DOI: 10.7256/2409-8728.2017.2.21743

Abstract:   The object of this research is the modern analytical philosophy, while the subject is the resolution of question of mental causation in biological naturalism of the analytical philosopher John Searle. The author examines the key aspects of the theory of biological naturalism and analyzes their internal compatibility. Special attention is given to the main arguments and analogies, provided by J. Searle as the substantiation of possibility of mental causation. During the course of this work, the author determines the strongest and weakest aspects in the position of American philosopher, as well as suggests the ways to resolve the question of mental causation. The article presents a research in the area of history of the modern analytical philosophy, thus the key method of research is the historical-philosophical. The author uses textological analysis of the philosophical works, particularly of J. Searle, as well as conducts reconstruction of his views. The problem of mental causation is one of the key subjects of the research in modern analytical philosophy, it consists in the attempt to explain the possibility of causal efficiency of metal properties within the framework of naturalistic perception of the world. The biological naturalism of John Searle serves as one of the resolutions of this issue. This solution combines the theses on the ontological non-reduction of mental states, mental causation, and causation of closeness of the physical world. Searle attempts to naturalize consciousness, demonstrating that the mental causation is similar to the causation of high-level characteristics. The author pursues correlation between this analogy and the main theses of Searle. The scientific novelty lies in determination of the internal controversies in resolution of the issues of mental causation of J. Searle. The author believes that the more promising resolution of the problem of mental causation is particularly the teleological functionalism of Daniel Dennett.    

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2017.1.21669

Abstract: The object of the research of this article is the modern philosophical discourse on the problem of identity of personality. The subject of the study is the substantial approach of R. Swinburne and his place in this discourse. The author analyzes R. Swinburne's approach and, in particular, its main advantages – the ability to solve the problem of personality reduplication. However, as the author of the article shows, the substantive approach itself is not devoid of vulnerabilities. First of all, he is vulnerable to criticism using the verification principle. Swinburne believes that his approach is not consistent only with a strong version of the verification principle. However, as the author of this article shows, even a weak version of the verification principle is a problem for Swinburne's substantive approach. The author presents his own alternative to the substantial approach for overcoming the reduplication argument and interpreting hypothetical situations associated with it. Such an alternative is the perdurant theory of personality. The article presents a study in the field of the history of modern analytical philosophy. Therefore, the key research method used is historical and philosophical. In particular, the study used a textual analysis of the works of philosophers, first of all, R. Swinburne, according to several sources, a reconstruction of his views was carried out. The article also uses the method of comparative analysis, in particular, a comparison of empiricist approaches and a substantive approach to the problem of identity of personality is made. The article is devoted to the substantial concept of identity of R. Swinburne's personality. Despite the fact that this concept represents an important alternative to solving the problem of identity, it has not been studied much, especially in the Russian history of philosophy. The novelty of the article also lies in a detailed analysis of the verification counterargument in relation to the substantive approach. The author of the article also presents his own alternative to the substantial approach, which allows overcoming the indicated difficulties. As a result of the research, the author comes to the conclusion that the substantial approach only partially solves the problem of asynchronous identity of personality, and is most vulnerable to criticism with the help of the verification argument.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2015.6.15091

Abstract: The subject under research of the present article is the problem of free will. The author of the article presents a critical review of one of the most important modern arguments against compatibilism in the free will debate, Derk Pereboom's 'Manipulation Argument'. The Manipulation Argument is built upon the analogy between external manipulation of the agent's actions and causal determination. Based on that analogy, Pereboom concludes that agents who act in a situation of causal determination do not feel moral responsibility. The author of the present article suggests that we should extend the borders of Pereboom's mental experiment. In the course of his research the author comes to the conclusion that the Manipulation Argument does not prove the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. In the author's opinion, Pereboom's argument only proves that moral responsiblity requires an integrated personality and sequential personal history. The method of the present research is the conceptual analysis mostly used in analytical philosophy. The author also conducts mental experiments to illustrate and prove his point of view. The main conclusion of the present research is the author's proof of the failure of Peterboom's manipulation argument. The author of the article shows that the manipulation argument does not prove the statement that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. According to the author, Pereboom's argument only proves that moral responsiblity requires an integrated personality and sequential personal history.