DOI: 10.25136/2409-8728.2021.7.36042

Abstract: This article analyzes the modern American pragmatism as “uniform in its diversity” movement of the philosophical thought. The author reveals the differences between neopragmatism and classical pragmatism, the key of which consists in transformation of representation of the American philosophers on the specificity of their discipline, purpose of philosophy, and its role within the system of sciences. The classics, such as C. S. Peirce, J. Dewey, C. I. Lewis, referring to instrumental success and practical orientation of natural science, viewed the contemporary to them technoscience as a model for the philosophical research, while the neopragmatists rely on the cultural studies and hermeneutics. The problems of substantiation of knowledge, verification, logical analysis, scientific experimental proof/disproof of hypotheses, which drew the interest of the classics of pragmatism, are being replaced with the problematic of dialogue, interpretation, and social communication. The associated with it “communological trend” of neopragmatism found drastic reflection in ethnocentrism of R. Rorty. The author highlights the characteristic features and trends in the development of nonclassical pragmatism in the United States and Europe, as well as assesses its current state is assessed. prospects. The conclusion is made on the substantial heuristic potential of pragmatist tradition and possibilities of its effective convergence with other philosophical trends and schools: as “method of settling disputes” (W. James), neopragmatism considering the demand for its ideas and growing popularity among the European philosophers, can make certain contribution to the convergence and mutual enrichment of the Anglo-American analytical and continental philosophy, as well as overcoming the schism between the two intellectual traditions.

DOI: 10.25136/2409-8728.2020.11.34207

Abstract: This article examines the key provisions of philosophical concept of the American pragmatist, representative of Pittsburgh School Robert Brandom, described in the commentaries to Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” (published in separate volume in 2019). It is demonstrated that rational reconstruction of Hegel's philosophy's conducted by Brandom was intended to revive the legacy of the classic, taking into account peculiarities and trends of development of the modern analytical philosophy. The specificity of Hegelian approach towards the analysis of experience of human consciousness, Brandom traces in “hypostasization of the conceptual” and gradual separation from all kinds of idealistic antirealist doctrines that contrapose being-for-consciousness-in-itself to being of things and “disengage” the subject of cognition from objects of the world. Brandom claims that reality itself, things in themselves, is conceptually articulated, and thus cognizable. The author reveals the theoretical-methodological difference between Hegel's interpretation of normativity (“recognitive model”) and Kant's subjectivist approach: according to Kant, institutionalization of the normative status is exhausted by the gesture of accepting such as an autonomous subject; in Hegel’s opinion, the essential condition for founding the status is, as interpreted by Brandom, socio-communicative mediation (“assignment” of status to the subject by his interlocutors, as well as recognition of his assertions by interagents and audience). The article reviews Brandom's arguments against the reduction of Hegelian master – slave dialectic to the inner conflict of individual self-consciousness (position of J. McDowell). The conclusion is made that “re-description” of Hegel conducted by the American philosopher is of radically anachronistic nature, and sheds light on the views of author of the commentaries (primarily his semantic pragmatism and holism), but not on the content of work he provides commentaries to.

DOI: 10.25136/2409-8728.2019.4.29938

Abstract: On the example of “ethnocentrism” of R. Rorty, this article analyzes one of the most controversial and discussible in the modern philosophical literature versions of deflationary solution of the problem of truth and rational substantiation of knowledge. Opposing the metaphysical hypostatization of truth, considering it a ”mere concept”, the American philosopher, nevertheless, concedes the possibility of using the predicate of truth in the negatively-limited, fallibilistic meaning – as a cautionary reference to the future plausible refutation. Analysis of the concept alongside the discussions unfolding around it, allow concluding that in the question about truth, Rorty does not move far beyond from the pragmatism of C. S. Pierce, as he thinks he does. Virtually, in his gnoseology Rorty leans on Pierce’s theory of truth as a “final faith of scientific community; he does not decline transensus, a transition from “worse”, less substantiated and valid knowledge to the “better”, more substantiated and valid. From the perspective of common (scientific, philosophical, political, moral, etc.) sense, which may imply only one thing – approaching the objective truth.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2014.1.10343

Abstract: