem of social costs gained its fame by refuting the absolute necessity of prohibiting harmful activities in all cases where harm is established. It turns out that it is not always necessary to fight malicious activity, but only when the implementation of malicious activity will entail costs for the whole society higher than those that society would have if this malicious activity were stopped. Coase's theorem is particularly applicable to the problem of environmental pollution, in which everything is complex and interdependent, and government regulation is associated with uncertainty about the consequences of its implementation due to the lack of complete and reliable information about all possible social costs. Based on the study of theoretical works on political economy and content analysis of international and national documents adopted to combat climate change, I come to the conclusion that the context of taking measures on greenhouse regulation plays a determinant role in their choice: hypothetical risks of global warming and real risks of decarbonization of the economy make rescue efforts incompatible. the planet and maintaining the well-being of citizens for those countries whose budgets depend on oil and gas. The context of national institutional development dictates the choice, and it is obvious – either sheep or wolves. It is impossible to decarbonize production at the level of interstate cooperation without reducing the availability of consumption at the national level.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0633.2016.4.21112

Abstract: This article presents the analysis of subsidiarity as the principle containing the dual – political and legal nature. Thus, special attention is given to the questions of judicial and political control over compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in EU legislative activity regarding the questions that are not referred to as of its explicit competence, and primarily, the topic its joint competence with the member-states. In the first part of the article, the author analyzed the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the case on violation of the principle of subsidiarity by the supranational institutions. In the second part, the author examines the practice of application of the principle of subsidiarity in the EU legislative process within the framework of the so-called subsidiary control mechanism and its procedures of the “yellow” and “orange” cards, initiated by the EU member-states national parliaments. The scientific novelty consists in the position that the principle of subsidiarity is being viewed in the context of EU legislative activity not only from the perspective of political means aimed at protection of the national legislative prerogatives, but also from the perspective of legal limitation of realization of the supranational regulatory prerogatives, possessing jurisdictional power. The article assesses the efficiency of the work of subsidiarity as political (through the subsidiary control mechanism), as well as legal (through the court case hearing) principle. The author expresses an opinion on possibility of implementation of the principle of subsidiarity as the principle that limits the realization of supranational regulatory prerogative in Russia, where the problem of excessiveness activeness of the federal legislator in regulation of the questions of joint competence does not lose its relevance since 2000’s.