DOI: 10.25136/2409-8728.2018.12.28407

Abstract: This article explores the establishment of German phenomenology as a collective research program.  The author carefully examines the role of Max Scheler in establishment of publishing program of phenomenologists: his efforts in popularization of phenomenology and response to the critics of phenomenology. It is also demonstrate that articulation by the editors of yearbook of the most general objectives of the publisher practically aligns with the tasks formulate back in 1907 by one of the mentors of Edmund Husserl – Carl Stumpf: it is necessary to create world of ideas, capable of encompassing the sciences on nature and spirits, which by the “power of conviction”, will subordinate the wide variety of scholars. The scientific novelty lies in the analysis of publications of the first periodical that united the researchers of Göttingen and Munich, “Yearbook on the Philosophy and Phenomenological Studies”. The author demonstrates that the aforementioned formulations anticipate both, Husserl’s idea of the regional ontologies, as well as the reflected in the “Philosophy as a Strict Science” (1911) representation on the role of philosophy in culture. Since the first years of its existences, the “Yearbook” becomes an important branch of the forming academic community, and quite rapidly turns into the battlefield for influence.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2018.12.28481

Abstract: This article gives a brief characteristic to the philosophical evolution of Max Scheler in the “pre-phenomenological” period of his works; describes the circumstances of his philosophical encounter with Edmund Husserl. The scientific novelty of the conducted analysis lies in determination of the fundamental parameters of Scheler’s comprehension of phenomenology: as a “contact with the world”, as ontology. The author explains the reasons of Scheler’s negative attitude towards the theory of cognition and elucidation of the “criteria” of cognitive activity; demonstrates the boundaries of applicability of the phenomenological reduction according to Scheler: human personality. In Scheler’s works reduction can also be interpreted as a religious practice, type of asceticism, or in general, as moral behavior. The author uses the methods and methodology of historical-philosophical reconstruction, conceptual analysis, approach from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge. Initially, leaning on the tradition of Neo-Kantianism and philosophy of life, Max Scheler, getting with the phenomenology of Husserl, positively perceives the idea of eidetic reduction (the study of essence), partially agrees with the phenomenological reduction (uses it only as a getting away from the factual particularity of the phenomenon under consideration), and adamantly refuses to accept the idea of the absolute consciousness.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2018.11.28380

Abstract: This article demonstrates that the fundamental approaches, which are currently suggested for determining the phenomenology and unity alongside standing behind the “phenomenological movement” unity, are not satisfactory: they either do not reflect the actual common thematic or methodological features inherent to each of the thinkers included into the “movement”, or appear as general and trivial principles that guide the philosophy regardless of its affiliation to one or another school. It is revealed that all this “attributes” of phenomenology can equally be acknowledged as the characteristics of other philosophical movements or are insignificant with regards to the phenomenological method. The author underlines that the aforementioned ambiguity of phenomenology smoothly conjoins and partially supported by persuasion in the distinctness of this tradition as a scientific method and its ability to manifest as one of the methodologies of scientific cognition. The scientific novelty consists in stressing the need for development of alternate approaches to phenomenological movement.

DOI: 10.7256/2409-8728.2016.5.18562

Abstract: The subject of this research is the causes of “convergence” of the modern methods of philosophical analysis, which in classical phenomenology (Husserl) were considered incompatible, but turned into a stable program in the works of Husserl’s followers (Heidegger, Ricœur). In the first part of the article the author distinguishes the major milestones in the development of the theory of explanation and interpretation that led hermeneutics from texts to interpretation of human being. By clarifying the ontological meaning in Heidegger's philosophy, the author, basing on the general orientations of phenomenology, demonstrates what caused the necessity to combine the phenomenological and hermeneutic methods. The following conclusions are made: In the works of Heidegger and Ricœur the definition of “hermeneutic phenomenology” has two clearly distinct meanings: a) method used for formation of the foundations of scientific knowledge; this method radicalizes the notion of prerequisitness of science by turning to human existence which already contains an explanation, “clarity” of the world (Heidegger); b) method that our cognition of the world has its prerequisites and historicity, as well as language substantiation (Ricœur). It is determined that these two methods also have several significant differences: precisely the “method” is the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger; every step of philosophical study is simultaneously phenomenological and hermeneutical. Ricœur, under his hermeneutic phenomenology, means a rather general philosophical approach, which alternatively applies phenomenological and hermeneutical methodology, as well as allows structuralistic and psychoanalytical techniques, or analysis from the position of common language.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2016.4.18527

Abstract: The article deals with transformations that took place in the German phenomenology in the first decades of the XX Century and were stimulated by a discontinuity of the phenomenological idea of strict science and the growing popularity of anthropology and biology. The author focuses on the differences in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological approaches and on the internal situation in the phenomenological community, which required thematic specialization of phenomenological research, commitment to a single theoretical paradigm and institutional reinforcement after Husserl’s retirement from Freiburg. The paper uses methods of historical and conceptual analysis along with an approach from the side of sociology of knowledge. It is shown that Husserl views anthropology in the light of his earlier relativism and psychologism critique. However, Husserl fails to distinguish between “anthropology”, “philosophy of life” and “existential philosophy” and does not find any new philosophical arguments against these new forms of philosophizing. The article also shows that Husserl and Heidegger are basing themselves on different understanding of what is "initial grounds” for the philosophical research: ontology, strict science, or the doctrine about humans.