DOI: 10.7256/2409-8728.2017.2.21743

Abstract:   The object of this research is the modern analytical philosophy, while the subject is the resolution of question of mental causation in biological naturalism of the analytical philosopher John Searle. The author examines the key aspects of the theory of biological naturalism and analyzes their internal compatibility. Special attention is given to the main arguments and analogies, provided by J. Searle as the substantiation of possibility of mental causation. During the course of this work, the author determines the strongest and weakest aspects in the position of American philosopher, as well as suggests the ways to resolve the question of mental causation. The article presents a research in the area of history of the modern analytical philosophy, thus the key method of research is the historical-philosophical. The author uses textological analysis of the philosophical works, particularly of J. Searle, as well as conducts reconstruction of his views. The problem of mental causation is one of the key subjects of the research in modern analytical philosophy, it consists in the attempt to explain the possibility of causal efficiency of metal properties within the framework of naturalistic perception of the world. The biological naturalism of John Searle serves as one of the resolutions of this issue. This solution combines the theses on the ontological non-reduction of mental states, mental causation, and causation of closeness of the physical world. Searle attempts to naturalize consciousness, demonstrating that the mental causation is similar to the causation of high-level characteristics. The author pursues correlation between this analogy and the main theses of Searle. The scientific novelty lies in determination of the internal controversies in resolution of the issues of mental causation of J. Searle. The author believes that the more promising resolution of the problem of mental causation is particularly the teleological functionalism of Daniel Dennett.    

DOI: 10.7256/2409-8728.2017.2.21921

Abstract: The problem of sameness of identity within the modern analytical philosophy consists of two aspects: question about identification, and question about re-identification. However, such approach faces the problem of reduplication, which is determined by the modern philosophers B. Williams and D. Parfit in conceptual experiments “Guy Fawkes” and “Teleportation”. In the author’s opinion, there are three main ways of overcoming the problem of reduplication: criticism of conceptual experiments; additional criterion of the absence of duplicates; and four-dimensional model of identity. It is demonstrated that the first two ways lead to substantial difficulties for the psychological theory of the sameness of identity. The conclusion is made that namely the third ways is the most promising for the psychological theories. The object of this work is the problem of sameness of identity within the modern analytical philosophy, particularly the question of re-identification of personality in various moments of time. The subject of this work consists in psychological approach towards the aforementioned issue. According to this approach, one personality is identical to personality in different time, if there is a psychological succession between them. The scientific novelty consists in the author’s proposition on the introduction of the four-dimensional concept of personality. Despite the fact that the psychological approach is the most widespread in modern analytical philosophy, at the present stage there are very few works dedicated to the analysis of this theory. Moreover, there are no special research regarding the ways of overcoming the problem of reduplication from the perspective of the supporters of psychological approach.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2015.6.15091

Abstract: The subject under research of the present article is the problem of free will. The author of the article presents a critical review of one of the most important modern arguments against compatibilism in the free will debate, Derk Pereboom's 'Manipulation Argument'. The Manipulation Argument is built upon the analogy between external manipulation of the agent's actions and causal determination. Based on that analogy, Pereboom concludes that agents who act in a situation of causal determination do not feel moral responsibility. The author of the present article suggests that we should extend the borders of Pereboom's mental experiment. In the course of his research the author comes to the conclusion that the Manipulation Argument does not prove the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. In the author's opinion, Pereboom's argument only proves that moral responsiblity requires an integrated personality and sequential personal history. The method of the present research is the conceptual analysis mostly used in analytical philosophy. The author also conducts mental experiments to illustrate and prove his point of view. The main conclusion of the present research is the author's proof of the failure of Peterboom's manipulation argument. The author of the article shows that the manipulation argument does not prove the statement that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. According to the author, Pereboom's argument only proves that moral responsiblity requires an integrated personality and sequential personal history.